Darby Scott, Ltd. v Michael S. Libock & Co. LLC CPAs 2022 NY Slip Op 06746 [210 AD3d 582] November 29, 2022 Appellate Division, First Department gives a very short answer to whether “continuous representation” exists in accounting malpractice (aside from tax year calculations). It seems to where the accountants perform non-tax filing work.

“The record presents issues of fact as to whether the continuous representation doctrine applies to render plaintiff’s accounting malpractice claim timely—namely, whether the work by defendants’ representatives in September and October 2010 constituted a continuation of the services that are the subject of plaintiff’s claim, or at least constituted related remedial services (see Regency Club at Wallkill, LLC v Appel Design Group, P.A., 112 AD3d 603, 606-607 [2d Dept 2013]; Ackerman v Price Waterhouse, 252 AD2d 179, 205 [1st Dept 1998]).

Issues of fact also exist as to whether defendants breached their duty to plaintiff (see Berg v Eisner LLP, 94 AD3d 496, 496 [1st Dept 2012]). Although the engagement letters executed by the parties stated that defendants would perform bookkeeping and administrative tasks, neither party has offered an authoritative definition of the scope of these tasks. Nor has either party eliminated issues of fact as to whether the agreed-upon services were performed in a manner consistent with professional accounting standards (id.). Thus, the record presents issues of fact as to the scope of the engagement letters, and whether defendants’ alleged failure to notify plaintiff of recurring inventory and invoicing issues, or at least the full extent of those issues, constituted a breach of their duty (see Cumis Ins. Socy. v Tooke, 293 AD2d 794, 798 [3d Dept 2002]; cf. Italia Imports v Weisberg & Lesk, 220 AD2d 226, 226 [1st Dept 1995]).

Furthermore, issues of fact exist as to whether defendants proximately caused plaintiff’s damages. Even if it was plaintiff’s responsibility to track its inventory and implement internal controls, it is not clear as a matter of law whether at least some of plaintiff’s losses could have been avoided if defendants had fulfilled their duty to report known inventory and invoicing irregularities to plaintiff (see DG Liquidation v Anchin, Block & Anchin, 300 AD2d 70 [1st Dept 2002]). Plaintiff was not required to offer conclusive proof of the exact amount of damages it suffered in order to defeat an award of summary judgment in defendants’ favor. “

Nasca v Greene 2023 NY Slip Op 02317 Decided on May 3, 2023 Appellate Division, Second Department discusses the reach of Judiciary Law 487. Not all deceitful acts are subject to JL 487 claims.

“

In February 2019, the plaintiff commenced this action, inter alia, to recover damages for violation of Judiciary Law § 487 and unjust enrichment, alleging, among other things, that the plaintiff obtained a lien on certain real property owned by nonparty John Finocchio, and that the defendant attorneys colluded with Finocchio to transfer title to that property to nonparty 40-19 Realty, LLC (hereinafter the LLC), to circumvent the plaintiff’s lien. Thereafter, the defendants moved, inter alia, pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(7) to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a cause of action. In an order dated January 8, 2020, the Supreme Court, among other things, granted those branches of the defendants’ motion which were pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(7) to dismiss the causes of action alleging violation of Judiciary Law § 487 and unjust enrichment. The plaintiff appeals.

