An attorney may be fired for any reason at any time;  this is the rule in NY as well, apparently in California.  In this case, Mardirossian & Associates, Inc. v. Seth Ersoff, et al., ___Cal.Rptr.3d___, 2007 WL 1732896 (Cal.App. 2 Dist. 2007)  reported by Hinshaw attorneys were retained on a commercial case on a contingency.  They were fired, and the clients settled the case immediately thereafter.  What happens?

"Seth Ersoff and Sugar Ray Leonard retained Mardirossian & Associates, Inc. to represent them in a suit for breach of contract and fraud against Universal Management Services, Inc. (“UMSI”). Because of concerns about obtaining a recovery in the case, Mardirossian agreed to represent both Mr. Leonard and Mr. Ersoff for a 50 percent contingency fee of any settlement or award. The retainer agreement also provided that Mardirossian would have a lien on the cause of action for any recovery based on the reasonable value of legal services provided by Garo Mardirossian at $400 per hour and other firm attorneys at $220 per hour. The retainer further provided that if Mardirossian were discharged by the client, Mardirossian could seek the contingency fee or the reasonable value of services based on the quoted rates. Id. at *2.

After Garo Mardirossian had met personally with Mr. Ersoff and Mr. Leonard to determine he could represent both in the lawsuit, he obtained a signed waiver from each which stated they had “separate counsel with whom I have been given an opportunity to consult regarding this matter. I realize there may be conflicts between my goals and those of (Mr. Leonard or Mr. Ersoff). If there are any such conflicts of interest, I waive them.” Id. at fn. 2. After Mardirossian had filed the complaint, worked the case for seven months and prepared for a mediation scheduled for April 1999, Mr. Ersoff terminated the firm and settled the case nine days later for $3.7 million, while represented by a new firm. Id. at *2.

In November 2002, Mardirossian filed a complaint for quantum meruit seeking at least 50 percent of the $3.7 million settlement. The lower court found in favor of Mardirossian and held that it was entitled to reimbursement for the reasonable amount of hours worked on the case six years earlier. Since no hourly time records had been kept on this contingency matter, the attorneys who worked on the case reviewed the file and testified that they had spent approximately 3,700 hours on the case. The jury determined that 2,392 hours were reasonable for reimbursement, which resulted in an award of $645,440, plus interest. This appeal by Mr. Ersoff followed. Id. at *5.

Mr. Ersoff argued on appeal that because detailed time records were not kept by Mardirossian, the testimony from the firm’s attorneys regarding the estimated hours spent on the file was merely guesswork and should have been excluded from evidence. Id. at *6. The court rejected Mr. Ersoff’s argument, noting that there was no legal requirement that an attorney submit billing statements to support an attorney fee claim. “An attorney’s testimony as to the number of hours worked is sufficient evidence to support an award of attorney fees, even in the absence of detailed time records.” Steiny & Co. v. California Electric Supply Co., 79 Cal.App.4th 285, 293, 93 Cal.Rptr.2d 920 (2000). The court rejected the cases cited as supporting precedent by Mr. Ersoff. It also noted that this case was distinguishable because each of the attorneys who testified had personal knowledge of the services performed for Mr. Ersoff and testified about the complexity of the issues and extent of the work that was necessary. 2007 WL 1732896 at *7. These are the types of factors relevant to proving the reasonableness of the fees, factors which also include the attorney’s skill and learning as well as age and experience. See Los Angeles v. Los Angeles-Inyo Farms. Co., 25 P.2d 224 (1933). It was appropriate for the parties to use expert witnesses to also address the issue of reasonableness. See Mattheisen v. Smith, 60 P.2d 873 (1936). The fact that the jury awarded less than the number of hours claimed by Mardirossian indicated that the jury had evaluated the testimony of the Mardirossian attorneys as to the time spent, as well as the expert testimony on the issue and had substantial evidence to support their findings.

Mr. Ersoff also contended that Mardirossian violated California Rule of Professional Conduct 3-310, which provides that an attorney may not represent multiple clients where the interests of the clients may potentially conflict without written consent following written disclosure. 2007 WL 1732896 at *12. The court noted that whether forfeiture of the right to collect the fees is appropriate depends on the egregious nature of the violation. Id. at *14, citing Pringle v. La Chapelle, 87 Cal.Rptr.2d 90 (1999). The court upheld the findings below that the written consent was adequate but that even if it was not, any violation was not egregious and therefore did not justify fee disgorgement. The court also agreed with the lower court that Mr. Ersoff would be unjustly enriched if his fee obligation to Mardirossian were excused. "

This news article in Law.Com reports on the Pan Am v. Sheppard Mullin law suit:

"According to the complaint, Nadolny had forged a $320,000 bond meant to secure a settlement Pan Am had reached with the Air Line Pilots Association. When inspectors from the bond company came calling, Nadolny turned to attorneys at Sheppard Mullin, including John Fornaciari, a partner and white-collar defense attorney at the firm, for advice on how to best handle the insurance company’s investigation. Nadolny had worked with Fornaciari in the past on Pan Am-related litigation in New England and in Florida.

