Arising in the nature of inadvertant attorney client privilege, the question of meta data was recently discussed by Hinshaw:

"The D.C. Bar Association Legal Ethics Committee concluded that when a lawyer has actual knowledge that an adversary has inadvertently provided metadata in an electronic document, the lawyer should not review the metadata without contacting the sending lawyer and abiding by the sender’s instruction. This gives the sender the opportunity to determine if the metadata includes work product or confidential information of the sender’s client. In all other circumstances, however, the receiving lawyer is free to review the metadata contained in electronic files provided by an adversary"

Here is an interesting tidbit on fake lawyers, and the problems created by them. 

"The Problem of Barring Phony Lawyers from Practice

With so many bona fide lawyers struggling to obtain a job or attract clients, it’s hard to believe that some people not only manage to impersonate real lawyers, but find real business and jobs as well. As this article from the Stamford Advocate (11/2/07) describes, phony lawyers are a growing problem in Connecticut, with the bar handling fifty fake cases per year. In Connecticut, most of the fake lawyer cases involve "notarios" who purport to offer legal assistance in immigration cases. But there are other cases, such as that of Brian Valery, a paralegal who duped his employer Anderson, Kill & Olick into believing that he’d gone to law school and passed the bar while working at the firm.

Most incredible, there’s also the case of Howard Seidler, who has posed as a lawyer in courts around the country by using the name of a real lawyer, Howard Webber. Seidler sought admission by motion to the Connecticut bar, using another fake attorney by the name of Jermaine Johnson to sponsor him. The application contained several red flags; Seidler did not file an affidavit under oath and he and Johnson submitted the same bar number. But even though Seidler’s application slipped through, his performance gave him away. During voir dire for a DUI case, Seidler asked potential jurors questions such as whether they liked animals, whether they could "envision the coffee table in front of them" or describe a house that they might see if, hypothetically, they were in a forest and came to a clearing. Finding this line of questioning a little odd, the prosecutor checked Seidler’s background (who was using the name Webber) after the trial (the client was convicted after eight minutes) and discovered the fraud.

Seidler’s case is now in the hands of the criminal justice system and not the bar — he’s being prosecuted for fraud. As for Seidler’s client, he’ll get a new trial, and investigators will try to recoup the $18,000 that the client spent for Seidler’s service. In the meantime, Connecticut lawmakers are proposing legislation that would make unauthorized practice of law a felony punishable by at least a year in jail. Currently, the charge is a misdemeanor and according to bar officials, no one in Connecticut has ever been jailed for phony lawyering.

So the next time you’re up against an incompetent lawyer, don’t just laugh it off. Why not check the bar records — most are readily available on line — and make sure that your opponent is licensed to practice law?

Posted by Carolyn Elefant

They lost the huge legal malpractice case, he may be horse of the year.  It’s astudy in contrasts.  Plaintiffs may be tne new owners of the Preakness and the Breeders Cup Stakes Winner .

"A state judge has given the plaintiffs, in a lawsuit against three lawyers, the right to claim part ownership of the 3-year-old colt who has earned more than $5.1 million on the track.

Judge William Wehr said the plaintiffs can make the claim through Midnight Cry Stables, the company used by attorneys Shirley Cunningham Jr. and William Gallion to buy the horse for $57,000.

Cunningham and Gallion own a 20 percent stake in Preakness Stakes winner Curlin, who won the Classic on Saturday under Midnight Cry Stables’ blue and black colors. Curlin was third in the Kentucky Derby and second in the Belmont Stakes. and is likely to voted Horse of the Year.

The attorney for the 400-plus plaintiffs said the horse is now for sale, which prompted the move to claim Cunningham and Gallion’s assets. Angela Ford, the lawyer who represents the plaintiffs, said there have been discussions about both a private sale and a public auction of Curlin, but no decisions had been made as of Friday morning.

"I wouldn’t want to speculate on what he’s worth," Ford said.

Wehr’s order, issued late Thursday, comes in a case against Cunningham, Gallion and Lexington lawyer Melbourne Mills Jr. over the handling of a $200 million settlement in litigation over the diet drug fen-phen. Mills is not involved in the ownership of Curlin.

Wehr previously ruled that the attorneys bilked their clients of funds from the settlement and owe at least $42 million. Cunningham, Gallion and Mills are currently jailed in northern Kentucky awaiting a federal trial on charges of wire fraud stemming from the fen-phen settlement. They have pleaded not guilty."