“An attorney is liable under Judiciary Law § 487(1) if he or she is guilty of any deceit or collusion, or consents to any deceit or collusion, with intent to deceive the court or any party” (Long Is. Med. Anesthesiology, P.C. v Rosenberg Fortuna & Laitman, LLP, 191 AD3d 864, 866 [alterations and internal quotation marks omitted]). “A cause of action alleging a violation of Judiciary Law § 487 must be pleaded with specificity” (Betz v Blatt, 160 AD3d 696, 698; see Long Is. Med. Anesthesiology, P.C. v Rosenberg Fortuna & Laitman, LLP, 191 AD3d at 866). Further, except where there is deceit directed against a court, Judiciary Law § 487 “applies only to wrongful conduct by an attorney in an action that is actually pending” (Mahler v Campagna, 60 AD3d 1009, 1012-1013; see Bill Birds, Inc. v Stein Law Firm, P.C., 35 NY3d 173, 178; Meimeteas v Carter Ledyard & Milburn LLP, 105 AD3d 643, 643). Here, the plaintiff failed to allege wrongful conduct by the defendants during the course of a pending judicial proceeding or directed against a court. Rather, the alleged wrongful conduct involved the drafting of title documents and the securing of a mortgage, which occurred outside of a judicial proceeding (see Costalas v Amalfitano, 305 AD2d 202, 204; Hansen v Caffry, 280 AD2d 704, 705). Accordingly, the Supreme Court properly granted [*2]that branch of the defendants’ motion which was pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(7) to dismiss the cause of action alleging violation of Judiciary Law § 487 for failure to state a cause of action.”

Miho Suzuki v Greenberg 2023 NY Slip Op 31289(U) April 21, 2023 Supreme Court, New York County Docket Number: Index No. 159360/2021 Judge: David B. Cohen may be the only case in which summary judgment was granted to plaintiff on a Judiciary Law 487 claim. It leans heavily on a prior finding in a matrimonial action.

“Plaintiff moves for summary judgment, pursuant to CPLR 3212, seeking an award of
treble damages against defendant for an alleged violation of Section 487 of the Judiciary Law. Defendant cross-moves for summary judgment, seeking an order dismissing plaintiffs complaint, and sanctioning plaintiff and her attorney for their alleged frivolous conduct in bringing this action.
Background
Plaintiff, a resident of the State of Michigan ( complaint ,JI [NYSCEF Doc No. 197]),
previously resided in the State of New York, during her 2002 marriage to, and later separation from, her former husband Sebastian Gollings (see id. ,i,i 3-7 and Plaintiff aff,J3 [NYSCEF Doc No. 176]). Plaintiff and Gollings have one child togther, Kira Gollings, who was born on April 25, 2006 ( complaint ,J,J3-4 and Plaintiff aff,J3).

Gollings commenced an action for divorce against plaintiff in 2014, represented by a
non-party attorney, in New York County Supreme Court under Index Number 309246/2014 (Divorce Action) ( complaint, ,J5).
On October 19, 2015, plaintiff and Gollings entered into a settlement of the Divorce
Action, documented by a stipulation, a parenting plan, and a child support stipulation (Plaintiff statement of material facts [SOP] [NYSCEF Doc No. 200], ,J3). Plaintiff alleges that these agreements provided, among other things, that she and Gollings would share joint legal custody of Kira and that Gollings would have residential custody ( complaint ,J6). “

“At an inquest held on October 19, 2015, before a justice of this Court, Gollings and
plaintiff presented their executed stipulation, parenting plan, and child support stipulation to the Court, and allocuted to the terms of these agreements. The justice presiding informed the parties that they were now bound by the agreements but not yet divorced, and directed counsel to prepare and submit the necessary documents, including a proposed judgment, to finalize matters (see ex B to Defendant’s affidavit in support of cross-motion in sequence number 003 [hearing tr.] [NYSCEF Doc No. 206]).
Plaintiff alleges that Gollings’ s attorney failed to submit the proposed judgment and
ancillary documents needed for the judgment of divorce to be granted and that, from 2015 to 2018, she and Gollings remained separated but adhered to their parenting plan with respect to their child ( complaint, ,J7).”

