In both Federal District Court and in State Court in New York attorneys have a "retaining lien" under Judiciary Law 475.  In Federal District Court the rule is set forth in Katz v. Image Innovations Holdings Inc., 06 Civ. 3707;Decided: May 27, 2009; District Judge John G. Koeltl

U.S. DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

"It is well settled in this Circuit that an attorney may claim a retaining lien for outstanding unpaid fees and disbursements on a client’s papers and property that came into the attorney’s possession as the result of his professional representation of that client. See Pomerantz v. Schandler, 704 F.2d 681, 683 (2d Cir. 1983) (per curiam) (citing In re San Juan Gold, Inc., 96 F.2d 60 (2d Cir. 1938)). This right to a retaining lien is grounded in common law, and is enforced in federal courts unless a specific federal law alters the parties’ rights. See Allstate Ins. Co. v. Nandi, 258 F.Supp.2d 309, 311 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (citing Rivkin v. A.J. Hollander & Co., Inc., No. 95 Civ. 9314, 1996 WL 633217, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 1, 1996)). In this case, no federal law prevents the Court from fixing a retaining lien.

The decision to fix a retaining lien lies within the discretion of the district court. See Allstate, 258 F.Supp.2d at 311 (citing Pay Television of Greater New York, Inc. v. Sheridan, 766 F.2d 92, 94 (2d Cir. 1985) (per curiam)). A retaining lien attaches "when the action is commenced and remains in force when an attorney is discharged without cause." See Allstate, 258 F.Supp.2d at 312 (quoting Casper v. Lew Lieberbaum & Co., Inc., No. 97 Civ. 3016, 1999 WL 335334, at *8 (S.D.N.Y. May 26, 1999)). While an attorney who has been discharged for cause has no right to compensation or to a retaining lien, an attorney who has been discharged without cause is entitled to be paid a fee on a quantum meruit basis for the reasonable value of the legal services that were provided. See Viada v. Osaka Health Spa, Inc., No. 04 Civ. 2744, 2005 WL 3481196, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 19, 2005) (citing Gurry v. Glaxo Wellcome, Inc., No. 98 Civ. 6243, 2000 WL 1702028, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 14, 2000)). When counsel is granted leave to withdraw by the court, the discharge is not for cause. See Viada, 2005 WL 3481196, at *2. Absent a defendant’s urgent need for the papers subject to the retaining lien, such as for a criminal trial, the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit has held it an abuse of discretion to require withdrawing counsel to turn over papers subject to a retaining lien without conditioning it on payment or posting bond for payment of outstanding legal fees. See Pomerantz, 704 F.2d at 683-684."
 

How are "inefficiencies" such as intra-office conferences and duplication of effort handled?

"There is some duplication caused by McCarter’s employment of 14 attorneys in this matter, and its billing for internal conferences. (See generally Ex. A, Moran Decl., Jan. 21, 2009.) A deduction of 5 percent from the attorney’s fees adequately compensates for this inefficiency. See New York State Ass’n for Retarded Children, Inc. v. Carey, 711 F.2d 1136, 1146 (2d Cir. 1983) (endorsing percentage reductions as a practical means of reducing a fee application to avoid an excessive fee, and noting percentage reductions of 5 percent to 22 percent ); Mr. X v. New York State Educ. Dept., 20 F.Supp.2d 561, 564 (S.D.N.Y. 1998) (reducing requested attorney’s fees award by twenty percent for, among other considerations, duplicative work)."

The collapse of a hedge fund gives rise to a legal malpractice claim by various of the investors.  The hedge fund impresario is convicted of securities fraud, and then turns around to help the investors sue the funds’ attorney. 

In Eurycleia Partners, LP v Seward & Kissel, LLP ; 2009 NY Slip Op 04299 ; Decided on June 4, 2009 ; Court of Appeals ; Graffeo, J. we see that there is not enough connection between the attorneys and plaintiffs, and that plaintiffs cannot show the requisite relationship between the attorneys and the funds.
 

"The July 2007 amended complaint presents three main allegations against S & K. First, plaintiffs assert S & K learned at some point in 2005 that Wood River invested more than 10% of its assets in Endwave stock in violation of the 10% restriction contained in the offering memoranda. According to plaintiffs, S & K nonetheless persisted in drafting offering memoranda falsely representing that Wood River was adhering to the 10% cap as part of its investment policy. Second, plaintiffs claim that S & K falsely stated in the offering memoranda that TBS was Wood River’s auditor even though S & K knew from the inception that TBS had not been retained to perform any auditing work. Third, plaintiffs allege S & K learned in January 2005 that Wood River had violated securities laws by failing to file required notices when Wood River obtained 5% and, later, 10% of Endwave’s stock [FN5]. Plaintiffs maintain that S & K breached fiduciary duties owed to them, as limited partners, by failing to disclose the SEC violations to them.

