In Tatum v. Oberg; UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT;2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 82208;September 3, 2009 we see a spirited discussion of the overlap between fraud claims and negligence, as well as a discussion of the overlap between breach of contact claims and negligence.  It is a 2d Circuit case decided on Connecticut law, but the basic premises are similar.

"Oberg and FOMH first move to dismiss Tatum’s fraud claim. Under Connecticut law, a fraud claim is established if "(1) a false representation was made as a statement of fact; (2) the statement was untrue and known to be so by its maker; (3) the statement was made with the intent of inducing reliance thereon; and (4) the other party relied on the statement to his detriment." Weinstein v. Weinstein, 275 Conn. 671, 685, 882 A.2d 53 (Conn. 2005). In this case, Tatum alleges that Oberg and FOMH committed fraud because Oberg made numerous false statements of fact related to Tatum’s dissolution action (see, supra section II); Oberg knew such statements to be untrue; Oberg intended to induce Tatum to rely [*9] on her statements; and Tatum relied on Oberg’s statements to his detriment. ""It is also worth noting that Tatum does not specify facts in support of his assertion that Oberg knew her allegedly fraudulent statements to be false and made them for the purpose of inducing Tatum to rely on them. While Rule 9(b) states that the scienter element of fraud "may be alleged generally," pleadings with respect to scienter must still comply with the requirements of Rule 8(a)(2). See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 1954, 173 L. Ed. 2d 868 (2009). As the Supreme Court has held, a pleading offering [*11] merely "labels and conclusions" or "a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action" is insufficient to satisfy Rule 8(a)(2). Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. In this case, Tatum’s Amended Complaint contains merely a bare-bones assertion of scienter. It alleges no "facts that give rise to a strong inference of fraudulent intent," as is required by the law of this Circuit. Shields v. Citytrust Bancorp, Inc., 25 F.3d 1124, 1128 (2d Cir. 1994).
 

"Under Connecticut law, the elements of a breach of contract are "the formation of an agreement, performance by one party, breach of the agreement by the other party and damages." Rosato v. Mascardo, 82 Conn. App. 396, 411, 844 A.2d 893 (Conn. App. Ct. 2004) (quoting Bouchard v. Sundberg, 80 Conn. App. 180, 189, 834 A.2d 744 (Conn. App. Ct. 2003)). In general, a client may sue his or her attorney for either breach of contract, negligence or both. Conn. Educ. Ass’n, Inc. v. Milliman USA, Inc., 105 Conn. App. 446, 458, 938 A.2d 1249 (Conn. App. Ct. 2008). See also Mac’s Car City, Inc. v. DeNigris, 18 Conn. App. 525, 529-30, 559 A.2d 712 (Conn. App. Ct. 1989). The court must dismiss a claim for breach of contract, however, if the claim is in fact "a claim that one has breached a standard of care in the language of contract." Caffery v. Stillman, 79 Conn. App. 192, 197, 829 A.2d 881 (Conn. Ct. App. 2003). See also Gazo v. City of Stamford, 255 Conn. 245, 263, 765 A.2d 505 (Conn. 2001) [*13] ("[W]e look beyond the language used in the complaint to determine what the plaintiff really seeks. . . . [P]utting a contract tag on a tort claim will not change its essential character.").

Tatum’s breach of contract and malpractice claims are based largely on the same underlying facts. The only difference in this respect is that the malpractice claim, but not the breach of contract claim, rests in part on allegations that Oberg and FOMH "[c]onceal[ed] discovery and/or fail[ed] to obtain discovery that would have alerted Plaintiff to their failure to comply with the standard of care," and "[f]ail[ed] to respond to Plaintiff’s request regarding the manner in which the case proceeded." Am. Comp. P 19(f)-19(g). 3 Despite similar factual underpinnings, Tatum asserts that his breach of contract claim derives from Oberg and FOMH’s "contractual duty to provide timely and correct legal advice to Plaintiff," and that his malpractice claim derives from the defendants’ "duty to provide Plaintiff with professional services equal to the degree of skill and learning commonly applied under the circumstances then and there existing by a prudent member of the legal profession." Am. Comp. PP 18, 18.