“Here, plaintiff establishes her prima facie entitlement to judgment on her claim, by
demonstrating that the justice presiding over the divorce action already determined that defendant attempted to deceive or mislead the court by failing to include or mention the Final Custody Order when filing for a final judgment of divorce, which caused her to incur damages in the form of attorney fees and costs (see e.g. Schindler v Isller & Schrage, P.C., 262 AD2d 226 [1st Dept 1999], lv dismissed 94 NY2d 791 [1999] [plaintiff granted judgment on Judiciary Law § 487 claim as defendant law firm knowingly withheld crucial information from court in underlying action]; cf Betz v Blatt, 160 AD3d 696 [2d Dept 2018] [defendant attorney was properly denied summary dismissal of Judiciary Law § 487 claim based on allegations that he filed blatantly deficient accounting with court, which delayed administration of estate, and
caused estate to incur legal fees]; see also Amaltifano v Rosenberg, 428 F Supp 2d 196 [SD NY 2006] [attempted deceit is sufficient to trigger liability under section 487]). Moreover, given the prior finding that defendant intentionally attempted to mislead the court, he is estopped from arguing otherwise here.”

“For the foregoing reasons, it is hereby
ORDERED that plaintiffs motion for summary judgment on her sole cause of action, for
violation of Judiciary Law Section§ 487, is granted, and the Clerk of the Court is directed to enter judgment in favor of plaintiff and against defendant in the sum of $54,774.00, with interest at the statutory rate, from the date of this decision, as calculated by the clerk, together with costs and disbursements as taxed by the Clerk upon submission of an appropriate bill of costs; and it is further ORDERED that defendant’s cross motion is denied; and it is further ORDERED, that the clerk is directed to enter judgment accordingly.”

Siegel v Melito & Adolfsen, P.C. 2023 NY Slip Op 31373(U) April 14, 2023
Supreme Court, New York County Docket Number: Index No. 152781/2022
Judge: Dakota D. Ramseur is a primer on how to avoid a statute of limitations problem in a legal malpractice setting when a claim against the first of several attorneys may become stale while waiting for the outcome of the underlying action.

“Plaintiff, Florence Siegel (plaintiff), commenced this action for malpractice against
defendants, Melito & Adolfsen, P.C. (Melito & Adolfsen.), Louis Adolfsen, Esq. (Adolfsen),
Steven Lewbel, Esq. (Lewbel) (collectively, the moving defendants), W. John Weir, Esq. (Weir) and Weir & Associates (Weir Associates), stemming from their alleged failure to file a timely notice of claim concerning a pending action commenced by plaintiff in Supreme Court, New York County, entitled Siegel v City of New York, et al., Index No. 156682/2018 (the pending action). Defendants now moves pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a)(l) and (7) to dismiss the amended complaint. Plaintiff opposes the motion and cross-moves pursuant to CPLR 2201 to stay the action pending the determination of the pending action. For the following reasons, the moving defendants’ motion is denied, and plaintiff’s cross-motion is granted in part.”

“On January 26, 2023, defendants in the pending action, New York City Transit Authority
and Manhattan and Bronx Surface Transit Operating Authority, filed a notice of motion to dismiss the complaint pursuant to General Municipal Law § 50-e, on the grounds that the notice of claim is untimely, insufficient, inaccurate, and fatally defective. Those defendants specifically argue that the notice of claim was “stamped received by personal service on November 8, 2017 at 4: 15 p.m. The Notice of Claim was filed on the 91st day and beyond the ninety day period for filing a Notice of Claim” (pending action, NYSCEF doc. no. 83 at ,i 4). The motion is marked as submitted and a decision is imminent.”

“The moving defendants fail to demonstrate that the documentary evidence utterly refutes plaintiff’s allegations that the notice of claim was not timely filed or that they were not negligent for failing to amend or refile the notice of claim. The documentary evidence submitted by defendants consists of the NYCTA Accident Report, the original notice of claim, the letter from NYCTA objecting to the notice of claim, a transcript of the NYCTA 50-h hearing and an email from Associates concerning the NYCTA letter. Plaintiff’s accident occurred on August 9, 2017 and the notice of claim was marked as received on November 8, 2017-ninety-one days from the date of plaintiff’s incident. None of the aforesaid documents refute plaintiff’s allegation that the notice of claim was untimely filed.

In addition, there is no second notice of claim, which the moving defendants contend
was filed by plaintiff. The subject email, dated January 23, 2018, indicates that the refiling of the notice of claim was done. In her cross-motion papers, plaintiff states that there is no record of this second notice of claim, apparently denying any involvement in the alleged refiling. In the absence of a second notice of claim, there is no conclusive proof from the evidence that the filing of the notice of claim was timely.”