Here, whether the claim is labeled fraud or aiding and abetting fraud, we conclude that neither the allegations in the complaint nor the surrounding circumstances give rise to a reasonable inference that S & K participated in a scheme to defraud or knew about the falsity of the two contested statements in the offering memoranda. The amended complaint conclusorily alleges that at some unspecified point in 2005 S & K became aware that more than 10% of Wood River’s holdings were invested with Endwave but, nonetheless, S & K continued to issue offering memoranda falsely representing that Wood River would not invest more than 10% of its assets in any given security.

We likewise find the amended complaint’s alternative allegation of fraud or aiding and abetting fraud — that S & K knew TBS was not Wood River’s auditor yet continued to list TBS in the offering memoranda — to be similarly conclusory. As the Appellate Division recognized, the complaint elsewhere alleges that in the summer of 2005 TBS falsely represented that it was the fund’s auditor and would conduct an audit. In short, although we are mindful that a plaintiff need not produce absolute proof of fraud and that there may be cases in which particular facts are within a defendant’s possession, it is also true that the strength of the requisite inference of fraud will vary based on the facts and context of each case.

A fiduciary relationship arises "between two persons when one of them is under a duty to act for or to give advice for the benefit of another upon matters within the scope of the relation" (EBC I, Inc. v Goldman, Sachs & Co., 5 NY3d 11, 19 [2005] [internal quotation marks and citation omitted]). Put differently, "[a] fiduciary relation exists when confidence is reposed on one side and there is resulting superiority and influence on the other" (AG Capital Funding Partners, L.P. v State St. Bank & Trust Co., 11 NY3d 146, 158 [2008] [internal quotation marks and citation omitted]). Ascertaining the existence of such a relationship inevitably requires a fact-specific inquiry. [*6]

Here, plaintiffs do not allege that they had direct contact or any relationship — contractual or otherwise — with S & K. Indeed, plaintiffs acknowledge that the offering memoranda advised prospective limited partners to consult their own legal counsel prior to investing in Wood River. Plaintiffs nevertheless contend that S & K’s attorney-client relationship with Wood River in and of itself created a fiduciary relationship between S & K and the limited partners themselves. We disagree. "

Aside from the precatory "You’ve got to be crazy…", 

" on occasion, true mental incompetence does collide with questions of legal malpractice, and in this case, criminal conviction.  In ALLEN WOLFSON, -v- AVRAHAM MOSKOWITZ,  08 Civ. 8796 (DLC);UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK’; 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 45822;  May 29, 2009, Decided   we see the result:
 

"Allen Wolfson has filed suit against Avraham Moskowitz, Wolfson’s former attorney in a criminal matter. Moskowitz moved to dismiss the complaint pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. . For the following reasons, the Report is adopted, and the motion is granted.

Following trial, Wolfson moved for a new trial and to vacate his conviction, as well as to vacate his guilty plea entered in another case, arguing, inter alia, that the jury instructions were defective, that he was incompetent at the time of his trial and plea, and that his counsel was ineffective. The Honorable John G. Koeltl, United States District Judge, denied these motions in two separate opinions issued on the same day.  Judge Koeltl did find that Wolfson was not competent to be sentenced. Wolfson, . Wolfson was therefore provisionally sentenced and ordered to a facility for treatment, and will be given a final sentence when he is deemed competent.

The Report states that in a diversity action such as this case, a federal court applies the choice-of-law rules of the state in which the court sits. See Schwartz v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 539 F.3d 135, 147 (2d Cir. 2008). Finding that the complaint against Moskowitz for failure to inform Wolfson that the indictment failed to charge a crime was a claim for the tort of legal malpractice, the Report applied New York’s "interest analysis," see White Plains Coat & Apron Co., Inc. v. Cintas Corp., 460 F.3d 281, 284 (2d Cir. 2006), and concluded that New York’s interest was paramount and therefore [*6] New York law applied. See, e.g., LNC Inv., Inc. v. First Fidelity Bank, N.A., 935 F. Supp. 1333, 1350-51 (S.D.N.Y. 1996).

The Report correctly concluded that under New York law, a party cannot maintain a cognizable claim for legal malpractice in connection with representation provided in a criminal case when his conviction still stands. See Britt v. Legal Aid Soc, Inc., 95 N.Y.2d 443, 447, 741 N.E.2d 109, 718 N.Y.S.2d 264 (2000); Carmel v. Lunney, 70 N.Y.2d 169, 173, 511 N.E.2d 1126, 518 N.Y.S.2d 605 (1987). Thus, because Wolfson has not had his conviction vacated and remains incarcerated, he fails to state a claim for malpractice and his complaint must be dismissed."