"

In Felt v. Van Alstyne we see an interesting real estate-legal malpractice case, one which is, unfortunately, no so uncommon.  Plaintiff owns 51 acres of property in Greene County and wants to sell a portion, 6.1 acres.  The balance of 45 acres or so, which is unimproved, is to be sub-divided and kept.  Defendant attorney is hired to do the closing.

What is a closing?  It is the sale transaction, and the attorney for a party is supposed to make sure that the transaction actually follows the intent of the parties.  Here everything went wrong.  Now, plaintiff, who has sued the buyers in a separate action, must sue the attorney and the title closing company over this mistake:  the deed did not have a description of the premises to be sold attached to it.  Imagine that, the deed simply recited all 51 acres, when in fact only 6 acres were to be sold.

The defense?  That’s how it’s done here!    The lesson to be taken from this case, is that when plaintiff moves for summary judgment, and includes the affidavit of an expert, defendant better have one too.  The affidavit of co-defendant was simply not enough.  Result?  Plaintiff is granted partial summary judgment with the damages to await the outcome of another trial, presumably against the buyer.

 

In law, sometimes a single case decision opens the flood gates.   This is an oft-heard argument, with a rarely seen result, yet in legal malpractice the Ulico v. Wilson Elser, 56 AD3d 1 (1st Dept, 2008) case seems to have accomplished the re-awakening of "breach of fiduciary duty."

As an example, see Colucci v. Arisohn, 2009 NY Slip Op 32053(U).  There the claim was that plaintiff had been involved in a medical billing scheme which went into the 70+ million range, and involved Beth Israel Hospital.  He hired attorneys who at the same time were representing another plaintiff in a qui tam whistle blower action.  The plaintiff [relator] in such a case may reap a significant reward, and here, a Mr. Perez did.

Colucci ended up pleading guilty to Grand Larceny and settling a civil suit as a defendant.  He felt that his own qui tam information was taken from him by the attorneys and used in the Perez case, all to the attorney’s benefit.

The interesting aspect of this case is that the legal malpractice case was dismissed on the basis that a criminal defendant who cannot demonstrate actual innocence may not sue for legal malpractice.  Plaintiff’s Judiciary Law section 487 case was dismissed as too similar to the legal malpractice case.

The Breach of fiduciary duty matter, however, remains vital, and in the case.  Based upon Ulico the court held:

"The attorney-client relationship imposes on the attorney `the duty to deal fairly, honestly and with undivided loyalty…including maintaining confidentiality, operating competently, safeguarding client property and honoring the client’s interests over the lawyers [Matter of Cooperman, 83 NY2d 465 (1994).  Thus any act of disloyalty by counsel will also comprise a breach of the fiduciary duty owed to the client."

"The Labaton Defendants argue that plaintiff’s breach of fiduciary duty-based claims (as well as fraud, usurpation of economic opportunity and unjust enrichment claims) should be dismissed because they are duplicitive of plaintiff’s malpractice claims.  This argument is rejected."

When practitioners in Legal Malpractice stay in the area long enough, older cases they handled come back to save or haunt them.  A prime example is DeNatale v Santangelo ;  2009 NY Slip Op 06398 ;  Decided on September 8, 2009 ;  Appellate Division, Second Department .  Here the defendant law firm wins dismissal based upon a now well known case.  In that case, defendant attorney lost the motion and the appeal, here, based on the same law, defendant attorney wins. 
 