“Plaintiffs cross-motion for a stay in this action pending the outcome of the pending
action is granted and the moving defendants’ motion is denied. Pursuant to CPLR 2201, “the court in which an action is pending may grant a stay of proceedings in a proper case, upon such terms as may be just.” A court may grant a stay where the determination in one action may dispose or limit issues in a separate action (Uptown Healthcare Mgmt., Inc. v Rivkin Raddler LLP, 116 AD3d 631 [1st Dept 2014]; SSA Holdings LLC v Kaplan, 120 A.D.3d 1111 [1st Dept 2014]). An outcome in the pending action would resolve issues in this action, including the issue of whether plaintiff was damaged because of defendants’ alleged negligence (see Corrado v Rubine, 25 AD3d 748 [2d Dept 2006] [“Furthermore, since some or all of the components of the damages alleged by the plaintiff may ultimately be addressed in the divorce action, the Supreme
Court improvidently exercised its discretion in denying the plaintiffs cross motion for a stay of all proceedings pending the resolution of that action”]; Belopolsky v Renew Data Corp., 41 AD3d 322, 323 [1st Dept 2007] [granting stay of action where, “the determination of the prior action may dispose of or limit issues which are involved in the subsequent action”] [internal citations omitted]; 187 Street Maza! Manager, LLC v Herrick Feinstein LLP, Sup Ct, New York County, March 11, 2020, Sherwood, J., index no. 158840/2018 [“As any determination of whether the alleged negligence was the proximate cause of plaintiffs’ losses, and whether plaintiffs suffer losses related to the ownership of the property, will be informed by the outcome of the Property Actions, this court will use its discretion to stay this action pending resolution of the Property Actions”]; Emamian v. Liddle & Robinson, L.L.P., Sup Ct, New York County, December 12, 2014, Wooten, J., index no 153144/2014 [staying the legal malpractice action where a resolution in favor of the plaintiff in the pending Federal action may limit the damages
sought against the defendants]). Here, a decision on the motion to dismiss in the pending action may resolve issues in the instant matter. To wit: whether plaintiff was damaged by defendants’ alleged negligence. Thus, the Court exercises its discretion to stay this matter until the resolution of the motion to dismiss the complaint in the pending action.”

“But for” proximate cause is central to legal malpractice claims. In Bono v Stim & Warmuth, P.C. 2023 NY Slip Op 02099 Decided on April 26, 2023 Appellate Division, Second Department the claim was that “but for” the failure to plead “usury” as an affirmative defense, the underlying litigation would have been won. The Appellate Division disagreed.

“The defendants represented the plaintiffs for a period of approximately six months in a commercial mortgage foreclosure action (hereinafter the underlying action). After the defendants were granted leave to withdraw as counsel and the plaintiffs retained new counsel, the plaintiffs commenced this action to recover damages for legal malpractice, alleging, inter alia, that the defendants negligently failed to assert criminal usury as an affirmative defense in the underlying action. Thereafter, the defendants moved pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(1) and (7) to dismiss the complaint. In an order dated February 24, 2020, the Supreme Court, among other things, granted the defendants’ motion. The plaintiffs appeal.”

“The claim of legal malpractice was predicated on the plaintiffs’ allegations that the court would have ruled in their favor in the underlying action had the defendants asserted the affirmative defense of criminal usury. However, the evidence indisputably demonstrated that the annual interest rate imposed under the loan documents was 6.5%, and, therefore, was not criminally usurious (see Penal Law § 190.40; Paycation Travel, Inc. v Global Merchant Cash, Inc., 192 AD3d 1040, 1041). Moreover, contrary to the plaintiffs’ contention, “the defense of usury does not apply where . . . the terms of the . . . note impose a rate of interest in excess of the statutory maximum only after default or maturity” (Torto Note Member, LLC v Babad, 192 AD3d 843, 845 [internal quotation marks omitted]; see Kraus v Mendelsohn, 97 AD3d 641, 641).”