This is really a horrible story.  Solo Attorney has a longtime office manager/secretary who uses the position to steal a lot of money from a client estate.  Secretary pleads guilty to crime.  Attorney left holding the bag.  Insurance company says it has no coverage for conversion. 

Q:  was it legal malpractice to allow the secretary such access/no oversight?

 

 

 

An often asked question in legal malpractice is: "what was the standard of good representation?  The following question is whether the attorney met that standard.  In trolling through the literature on this and other questions we ran across this interesting tidbit:  In West Virginia courts permit payment to jury researchers for indigent clients.  We have not heard of this before.

If this is the standard for criminal representation, is anything less for other defendants, criminal and civil, a deviation?

"Due diligence. Preparation. Undoubtedly, this is the most important responsibility that counsel owes to his or her client.

Inadequate representation due to poor preparation nearly always results in a negative outcome. Worst case scenario is the conviction of a criminal client who is innocent. But consider that the State of West Virginia provides public monies for trial research for indigent clients who are being represented by the Public Defender’s Office. Our firm has conducted multiple change of venue surveys for clients of the Public Defender’s office that were funded by taxpayer dollars. In each case, the judge approved the expenditure because the indigent client is entitled-the same as everyone else-to adequate representation. And trial research, like a court-appointed attorney, is considered essential to providing this adequate representation. "

When the statute starts to run in legal malpractice is an important consideration.  Here is a Pennsylvania case.  It’s a complex anaysis, taking into account the date of the mistake, the date that actual damage happens, and continuing representation [not mentioned in this case]. 

"In Wachovia v. Ferretti, the appeals court panel rejected Wachovia’s argument that it could not have brought a negligence claim against its attorney for an act that didn’t result in damages until years later.

The court instead ruled that the statute of limitations for a breach of contract claim starts when the duty is breached and is only tolled until the plaintiff should reasonably have found out about the claim — not until a judgment is entered or appeals are finished.

The appeals court pointed out that its ruling could require a client to pursue two legal actions with competing interests at the same time.

"We recognize Wachovia’s public policy arguments, including their argument that, if the statute of limitations is to accrue upon the breach of a duty, a plaintiff in a legal malpractice action would be forced to take competing positions while defending the underlying claim and prosecuting their own legal malpractice action premised on that underlying claim," Judge John T. Bender said for the panel.

"Although we recognize this potential dilemma, the overriding public policy concern is that not commencing legal malpractice actions in a timely fashion results in stale claims."
"In Wachovia v. Ferretti, the appeals court panel rejected Wachovia’s argument that it could not have brought a negligence claim against its attorney for an act that didn’t result in damages until years later.

The court instead ruled that the statute of limitations for a breach of contract claim starts when the duty is breached and is only tolled until the plaintiff should reasonably have found out about the claim — not until a judgment is entered or appeals are finished.

The appeals court pointed out that its ruling could require a client to pursue two legal actions with competing interests at the same time.

"We recognize Wachovia’s public policy arguments, including their argument that, if the statute of limitations is to accrue upon the breach of a duty, a plaintiff in a legal malpractice action would be forced to take competing positions while defending the underlying claim and prosecuting their own legal malpractice action premised on that underlying claim," Judge John T. Bender said for the panel.

"Although we recognize this potential dilemma, the overriding public policy concern is that not commencing legal malpractice actions in a timely fashion results in stale claims."

This is not legal malpractice.  The story is remarkable, however.  Judge calls colleigue a "fool" and a group of other judges don’t exactly disagree.  From Law.Com:

"Fulton Superior Court Judge Craig L. Schwall has told other members of the Fulton bench that Judge Hilton M. Fuller has bungled the Brian G. Nichols murder case and should be replaced.

In an Oct. 11 e-mail sent to all Fulton Superior Court judges, Schwall doesn’t mince words, calling Fuller a "fool" and "embarrassment," adding "Surely he can be replaced."

The full text of the e-mail reads (with original punctuation and capitalization):

"From: Schwall, Craig, To: All Superior Court Judges."

"Is there any way to replace the debacle and embarrassment Judge Fuller is. He is a disgrace and pulling all of us down .He is single handedly destroying the bench and indigent defense and eroding the public trust in the judiciary. See his latest order. He can not tell the legislature what to do. ENOUGH IS ENOUGH. .Surely he can be replaced. He is a Fool .How is it done. Seek mandamus for a trial? We should investigate if it can be done."

The e-mail is signed: "From not shy in 5C."