Sheppard Mullin agreed to take Nadolny on as a client, but here’s the interesting part: For several months it allegedly didn’t inform Pan Am that it had done so, nor did it alert Pan Am to the problem with the pending bond. Pan Am alleges that this clandestine relationship resulted in damage to the company’s reputation and a snarled Transportation Department proceeding that has remained stalled for two years.

And the bond, which Nadolny conjured out of thin air complete with a forged signature, wasn’t the only misdeed involved. The former Pan Am senior vice president and general counsel pleaded guilty in late March in the U.S. District Court of New Hampshire to providing false financial information to the Transportation Department and was sentenced last week to six months in a federal prison. "

In this New OrleansCase:

"NEW ORLEANS – A federal appeals panel on Sept. 13 reversed and remanded a district court order dismissing a legal malpractice claim against an errors and omissions insurer and its insured law firm because the claimant had suffered a compensable injury sufficient to assert a legal malpractice claim (H.S. Stanley Jr., in his capacity as trustee of the bankruptcy estate of Gary Eugene Hale v. Clare W. Trinchard, etc., et al., Clare W. Trinchard, Esq., Trinchard & Trinchard Llc, Leigh Ann Schell; Clarendon National Insurance Co.; H. S. Stanley, Jr., in his capacity as trustee of the bankruptcy estate of Gary Eugene Hale, v. Clare W. Trinchard, etc., et al., Northwestern National Ins. Co. Of Milwaukee, Wis., Nos. 06-30120, c/w 06-30299, 5th Cir.; 2007 U.S. App. LEXIS 21937"

This is a shocking story.  "EDMOND, Okla. — Police have arrested an attorney from Edmond on numerous charges after they say he robbed the same pharmacy three times within an 11-minute time span.

Authorities said Robert Behlen, 50, swallowed painkillers before leaving Barrett Drug Center for the final time on Tuesday morning. Police later arrested Behlen at his home on complaints of armed robbery, kidnapping and pointing a firearm.

Edmond police spokeswoman Glynda Chu said Behlen pointed the gun at employees and took several bottles of painkillers from the pharmacy, going in and out of the business three times in quick fashion. Chu said when officers found Behlen at his home, he did not cooperate and an officer used a Taser weapon on Behlen while making the arrest.

State court records list Behlen as an attorney on dozens of civil litigation cases. A phone message left at Behlen’s law office Wednesday morning was not immediately returned.

Chu said Behlen was taken to Edmond Medical Center after his arrest. He was released from the hospital Wednesday morning and processed by Edmond police before being taken to the Oklahoma County jail, she said. "

A classic expression we have heard is that if "x" was not able to be an attorney he would have been digging ditches or sewers.  Here is a case from Kentucky which combines the best of both worlds.

"MATHERLY LAND SURVEYING, INC. V. GARDINER PARK DEVELOPMENT
TORTS: LEGAL NEGLIGENCE; INDEMNITY
CIVIL PROCEDURE: STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS
2005-SC-000576-DG.pdf
2006-SC-000163-DG.pdf
PUBLISHED: REVERSING
OPINION OF THE COURT BY SCOTT
FROM: JEFFERSON
DATE RENDERED: 08/23/2007

SYNOPSIS: Engineering and Land Surveying (as a part of the engineering services) are professional services under KRS 413.245 and although damages were not EXACT they did not toll the statute of limitations.

Gardiner hired Matherly to design sewers and roads for a subdivision. Gardiner alleged that Matherly’s work was incorrect and hired other companies to finish the subdivision project. Gardiner also alleged that their attorneys committed malpractice by allowing the statute of limitations to run. The trial court granted the Matherly’s motion for summary judgment on the grounds that Gardiner’s claims were barred by KRS 403.245, Kentucky’s one-year professional services statute of limitations. The Trial court reasoned that Matherly performed engineering services that were supervised by a professional–the engineer. The Court of Appeals reversed on the grounds that Matherly also performed land surveying, which it opined was NOT a professional service and under KRS 413.245. Kentucky Supreme Court disagreed and held that Matherly held itself out as a professional engineering firm and had a professional engineer overseeing work on the ENTIRE project–even the land surveying. In addition, Gardiner believed Matherly was going to perform engineering services. The Supreme Court held that both the engineering and land surveying by Matherly were "professional" and subject to KRS 413.245. The court also held that Gardiner’s action was time barred and even if the exact damages may not have been known. Lastly the court rules that KRS 413.120 does not apply because this action is not an indemnity action. "

This attorney was working for the local township and was sued.  Now,  News Transcript reports that he might have a political prosecution defense, and may have either shielded, hid or voided his legal malpractice insurance.

"Ajudge’s ruling in Manalapan’s lawsuit against a former township attorney leaves both sides preparing for a possible trial.

On Sept. 11 state Superior Court Judge Terence P. Flynn, sitting in Freehold, denied attorney Stuart Moskovitz’s motion to dismiss a lawsuit that was filed against him by the Manalapan Township Committee.

Moskovitz was Manalapan’s municipal attorney in 2005.