Legal malpractice is different from almost all other forms of litigation, requiring not only the pleading of “but for” causation, but also a very robust explanation of how things “should’ have gone, but for the negligence of the attorneys. In Buchanan v Law Offs. of Sheldon E. Green, P.C. 2023 NY Slip Op 01980 Decided on April 19, 2023
Appellate Division, Second Department Supreme Court denied the motion, but the Appellate Division honed in on the lack of a case within the case details.

“In an action, inter alia, to recover damages for legal malpractice, the defendant Law Offices of Sheldon E. Green, P.C., appeals from an order of the Supreme Court, Nassau County (R. Bruce Cozzens, Jr., J.), entered February 8, 2021. The order, insofar as appealed from, denied those branches of that defendant’s motion which were pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(7) to dismiss the first cause of action insofar as asserted against it, and, in effect, the third cause of action.

ORDERED that the order is reversed insofar as appealed from, on the law, with costs, and those branches of the motion of the defendant Law Offices of Sheldon E. Green, P.C., which were pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(7) to dismiss the first cause of action insofar as asserted against it, and, in effect, the third cause of action are granted.”

“Here, the plaintiffs alleged that the decedent died after a brief admission to a drug and behavioral treatment facility, that the defendants agreed to represent the plaintiffs in an underlying action against the treatment facility and the medical providers who treated the decedent, that the defendants committed legal malpractice by failing to timely complete service of process in an action commenced in state court and by failing to commence a wrongful death cause of action in federal court before the applicable statute of limitations expired, and that the defendants’ failures resulted in the plaintiffs being unable to recover on their wrongful death causes of action. Absent from the complaint are any factual allegations relating to the basis for the plaintiffs’ purported wrongful death causes of action against the treatment facility or medical providers.

Accepting the facts alleged in the complaint as true, and according the plaintiffs the benefit of every possible favorable inference, the complaint failed to set forth facts sufficient to allege that the defendant’s purported negligence proximately caused the plaintiffs to sustain actual and ascertainable damages (see Joseph v Fensterman, 204 AD3d at 770-771). Even when considered with the documents submitted by the plaintiffs in opposition to the defendant’s motion, the complaint failed to allege any facts tending to show that, but for the defendant’s alleged negligence in failing to timely serve process in the state court action and in failing to timely commence an action in federal court, the plaintiffs would have achieved a more favorable outcome on their wrongful death causes of action (see Kennedy v H. Bruce Fischer, Esq., P.C., 78 AD3d 1016, 1018; see also Denisco v Uysal, 195 AD3d 989, 991; Weiner v Hershman & Leicher, 248 AD2d 193, 193; cf. Aristakesian v Ballon Stoll Bader & Nadler, P.C., 165 AD3d 1023, 1024). Accordingly, the Supreme Court should have granted that branch of the defendant’s motion which was to dismiss the first cause of action insofar as asserted against it.”

Creadore v Rosenberg & Estis, P.C. 2023 NY Slip Op 31253(U) April 19, 2023
Supreme Court, New York County Docket Number: Index No. 155690/2022
Judge: Lyle E. Frank is an illustration of what happens when attorneys are terminated and then the underlying case settles while attorney # 2 is representing Plaintiff (or Plaintiff is pro-se).

“Plaintiff hired defendant lawyers to represent him in a real estate sales deposit dispute in New York. Plaintiff as the seller believed that the purchasers violated the “best efforts” provision in the sales contract, and he had reason to keep the entire deposit. Defendants did not raise the “best efforts” standard in their answer to the action commenced by purchasers in federal court and only recouped half of the deposit. Plaintiff believed the omission is a legal malpractice and filed the suit in this court, alleging twelve causes of action, including malpractice, defamation, accounting, conversion, and violation of Judiciary Law § 487, etc. Defendants filed the motion to
dismiss all the claims pursuant to CPLR § 3211 (a)(l), (a)(7) and the doctrine of “duplicative claims”.