The case in common is Barnett v Schwartz ;2007 NY Slip Op 09712 [47 AD3d 197] .  Important language there:  "The elements to be proved in a legal malpractice action have been subjected to various formulations. Thus, while it is clear that a plaintiff-client must prove negligence (i.e., that the defendant-attorney failed to exercise that degree of care, skill, and diligence commonly possessed and exercised by members of the legal community), some cases hold that the negligence must be "the" proximate cause of damages (Britt v Legal Aid Socy., 95 NY2d 443, 446 [2000]; see e.g. Kleeman v Rheingold, 81 NY2d 270 [1993]; Caruso, Caruso & Branda, P.C. v Hirsch, 41 AD3d 407 [2007]; Cohen v Wallace & Minchenberg, 39 AD3d 691 [2007]; Cummings v Donovan, 36 AD3d 648 [2007]; Kotzian v McCarthy, 36 AD3d 863 [2007]), while others hold that it must be "a" proximate cause of damages (Bauza v Livington, 40 AD3d 791, 793 [2007]; see e.g. Moran v McCarthy, Safrath & Carbone, P.C., 31 AD3d 725 [2006]; Terio v Spodek, 25 AD3d 781 [2006]; Pistilli v Gandin, 10 AD3d 353 [2004]). There are also cases from this Court requiring the damages to be a "direct result" of the negligence (Caruso, Caruso & Branda, P.C. v Hirsch, 41 AD3d 407, 409 [2007]; Kotzian v McCarthy, 36 AD3d 863 [2007]; Moran v McCarthy, Safrath & Carbone, P.C., 31 AD3d 725 [2006]). In the main, the cases from the Court of Appeals, including the most recent, do not expressly require that the negligence be either "the" or "a" proximate cause of damages, but require proof that, "but for" the negligence of the defendant-attorney, the plaintiff-client would have prevailed in the underlying action (in a classic lawsuit-within-a-lawsuit scenario) or would not have incurred damages (in an action alleging negligent advice, etc.) (see e.g. Leder v Spiegel, 9 NY3d 836 [2007]; Rudolf v Shayne, Dachs, Stanisci, Corker & Sauer, 8 NY3d 438 [2007]; AmBase Corp. v Davis Polk & Wardwell, 8 NY3d 428 [2007]; Davis v Klein, 88 NY2d 1008 [1996]; Carmel v Lunney, 70 NY2d 169 [1987]). The defendants here, while not expressly describing the difference between proximate and "but for" causation, argue that the latter requires a greater, more direct degree of causation. However, we find no substantive{**47 AD3d at 204} import to the variations in the formulations discussed above, and hold that a plaintiff-client in a legal malpractice action need prove only that the defendant-attorney’s negligence was a proximate cause of damages. "

"Moreover, our reading of the case law does not reveal that a heightened standard for causation is actually being applied in legal malpractice cases. Rather, all results can be explained by application of general principles of proximate cause.""In sum, regardless of the formulation employed, a plaintiff in a legal malpractice action need prove only that the defendant-attorney’s negligence was a proximate cause of damages. "

 

Continuing from yesterday, what is the relationship between legal malpractice litigation and breach of fiduciary duty?  One reflexive answer is that the broad category of legal malpractice litigation, which requires a demonstration of deviation, proximate cause, "but for" causation and damages contains breach of fiduciary duty as a subset.  Often, alternative claims of breach of fiduciary duty are routinely dismissed as included in , or "coextensive" with the legal malpractice claims.

In one species of breach of fiduciary duty area, there is divergence.  Here, plaintiff seeks disgorgement or reimbursement of legal fees paid to the attorney on the theory that there was a fiduciary duty between attorney an client and there was a breach of that duty.  No proof of damages is offered, and none is alleged.  Plaintiff simply wants his fees returned.  Is this proper?

Here is Judge Sweet’s reasoning from KIRK , -against-  HEPPT, ESQ., 05 Civ. 9977;UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK;2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 80989;September 1, 2009,

"in order to prevail on a cause of action for breach of fiduciary duty in New York, a plaintiff must prove only two elements: (1) the existence of a fiduciary duty between the parties and (2) the breach of that duty by defendant. See January 9, 2008 Opinion at 592. In holding that the Kirks were not required to allege causation, the Court relied on cases from this District, see Official Comm. of Asbestos Claimants of G-l Holding, Inc. v. Heyman, 277 B.R. 20, 37 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) ("Under New York law, the elements of a claim for breach of fiduciary duty are (1) existence of fiduciary relationship and (2) breach of a fiduciary duty."); Schweizer v. Mulvehill, 93 F. Supp. 2d 376, 401 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) ("[A] breach of fiduciary duty may give rise to liability in the absence of damages."), as well as a New York Supreme Court case, Ulico Cas. Co. v. Wilson, Elser, Moskowitz, Edelman & Dicker, et al., 843 N.Y.S.2d 749 (Sup. Ct. 2007).