Schwall uses courtroom 5C. The Daily Report obtained the e-mail from a source who is not involved in the case. Two Fulton Superior Court judges, who asked not to be identified, verified the authenticity of the e-mail.

Speaking as a group, the judges acknowledged the e-mail and dissatisfaction with Fuller. Asked to comment on Schwall’s e-mail, the Fulton bench issued the following statement through its public information "

We will be speaking on this topic througout November, but here is a California case on the subject.  Its lesson:  the client confidence must be in issue.

"Case law does not “require dismissal whenever a law firm defendant suggests that client confidences are threatened,” Guilford wrote (.pdf). “Instead, they require a showing that the case can be tried fairly only by revealing client confidences. Irell represented the cable company and its chairman, uber-rich techie Paul Allen, in acquiring existing cable systems across the country. According to the tentative ruling (which had to assume the allegations are true), one of Irell’s associates mistakenly deleted two paragraphs of a contract, which led to Allen acquiring a type of stock he wasn’t supposed to. That forced Charter to pay Allen “millions of dollars” to undo the damage.

L.A.-based Irell tried to snuff the suit by arguing it could not defend itself without revealing Allen’s client confidences, over his objections. And while Guilford found that very well may end up the case, “the dust of initial posturing has not yet sufficiently settled” to determine whether Irell could mount a defense without breaking privilege.

The court found Irell had not yet pinpointed the specific privileged issues it needs to be able to discuss. "

Here is the story of a convicted ex-accountant who is selling a legal type service to inmates.  Now, he has problems.  Problem one:  he’s not an attorney, and authorities are determining whether he gave legal advice.  Problem two: a group of angry inmates and their families. They are paying big fees for his service to make a motion seeking dismissal and release, all based on a purported jurisdictional glitch back in the Truman era.

"A small Austin company, International Legal Services, advertises that it can free just about any federal prison inmate on appeal, even those who pleaded guilty or confessed — a dubious claim that even the most prestigious law firms would never make.

The key is supposed to be a legal argument, developed by employee Tony Davis, that claims the federal criminal code is invalid because Congress botched key legislation during the Truman administration. As a result, most criminal convictions obtained in the past 59 years should be tossed out, Davis argues.

Davis, however, is not a lawyer. He’s a former accountant who served almost 51/2 years in prison for fraud and money laundering — details International Legal Services fails to disclose to its clients, including about 160 inmates who paid up to $17,500 each for the company’s services, potentially generating fees topping $1 million.

Nor does the company, which Davis said is owned by his wife, disclose that its ballyhooed legal argument has yet to free one inmate since Davis first used it to challenge his own 1998 conviction."

Attorney fees are regulated, and may be most regulated in matrimonial settings.  22 NYCRR 1400 regulates how fees are calculated, how they are billed, and most importantly, what happens if the procedures are not followed.

In this case, Sheresky Aronson & Mayefsky LLP v. Whitmore, 117068/06 ,Decided: October 5, 2007
Justice Doris Ling-Cohan NEW YORK COUNTY Supreme Court , the law firm of Sheresky Aronson & Mayefsky LLP  successfully represented the wife in a matrimonial, and had their fees paid by the husband.  Nevertheless, they wanted a premium for successful conclusion, from the wife, and proposed a $ 150,000 reward.  The wife paid $ 50,000 and then balked.

Law firm loses, for its failures with regard to 22 NYCRR 1400.3.  "22 NYCRR 1400.3 was "’promulgated to address abuses in the practice of matrimonial law and to protect the public’" (Mulcahy v. Mulcahy, 285 AD2d 587, 588 [2d Dept], lv denied 97 NY2d 605 [2001], quoting Julien v. Machson, 245 AD2d 122, 122 [1st Dept 1997]). The requirement that attorneys execute written retainer agreements with matrimonial clients is found not only in the Rule, but also in Code of Professional Responsibility, in Disciplinary Rule (DR) 2-106 (c) (2) (b), which forbids attorneys from collecting "[a]ny fee in a domestic relations matter . . . unless a written agreement is signed by the lawyer and client setting forth in plain language the nature of the relationship and the details of the fee arrangement." It is well settled that an attorney’s noncompliance with the Rule generally precludes the attorney’s recovery of fees in domestic relations matters (see Ackerman v. Gebbia-Ackerman, 19 AD3d 519 [2d Dept], dismissed 6 NY3d 740 [2005]; Bishop v. Bishop, 295 AD2d 382 [2d Dept 2002]). "