“Here, plaintiff failed to plead a cognizable legal malpractice claim. First, failure to raise
the “best efforts” standard to which agreed by purchasers in the sales contract could be deemed as a professional negligence by defendants. A party’s promise to use best efforts is valid consideration, and, where it is clear from the language of an agreement that the parties intended to be bound, and there exists an objective method for supplying a missing term, the parties should be held to their bargain. Maestro W Chelsea SPE LLC v. Pradera Realty Inc., 38 Misc. 3d 522, 525.

Here, in the rider to the sales contract, purchasers promised to use best efforts to “comply promptly with reasonable requests made by the Board.” See NYSCEF Doc. No. 18, page 10. An interview request from the Board is a reasonable one and failure to comply with it is a breach of the promise, thus making it the basis for plaintiff to object to refund of the deposit and frustrating purchasers’ declaratory judgment motion. See NYSCEF Doc. No. 81, ,i 38. Therefore, failure to raise the “best efforts” standard in the answer to the declaratory judgement motion could be deemed as a professional negligence by defendants, the more so because they are self-proclaimed “premier real
estate” lawyers in New York City. Id. at ,i 20.

The problem is negligence alone is far from enough to build a case for legal malpractice. Plaintiff also needs to plead the actual damages and the proximate cause prongs of the test. Here, plaintiff did not elaborate on the basis for the damages sought in the complaint. The deposit amounts to $190,000 in total and plaintiff did get a portion of it in return pursuant to the final settlement agreement with the purchasers. See NYSCEF Doc. No. 52. The court couldn’t figure out why plaintiff demanded at least $350,000 for actual damages associated with the legal malpractice claim. Again, “the damages claimed in a legal malpractice action must be ‘actual and ascertainable’ resulting from the proximate cause of the attorney’s negligence. The damages
claimed cannot be too speculative and incapable of being proven with any reasonable certainty.” Zarin v. Reid & Priest, 184 A.D.2d 385, 385 [1st Dept. 1992].

Plaintiff also failed to allege that any legal malpractice by defendants proximately caused the actual damages incurred by him. The Court of Appeals stressed that “to establish causation, a plaintiff must show that he or she would have prevailed in the underlying action or would not have incurred any damages, but for the lawyer’s negligence.” Rudolf at 442 ( emphasis added). After relieving defendants as counsel in the underlying case, plaintiff litigated the case prose and settled with purchasers with a number less than the full deposit. If the “best efforts” provision is the linchpin to his case, as claimed by plaintiff in the complaint, then why did he still incur certain
damages in the settlement or why didn’t he press on with the legal theory and prevail in the underlying action, given that he had full control of the proceedings then? See NYSCEF Doc. No. 49 The First Department has emphasized the burden time and again: “[a] plaintiffs burden of proof in a legal malpractice action is a heavy one. The plaintiff must prove first the hypothetical outcome of the underlying litigation and, then, the attorney’s liability for malpractice in connection with that litigation. The requirement of proving a case within a case is a distinctive feature of legal malpractice actions arising from an attorney’s alleged negligence in preparing or conducting litigation. It adds an additional layer to the element of proximate cause … ” Lindenman v. Kreitzer,
7 A.D.3d 30, 31 (emphasis added).”

Fraumeni v Law Firm of Jonathan D’Agostino, P.C. 2023 NY Slip Op 01984
Decided on April 19, 2023 Appellate Division, Second Department illustrates the outer limits of “continuous representation” which requires a continuing relationship of trust and confidence as well as a mutual understanding of the need for further legal work. Here, the act of asking for the file to be returned marked the end of “continuous representation.”