This recent Court of Appeals Case, Wyly v Milberg Weiss Bershad & Schulman, LLP
2009 NY Slip Op 03628 ; Decided on May 7, 2009 ; Court of Appeals  discusses the rights of a client to "its" case file for use in a later proceeding…which is often a legal malpractice action.  Wyley is the offshoot  of the Computer Associates class actions, and one in which millions of dollars were at stake.
The rule in New York concerning whether a client is entitled to look at and copy a file  is generally set forth in Matter of Sage Realty Corp. v Proskauer Rose Goetz & Mendelsohn, 91 NY2d 30 [1997]  The Court of Appeals held that the joined the "majority of courts and State legal ethics advisory bodies," which take the position that "upon termination of the attorney-client relationship, where no claim for unpaid legal fees is outstanding," a client is "presumptively accord[ed] . . . full access to the entire attorney’s file on a represented matter with narrow exceptions" (Sage Realty, 91 NY2d at 34).

"The petitioners in Sage Realty retained Proskauer to represent them in a multi-million dollar mortgage financing and a restructuring of ownership interests, all involving New York City properties. After a falling out with Proskauer, the petitioners retained a different firm to represent them in the transaction. Proskauer refused to turn over certain documents relating to its representation of the petitioners, prompting them to commence a special proceeding to recover the documents. "
 

A recurring theme in legal malpractice is how to obtain the documents from the underlying representation.  A confounding factor is that often there is a fee dispute between the plaintiff and its prior counsel, and the prior counsel refuse to allow plaintiff a copy of the file under the authority of a Judiciary Law retaining lien.  Sage remains the authority in this area.

In Leone v Silver & Silver, LLP ; 2009 NY Slip Op 04204 ; Decided on May 26, 2009
Appellate Division, Second Department we see that merely settling a case does not deprive plaintiff of the right to sue the attorney, so long as the settlement was effectively compelled by the acts of the target attorney. If the attorney’s acts caused plaintiff to be in a position where settlement was the correct choice, there may still be liability for the attorney.
 

"The gravamen of the plaintiff’s complaint is that the defendants failed to protect her interest in connection with the fraudulent conveyance of certain real property. In order to prevail on this claim, the plaintiff must establish both that the defendants "failed to exercise the ordinary reasonable skill and knowledge commonly possessed by a member of the legal profession" (Rudolf v Shayne, Dachs, Stanisci, Corker & Sauer, 8 NY3d 438, 442; see Davis v Klein, 88 NY2d 1008, 1009-1010) and that their breach of this duty proximately caused her actual and ascertainable damages (see Rudolf v Shayne, Dachs, Stanisci, Corker & Sauer, 8 NY3d at 442; see Hearst v Hearst, 50 AD3d 959, 963; Bauza v Livington, 40 AD3d 791, 792-793). To succeed on their motion for summary judgment, the defendants were required to establish, through the submission of evidentiary proof in admissible form, that the plaintiff is unable to prove at least one of the essential elements of the cause of action (see Suydam v O’Neill, 276 AD2d 549; Ostriker v Taylor, Atkins & Ostrow, 258 AD2d 572). The Supreme Court correctly concluded that the defendants failed to do so here. Contrary to the defendants’ contention, the plaintiff’s decision to settle an action to recover the property, rather than risk dismissal on the basis of the defense of laches allegedly caused by their conduct, does not preclude the plaintiff from maintaining a subsequent action against them to recover damages for legal malpractice (see N.A. Kerson Co. v Shayne, Dachs, Weiss, Kolbrenner, Levy & Levine, 45 NY2d 730, 732; Tortura v Sullivan Papain Block McGrath & Cannavo, 21 AD3d 1082, 1083; Rau v Borenkoff, 262 AD2d 388, 389; Lattimore v Bergman, 224 AD2d 497). The Supreme Court, therefore, properly denied the defendants’ motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint. "
 

Slip and fall cases are a major part of the personal injury oeuvre, and personal injury litigation remains a large part of the world of the bar.  Accordingly the laws of personal injury, and specifically those relating to trips and falls are widely known and highly important.  Mistakes and bad outcomes in personal injury litigation often lead to legal malpractice litigation.

One perennial problem in trips and falls is causation. The problem arises in the tension between whether one should have seen a defect, and proving that the defect was significant enough to cause the fall.  In sidewalk negligence, there is the principal of a defect that is "de minimus" and as a matter of law insufficient to support a negligence claim.

In Hamoudeh v Mandel ;2009 NY Slip Op 04195 ;decided on May 26, 2009 ; Appellate Division, Second Department we see the effect of plaintiff stating in a deposition [likely in the underlying action] that  he did not see what caused him to fall.  Whether this was the result of the attorney’s affirmative coaching, the attorney’s negligence failure to prepare plaintiff for a deposition, or the truth, it was fatal to both the underlying personal injury action and the legal malpractice action.
 