In Ulico, the New York Supreme Court, New York County, held that unless a legal malpractice claim and a breach of fiduciary duty claim are [*34] "co-extensive," "no proof of damages is required where the remedy that is sought for the breach is forfeiture of compensation." Id. The First Department recently addressed the lower court’s application of that "considerably lower standard of recovery" in the breach of fiduciary duty context, clarifying "that to recover under a claim for damages against an attorney arising out of the breach of the attorney’s fiduciary duty, the plaintiff must establish the ‘but for’ element of malpractice, irrespective of how the claim is denominated in the complaint." Ulico Cas. Co. v. Wilson, Elser, Mosokowitz, Edelman & Dicker, 865 N.Y.S.2d 14, 22 (App. Div. 2008) .
 

Sometimes a court’s decision will simply tell how the case came out.  Sometimes a decision can teach a lesson; in this case one decision teaches several lessons in Legal Malpractice.  KIRK , -against-  HEPPT,   05 Civ. 9977;UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK;2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 80989;September 1, 2009, Decided
by Judge Sweet is one such case. We will look at this case today and tomorrow.

"The Kirks, pro se, filed their complaint against Heppt, Kirk’s former attorney, on November 28, 2005, alleging claims for, inter alia, breach of contract, fraudulent misrepresentation, and breach of fiduciary duty arising out of Heppt’s representation of Kirk in an action brought by Kirk against his former employer. On October 2, 2003, Kirk filed suit against Schindler in New York State Supreme Court, New York County, asserting causes of action for breach of contract and defamation and seeking a declaratory judgment that Kirk had been constructively discharged by Schindler.

In November 2003, Schindler removed the state court action to federal court on the ground that Kirk’s breach of contract claim was preempted by ERISA. At the time, Heppt believed that proceeding in federal court offered certain advantages, namely that the fast pace of litigation there would make it more likely [*9] that Schindler would enter into settlement negotiations."

Issue:  May an attorney hire a contract attorney to work on the case, and bill rates for that contract attorney in excess of the contract attorneys pay?

In January 2004, Heppt hired a contract attorney, Elizabeth Hill ("Hill"), to assist him with Kirk’s case. Hill’s time was listed on Heppt’s invoices beginning with an invoice dated January 31, 2004, identifiable by the use of her initials in the "lawyer" column. According to the Kirks, they did not know that Heppt had been charging them for Hill’s time beginning [*15] in January and dispute that Hill’s time was readily identifiable. According to the Kirks, Heppt did not obtain their consent to Hill’s participation until three months after she began working on the case. The Kirks further allege that they never formally agreed to pay Heppt for Hill’s services.According to the Kirks, Heppt "grossly overcharged" them for Hill’s work and charged for work performed by Hill for which she was not paid by Heppt."
"The Kirks make the following allegations with respect to their breach of fiduciary duty cause of action: 1) Heppt’s hiring of Hill was unauthorized and resulted in inflated fees; 2) the sole purpose of the April 2004 remand motion was to increase fees; 3) Heppt produced incomplete responses to Schindler’s summary judgment motion; and 4) Heppt failed to advise Kirk about the limited value of his defamation claim."
 

"Assuming that such conduct on the part of Heppt constituted a breach of his fiduciary duty, the Kirks have not satisfied their burden in pointing to any injuries suffered as a result of such a breach. Beginning in January 2004, Heppt’s invoices listed Hill’s time and gave a detailed description of the work that she was performing. Kirk then met Hill at Heppt’s offices in March 2004, at which time Heppt informed Kirk that he wanted Hill to assist on the case, and Kirk asked Heppt about Hill’s billable rate. The Kirks never questioned or objected to Hill’s participation, either when they received the invoices in January or when they met Hill in March 2004."

 

 

Sometimes we find a stimulating discussion of a principal of legal malpractice in decisions concerning other professions.  In this case Sykes v RFD Third Ave. 1 Assoc., LLC ;2009 NY Slip Op 06387 ;Decided on September 8, 2009 ;Appellate Division, First Department ;Moskowitz, J.  we find a discussion of privity and third-party beneficiary law which informs legal malpractice issues.
 