“On July 3, 2019, the plaintiff commenced this action against the defendants, the Law Firm of Jonathan D’Agostino, P.C. (hereinafter the law firm), Jonathan D’Agostino, Edward J. Pavia, Glen Devora, and Frank J. DiBari, to recover damages for legal malpractice and violation of Judiciary Law § 487. The plaintiff alleged, inter alia, that the defendants committed legal malpractice in their representation of her in two personal injury actions (hereinafter the underlying actions) by suing the wrong parties, leading to the dismissal of the underlying actions, and that as a result of the defendants’ failure to ascertain the proper parties to sue, any new action was time-barred since the statute of limitations had expired. The defendants moved pursuant to CPLR 3211(a) to dismiss the complaint, asserting, inter alia, that the action was time-barred. The defendants contended that the action was commenced after the expiration of the applicable three-year statute of limitations, which began to run on May 4, 2016, when the plaintiff demanded, and received, her legal file from them. The plaintiff opposed on the ground that the action was timely commenced pursuant to the continuous representation doctrine, since the statute of limitations only began to run on July 15, 2016, when the Supreme Court granted the law firm’s motion to withdraw as counsel in the underlying actions. In an order dated February 19, 2020, the Supreme Court granted the defendants’ motion, and, by a judgment entered February 21, 2020, dismissed the complaint as time-barred. The plaintiff appeals. We affirm.”

“The statute of limitations for a cause of action alleging legal malpractice, and a cause of action alleging a violation of Judiciary Law § 487 arising out of the same transactions as the legal malpractice cause of action, is three years (see CPLR 214[6]; Farage v Ehrenberg, 124 AD3d 159). “‘However, causes of action alleging legal malpractice which would otherwise be barred by the statute of limitations are timely if the doctrine of continuous representation applies'” (Keshner v Hein Waters & Klein, 185 AD3d 808, 808, quoting Farage v Ehrenberg, 124 AD3d at 164 [alterations and internal quotation marks omitted]). “For the doctrine to apply, there must be clear indicia of ‘an ongoing, continuous, developing, and dependent relationship between the client and the attorney'” (Farage v Ehrenberg, 124 AD3d at 164, quoting Aseel v Jonathan E. Kroll & Assoc., PLLC, 106 AD3d 1037, 1038; see Joseph v Fensterman, 204 AD3d at 770). “The essence of a continuous representation toll is the client’s confidence in the attorney’s ability and good faith, such that the client cannot be expected to question and assess the techniques employed or the manner in which the services are rendered” (Farage v Ehrenberg, 124 AD3d at 167). Therefore, “[o]ne of the predicates for the application of the doctrine is continuing trust and confidence in the relationship between the parties” (id. [internal quotation marks omitted]). “‘What constitutes a loss of client confidence is fact specific, varying from case to case, but may be demonstrated by relevant documentary evidence involving the parties, or by the client’s actions'” (Tantleff v Kestenbaum & Mark, 131 AD3d 955, 957, quoting Farage v Ehrenberg, 124 AD3d at 168).

Here, the defendants established, prima facie, that the plaintiff’s legal malpractice and Judiciary Law § 487 causes of action were time-barred, as they accrued when the underlying actions were commenced in 2013 and 2015 (see Sclafani v Kahn, 169 AD3d 846, 849; Farage v Ehrenberg, 124 AD3d at 167-168). In opposition to the defendants’ prima facie showing, the plaintiff failed to raise a question of fact as to whether the continuous representation doctrine tolled the applicable statute of limitations. Contrary to the plaintiff’s contention, the record supports the Supreme Court’s determination that the relationship necessary to invoke the continuous representation doctrine ceased to exist on May 4, 2016, when the plaintiff demanded and received her file from the defendants’ office, thereby indicating her lack of trust and confidence in the parties’ relationship and her intention to discharge the defendants as her attorneys (see Aseel v Jonathan E Kroll & Assoc., PLLC, 106 AD3d at 1038). Moreover, numerous documented communications between the parties submitted by the plaintiff in opposition demonstrated that she lost all trust and confidence in the defendants, such that the attorney-client relationship ceased more than three years before the plaintiff commenced this action (see Sclafani v Kahn, 169 AD3d at 849; Farage v Ehrenberg, 124 AD3d at 160-161).”