"During a deposition, the plaintiff stated that he did not know what had caused him to fall. The defendants moved for summary judgment, contending that the plaintiff would not have prevailed in the underlying action even if they had timely commenced an action. The Supreme Court denied the motion. We reverse.

To establish a cause of action to recover damages for legal malpractice, a plaintiff must prove that the attorney "failed to exercise the ordinary reasonable skill and knowledge commonly possessed by a member of the legal profession and that the attorney’s breach of this duty proximately caused the plaintiff actual and ascertainable damages" (Maiolini v McAdams & Fallon, P.C.,AD3d, 2009 NY Slip Op 02755, *2 [2d Dept 2009] [citations omitted]). "To establish causation, a plaintiff must show that he or she would have prevailed in the underlying action or would not have incurred any damages, but for the lawyer’s negligence" (id. [citations omitted]; see also Pedro v Walker, 46 AD3d 789; Lichtenstein v Barenbaum, 23 AD3d 440; Porello v Longworth, 21 AD3d 541; Dimond v Kazmierczuk & McGrath, 15 AD3d 526; Iannarone v Gramer, 256 AD2d 443, 444).

Here, the defendants established, prima facie, that even if they had commenced a timely action, the plaintiff would not have been successful on the merits, since he could not identify what had caused him to fall (see Costantino v Webel, 57 AD3d 472; Karwowski v New York City Tr. Auth., 44 [*2]AD3d 826; Manning v 6638 18th Ave. Realty Corp., 28 AD3d 434; Golba v City of New York, 27 AD3d 524; Tejada v Jonas, 17 AD3d 448). In opposition, the plaintiff failed to raise a triable issue of fact (see Denicola v Costello, 44 AD3d 990; Tejada v Jonas, 17 AD3d 448; Sanchez v City of New York, 305 AD2d 487). "

Some time ago the legislature passed a statute of limitations for legal malpractice, overruling the Court of Appeals which permitted both a 3 year and a 6 year statute.  Of course, now there is but a single 3 year statute.  At the same time, it was determined that no matter whether one calls the attorney’s mistakes fraud, breach of fiduciary duty or something else, there is a single 3 year statute, and it’s all called legal malpractice except in certain unusual circumstances.

Here in Kullahsi v. Marengo, NY Slip Op 31154, Justice Tolub, Supreme Court, New York County, Mary 27, 2009, we see a more detailed explanation.  The allegation of fraud must be separate and distinct from the allegation of malpractice.  There must be damages separate and different from those which were caused by the malpractice.  The fraud must be independent, intentionally tortuous conduct.

Retainer agreements or letters of engagement are required in New York, and there is a large body of law concerning attorney fees and the necessity of retainer agreements.  On a different dimension, the question of what work an attorney has agreed to perform, and the limits of that attorney’s liability may well be determined by the scope of the retainer agreement.  May one, for example, limit representation to a single issue, and not be responsible for other issues?

in Douglas v Dashevsky ;2009 NY Slip Op 04187 ; Decided on May 26, 2009 ;Appellate Division, Second Department we see this issue illustrated.  Plaintiff retains attorney in a wrongful termination case, and alleges that he told her not to file a disability claim with the employer.  He says that his sole obligation was the wrongful termination matter. Is he responsible?
 

"To demonstrate entitlement to dismissal of a complaint pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(1), the documentary evidence submitted must conclusively establish a defense to the asserted claims, as a matter of law (see Leon v Martinez, 84 NY2d 83, 87-88; Williams v Williams, 36 AD3d 693, 695; New York Community Bank v Snug Harbor Sq. Venture, 299 AD2d 329, 330). Here, the retainer agreements submitted by the defendant do not establish, as a matter of law, that the defendant’s obligation was to advise the plaintiff solely with respect to her wrongful termination action against her employer. The one page of the disability carrier’s policy along with the complaint from the action alleging wrongful termination fails to conclusively establish that the plaintiff would not otherwise have been entitled to receive benefits under the policy, had she filed a timely claim.

Further, "in reviewing a motion pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(7) to dismiss a complaint for failure to state a cause of action, the facts as alleged in the complaint must be accepted as true, the plaintiff is accorded the benefit of every possible favorable inference, and the court’s function is to determine only whether the facts as alleged fit within any cognizable legal theory" (Kupersmith [*2]v Winged Foot Golf Club, Inc., 38 AD3d 847, 848; see Leon v Martinez, 84 NY2d at 87-88; Board of Educ. of City School Dist. of City of New Rochelle v County of Westchester, 282 AD2d 561, 562). Here, the plaintiff has pleaded sufficient facts to fit within a theory of legal malpractice.

The action is not barred by the doctrine of judicial estoppel since the plaintiff’s action predicated upon wrongful termination was settled and did not result in a judgment (see Kimco of New York, Inc. v Devon, 163 AD2d 573, 575). "