"Plaintiffs’ negligent misrepresentation claim fails to allege a "special relationship," i.e., "a relationship so close
as to approach that of privity" (Parrott v Coopers & Lybrand, 95 NY2d 479, 484 [2000]). The New York Court of Appeals takes a rather cautious approach to determining whether a relationship necessary to support a claim for negligent misrepresentation exists (see Ossining Union Free School Dist. v Anderson LaRocca Anderson, 73 NY2d 417, 424 [1989] ["[w]e have defined this duty narrowly, more narrowly than other jurisdictions"]). This narrow approach developed out of concern for the "limitless liability" that could result that otherwise would stop with the contracting parties (Parrott at 483 citing Prudential Ins. Co., v Dewey Ballantine, Bushby, Palmer & Wood, 80 NY2d 377, 382 [1992]; see also Credit Alliance Corp. v Arthur Andersen & Co., 65 NY2d 536, 553 [1985] [explicitly rejecting a rule "permitting recovery by any foreseeable plaintiff"]; Ossining, 73 NY2d at 421 ["[i]n negligent misrepresentation cases especially, what is objectively foreseeable injury may be vast and unbounded, wholly disproportionate to a defendant’s undertaking or wrongdoing"]).

Therefore, before a stranger to a contract can claim harm from negligent misrepresentation, there must be: "(1) an awareness by the maker of the statement that it is to be used for a particular purpose; (2) reliance by a known party on the statement in furtherance of that purpose; and (3) some conduct by the maker of the statement linking it to the relying party and evincing its understanding of that reliance" (Parrott, 95 NY2d at 484 [citations omitted]; see also Securities Investor Protection Corp. v BDO Seidman, 95 NY2d 702, 712 [2001] [no privity between SIPC and accountants where accountants had not prepared audit reports for the specific benefit of SIPC, did not send them to SIPC and SIPC never read these reports]). [*4]

Accordingly, we have been circumspect when assessing privity (see e.g. Houbigant, Inc. v Deloitte & Touche, 303 AD2d 92, 94-95 [2003] [accountant’s audit "was a task performed pursuant to professional standards applicable in the context of any audit, and was not undertaken pursuant to any duty owed toward [plaintiff]"); LaSalle Natl. Bank v Ernst & Young, 285 AD2d 101, 107-108 [2001] no privity between lender and borrower’s accountants where only contact was single phone call]; see also Israel Discount Bank of N.Y. v Miller, Ellin & Co., 277 AD2d 58, 59 [2000]).

"Although this rule first developed in the context of accountant liability, it has applied equally in cases involving other professions" (Parrott, 95 NY2d at 483; see also Ossining at 424 ["[n]or does the rule apply only to accountants"]). This Court too has extended the privity requirements of Parrott beyond
the accountant arena (see e.g. Bri-Den Constr. Co., Inc. v Kappell & Kostow Architects P.C., 56 AD3d 355 [2008], lv denied 12 NY3d 703 [2009] [no privity between architect and bidder]); Point O’Woods Assn. v Those Underwriters at Lloyd’s, London subscribing to Certificate No. 6771, 288 AD2d 78, 79 [2001], lv denied 98 NY2d 611 [2002] [no privity between insurance carrier and broker]). "

 

In "Boglia,  v  Greenberg, et al., ; SUPREME COURT OF NEW YORK, APPELLATE DIVISION, SECOND DEPARTMENT;2009 NY Slip Op 5278; 63 A.D.3d 973; 882 N.Y.S.2d 215; 2009 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 5183  the court writes:

 

"The client retained the attorneys to represent her in a matrimonial action. After terminating the attorneys’ representation, the client settled the underlying action and received a settlement in the amount of $ 200,000. Thereafter, the client sued the attorneys alleging, inter alia, that they negligently advised her of her rights to equitable distribution of the residence, and failed to communicate an offer of settlement to her in the amount of $ 250,000. She also sought to recover legal fees already paid to the attorneys."