Moskovitz said on Sept. 17 that he will now prepare a motion in which he will seek summary judgment in an attempt to have the lawsuit thrown out. He said it could be several months before he presents that motion to the court. Moskovitz said he may need to conduct depositions in order to prepare that document.

In a lawsuit filed in June, Manalapan officials allege that Moskovitz breached his responsibility to the township in 2005 at the time he was serving as the municipal attorney when he drew up a contract of sale for the township’s purchase of two single-family homes on Route 522 in front of the Manalapan Recreation Center.

A home at 95 Freehold Road (Route 522) was purchased for $432,000 and a home at 93 Freehold Road was purchased for $465,500. The township took possession of the properties on June 8, 2005. "

Reported in today’s NYLJ by Joel Stashenko, is the Court of Appeals affirmance of a dismissal in an estate legal malpractice case. 

"The state Court of Appeals yesterday upheld the dismissal of a legal malpractice action against the firm formerly known as Goodkind Labaton Rudoff & Sucharow. Jack E. Maurer, who died in 2005 at age 86, contended in a 2003 suit that his attorneys misled him into signing away control of his estate. Among Mr. Maurer’s holdings were a $12 million apartment on Central Park West and a $3 million home on Long Island. He also contended the law firm was conflicted because it represented his wife, Rona, at the same time it was handling his estate planning. In an unsigned unanimous ruling in Bishop v. Maurer, 162, the Court agreed with the Appellate Division, First Department (NYLJ, Oct. 25, 2006) that while Mr. Maurer was generally bound by the estate planning documents he signed, he was not precluded from bringing a malpractice action if his attorneys negligently gave him an incorrect explanation of their contents. The Court ruled, however, that Mr. Maurer’s complaint was "devoid" of nonconclusory allegations of what his attorneys failed to tell him or how he was otherwise misled or given incorrect advice. Prior to his death, Mr. Maurer was chief executive officer of a financial research and consulting firm, Indicator Research Group. The law firm is now known as Labaton Sucharow & Rudoff."

In this upstate Legal Malpractice Case, plaintiffs entered into a high stakes high risk real estate and mortgage deal with sellers, who were encumbered and hounded by the IRS, County tax liens, and other debts.  Sales, mortgages, liens and law suits later the results of a legal malpractice case:

"It is undisputed that prior to accepting the mortgage, plaintiff was aware that its $300,000 loan which carried a 16% interest rate was a high risk transaction, as the Carneys had in excess of $1 million in judgments and liens at the time the loan was made. Indeed, the Carneys indebtedness to the Internal Revenue Service alone exceeded $955,000. Significantly, the $300,000 loan proceeds check was made directly payable to the Internal Revenue Service, which accepted this sum in partial satisfaction of the Carneys’ indebtedness and agreed to subordinate its remaining liens to plaintiff’s mortgage. Hence, the value of plaintiff’s security interest, even before the tax certificates were sold, was impacted by the superior liens of the unpaid property taxes. Had plaintiff acquired the property through foreclosure, for example, the taxes still would have had to be satisfied, the Carney debt would have been eliminated and, as such, so would any damages to plaintiff stemming from defendants’ alleged malpractice (see Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co. v Roslyn Estates, Inc., 266 App Div 244, 248-249 [1943], affd 293 NY 680 [1944]).

We must also reject plaintiff’s assertion that it has, nevertheless, been damaged by the loss of its opportunity to foreclose on the mortgage because the tax sale certificates had already been sold when the Carneys defaulted, giving the holder of the certificates the right to apply for a deed free of plaintiff’s mortgage. Plaintiff knew that in order to protect the mortgage, the rapidly accumulating unpaid real property tax liability would ultimately have to be satisfied. Thus, any failure by defendants to report the precise significance of the real property tax liability as of the closing is of no real consequence under these circumstances [FN1]. When plaintiff became aware that [*5]the tax sale certificates had been sold, an opportunity still existed to purchase them from their holder. The resulting devaluation of plaintiff’s security interest was no greater than it had been as a result of plaintiff’s acceptance of the mortgage with full knowledge of the outstanding tax liens. In fact, Corvetti was able to purchase the tax sale certificates from TCA in December 1996 at essentially the then current cost of satisfying the original tax liens.[FN2]

Thus, we conclude that the purchase of the tax sale certificates and ultimate acquisition of the property would have placed plaintiff in essentially the same position that it would have been in had it been able to foreclose on the property. Plaintiff argues, however, that it remains damaged because it was Corvetti and his wife, rather than plaintiff, that ultimately took title to the property. We reject this argument because, in our view, the facts presented represent one of those rare opportunities where we are able to find, as a matter of law, that a breach of fiduciary duty occurred (see Matter of Greenberg [Madison Cabinet & Interiors], 206 AD2d 963, 964 [1994]). By acquiring the property personally rather than on behalf of plaintiff, Corvetti misappropriated a corporate opportunity in breach of his fiduciary duty as president of plaintiff. Thus, any damage to plaintiff as a result of the tax sale was caused by Corvetti, rather than the alleged negligence of defendants.