"The defendants met their burden of establishing entitlement to judgment as a matter of law by demonstrating that the plaintiff would be unable to prove that, but for the defendants’ alleged negligent advice regarding her rights to equitable distribution, she would have prevailed in the underlying action had it proceeded to trial. The plaintiff, in opposition, failed to raise a triable issue of fact. Accordingly, the Supreme Court properly granted that branch of the defendants’ cross motion which was for summary judgment dismissing the first cause of action, alleging legal malpractice based upon the defendants’ alleged negligent advice regarding her rights to equitable distribution of the [***218] residence, and properly denied that branch of the plaintiff’s motion which was for summary judgment on that cause of action (see Oberkirch v Charles G. Eichinger, P.C., 35 AD3d 558, 559, 827 N.Y.S.2d 192).

However, the Supreme Court should have denied that branch of the defendants’ cross motion which was for summary judgment dismissing the second cause of action, alleging legal malpractice based upon their alleged failure to convey her former husband’s $ 250,000 settlement offer to her, as triable issues of fact exist regarding whether the defendants failed to convey the settlement offer to the plaintiff and whether the plaintiff would have accepted that offer (cf. Bauza v Livington, 40 AD3d "

In MELNICK  v. CARY PRESS,;No 06-CV-6686 (JFB) (ARL);UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK;2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 77609; August 28, 2009, Decided  we find an excellent discussion of the rules of attorney fee liens under the Judiciary Law.
 

"Under New York law, an attorney who is discharged is statutorily entitled to a charging lien on any monetary recoveries obtained by the former client in the proceedings in which the attorney had rendered legal services. 1 See N.Y. Judiciary Law § 475. The Second Circuit has [*7] explained the rationale behind the charging lien:
New York’s statutory charging lien, see N.Y. Judiciary Law § 475 (McKinney 1983), is a device to protect counsel against "the knavery of his client," whereby through his effort, the attorney acquires an interest in the client’s cause of action. In re City of New York, 5 N.Y.2d 300, 307, 184 N.Y.S.2d 585, 157 N.E.2d 587 (1959). The lien is predicated on the idea that the attorney has by his skill and effort obtained the judgment, and hence "should have a lien thereon for his compensation, in analogy to the lien which a mechanic has upon any article which he manufactures." Williams v. Ingersoll, 89 N.Y. 508, 517 (1882).
Butler, Fitzgerald & Potter v. Sequa Corp., 250 F.3d 171, 177 (2d Cir. 2001).

FOOTNOTES

1 A discharged attorney is also entitled to a retaining lien on the former client’s papers and property that are in the attorney’s possession, under New York common law. See Resolution Trust Corp. v. Elman, 949 F.2d 624, 626 (2d Cir. 1991); see also McDermott v. Great Am. Alliance Ins. Co., No. 5:02 Civ. 0607 (NAM/DEP), 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 52878, 2006 WL 2038452, at *2 (N.D.N.Y. July 18, 2006) ("In New York, an attorney who ceases to represent his or her client but has rendered [*8] services for which payment has not yet been received has two forms of recourse against non-payment, other than commencement of a plenary action — one derived from the common law [generally referred to as a retaining lien], and the other created by statute [referred to as a charging lien]."). Wagner Davis’ assertion of a retaining lien is discussed in connection with plaintiffs’ motion to compel infra.

 

Specifically, Section 475 of the New York Judiciary Law provides:
From the commencement of an action . . . the attorney who appears for a party has a lien upon his client’s cause of action, claim or counterclaim, which attaches to a verdict, report, determination, decision, judgment or final order in his client’s favor, and the proceeds thereof in whatever hands they may come; and the lien cannot be affected by any settlement between the parties before or after judgment, final order or determination. The court upon the petition of the client or attorney may determine and enforce the lien.
N.Y. Judiciary Law § 475. The Second Circuit has made clear that Section 475 governs attorneys’ charging liens in federal courts sitting in New York, and such liens are "enforceable in federal courts in [*9] accordance with its interpretation by New York courts." Itar-Tass Russian News Agency v. Russian Kurier, Inc., 140 F.3d 442, 449 (2d Cir. 1998) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). In order to establish a lien under Section 475, "there must be asserted a claim which can eventuate in there being proceeds payable to, or assets recoverable by, the client as a result of the efforts of the attorney." Rosewood Apartments Corp. v. Perpignano, No. 99 Civ. 4226 (NRB), 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8396, 2005 WL 1084396, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. May 3, 2005). Further, attorneys who terminate their representation are still entitled to enforce their charging liens, as long as the attorney does not withdraw without "good cause" and is not discharged for "good cause." See, e.g., McDermott v. Great Am. Alliance Ins. Co., No. 5:02 Civ. 0607 (NAM/DEP), 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 52878, 2006 WL 2038452, at *2 (N.D.N.Y. July 18, 2006); Hill v. Baxter, No. 98 Civ. 4314 (SJF) (ASC), 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7157, 2005 WL 465429, at *2 (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 7, 2005); Petition of Harley & Browne, 957 F. Supp. 44, 48 (S.D.N.Y. 1997); Rankel v. Tracey, No. 84 Civ. 3412 (KMW), 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10673, 1991 WL 156324, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 2, 1991); Klein v. Eubank, 87 N.Y.2d 459, 663 N.E.2d 599, 600, 640 N.Y.S.2d 443 (N.Y. 1996).
 

 

On calculating the actual amount the court wrote: "The Court does, however, find it necessary to subtract those hours that the firm spent on its motion to withdraw and on this pending motion. Such activities were not in furtherance of obtaining a favorable judgment on behalf of plaintiffs in this case and are thus not properly the subject of the charging lien. See, e.g., Cutner & Assocs., P.C. v. Kanbar, No. 97 Civ. 1902 (SAS), 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1045, 1998 WL 104612, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 4, 1998)

"The Johnson factors are: "(1) the time and labor required; (2) the novelty and difficulty of the questions; (3) the level of skill required to perform the legal service properly; (4) the preclusion of employment by the attorney due to acceptance of the case; (5) the attorney’s customary hourly rate; (6) whether the fee is fixed or contingent; (7) the time limitation imposed by the client or the circumstances; (8) the amount involved in the case and the results obtained; (9) the experience, reputation, and ability of the attorneys; (10) the ‘undesirability’ of the case; (11) the nature and length of the professional relationship with the client; and (12) awards in similar cases." 488 F.2d at 717-19."

 

How much does one take on as attorney, and how does that scope of work affect legal malpractice litigation?  In Douglas v. Dashevsky, SUPREME COURT OF NEW YORK, APPELLATE DIVISION, SECOND DEPARTMENT; 2009 NY Slip Op 4187; 62 A.D.3d 937, ; 880 N.Y.S.2d 667, plaintiff says that she was terminated, and was terminated while disabled.  She retained defendant attorney, and now sues in legal malpractice on the theory that :

"The plaintiff retained the defendant to represent her in a claim against her former employer for wrongfully discharging her as a result of a medical condition. The plaintiff contends that the defendant advised her not to file a claim with her employer’s disability carrier and as a result she was denied disability benefits for not filing a timely claim. The defendant moved to dismiss the complaint pursuant [**669] to CPLR 3211(a)(1) and (7). The defendant maintained that the plaintiff retained him solely for the purposes of obtaining a damage award on the wrongful termination claim and restoring her to her prior position. [***2] The defendant argues that the plaintiff’s claim that she was disabled at the time and entitled to benefits contradicts the representations that the plaintiff made to him and alleged in her termination action that she was capable of performing her job.

 

The motion to dismiss was denied.  "Here, the retainer agreements submitted by the defendant do not establish, as a matter of law, that the defendant’s obligation was to advise the plaintiff solely with respect to her wrongful termination action against her employer. The one page of the disability carrier’s policy along with the complaint from the action alleging wrongful termination fails to conclusively establish that the plaintiff would not otherwise have been entitled to receive benefits under the policy, had she filed a timely claim.""The action is not barred by the doctrine of judicial estoppel since the plaintiff’s action predicated upon wrongful termination was settled and did not result in a judgment (see Kimco of [*939] New York, Inc. v Devon, 163 AD2d 573, 575, 558 N.Y.S.2d 630).