Hinshaw & Culbertson LLP  reports an Ohio Collectability case.  Here, no reduction for uncollectability.  Ohio Appellate Court Rejects Collectability in Underlying Case as Limit on Recovery in Legal Malpractice Action

Paterek v. Peterson & Ibold, 2006 WL 2337483 (Ohio App. 11 Dist. 2006)

In this 2-1 appellate court decision, the majority held that the trial court had improperly reduced a legal malpractice verdict resulting from a blown statute of limitations on the ground that the amount of the legal malpractice verdict exceeded what would have been collectible from the underlying tort defendant and his insurer.

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Plaintiff loses employment discrimination case due to legal malpractice.  Bad so far?  Plaintiff sues her attorney.  Her attorney defaults on discovery responsbilities, defaults on appearances, generally tries to screw around.  Plaintiff gets default judgment against attorney.  Getting a little better?

Attorney suffers default judgment and files bankruptcy.  Held, in this case, the default judgment is dischargeable, and plaintiff takes nothing.  A nightmare.

Reported all over the news today, Barry Scheck and his partners settled a legal malpractice law suit for the sum of $ 900,000.  This case went to the Court of Appeals which ruled that Scheck timely filed the suit, but verified it himself, rather than obtaining a plaintiff verification.  The plaintiff had been wrongfully convicted of rape.  A report.

Here is a story from Sullivan County telling of a revolving door for attorneys in an architectural malpractice suit.  "Sullivan West has fired two attorneys’ firms handling a number of lawsuits associated with the construction of the Lake Huntington campus. On Thursday night, the board dismissed Westchester attorney John Osborn, who was handling the district’s case against Hilliard Construction. The district is suing the architect for malpractice.

Also gone is Poughkeepsie’s Shaw & Perelson, which was defending the district in suits brought by former contractors.

"It was time for a change," Board President Arthur Norden said.

The majority of the board wasn’t satisfied with the progress of lawsuits that have dragged on for more than three years, Norden said. To date, Sullivan West has spent about $1.3 million on litigation associated with the Lake Huntington building project. The attorneys also weren’t keeping board members in the loop, he said.

The board has hired Albany-based Bond, Schoeneck & King to take over the cases. "

Hinshaw & Culbertson LLP  reports a change in DC disciplinary rules.

 "The District of Columbia Court of Appeals has announced amendments to the District of Columbia RPCs. Effective February 1, 2007, the District of Columbia Rules of Professional Conduct will allow the disclosure of confidential information when a lawyer’s services have been used to further a crime or fraud. In fact, such disclosure will be mandatory pursuant to new RPC 4.1(b) if disclosure is necessary to avoid assisting a client’s criminal or fraudulent act. "

The Jockey’s Guild has brought a legal malpractice case against its attorney.  They cite a default judgment and other losing tactics.

 "The Jockey’s Guild has filed a lawsuit against the organization’s former legal counsel claiming he and others were negligent in their responsibilities to protect the financial interests of the Guild and its 1,300 member-jockeys at race tracks around the country.

The complaint against Los Angeles lawyer, Lloyd Ownbey, and un-named co-defendants was filed in Los Angeles Superior Court. It alleges they committed errors and omissions that led to a quarter-million-dollar default court judgment against the Guild, and that Ownbey failed to properly disclose "unfair and onerous terms" of contractual dealings involving the Guild’s former National Manger, Wayne Gertmenian, who was fired last December. " The article.

Accountant malpractice is very similar to legal malpractice.  Continuous representation is one aspect.  Here is an Appellate reversal of a New York County Supreme Court case where Justice Kornreich found continuous representation, but the AD reversed in Booth v. Kriegel.

"Accountant I. Stanley Kriegel admits that for 17 straight years he failed to advise his client, actress Connie Booth — a U.S. citizen who lives in the United Kingdom — that a 1985 British-American agreement exempted her from paying Social Security taxes.

Yesterday, the Appellate Division, First Department, reversed, and dismissed Ms. Booth’s case.

"We hold that the continuous representation doctrine does not apply under these facts because, regardless of the common mistake affecting the tax returns, each return was a separate and discrete transaction," Justice David Friedman (See Profile) wrote for the unanimous panel in Booth v. Kriegel, 9312. "Therefore, any claim arising from the preparation of each successive tax return accrued, and the statute of limitations on that claim began to run, upon the completion of the services relating to that return." "

Here is a problem that shows up with frequency:  Is it legal malpracitce not to "freeze" or insulate the retirement account in a matrimonial action after agreement/verdict and before actual transfer.

Often, there is a long delay between agreement and transfer of the IRA or Pension accounts between H & W.  Market changes make this a nightmare.  For example, if the W is given 50% of the retirement account, and in the 12 months between agreement and actual transfer it declines 15%, who takes the loss?  Was she granted a sum certain as of the date of agreement, or a percentage certain as of the date of transfer.  Here is an interesting case.  An exerpt:

"While Lappin v. Greenberg is still in pleadings, it sets the stage for an interesting decision on this issue.  So construed, the complaint sufficiently asserts that defendants’ inordinate delay in effecting the stipulated transfer of funds resulted in a loss of principal attributable to defendants’ lack of professional diligence. For purposes of this appeal, we reject the intimation that plaintiff must be treated as an investor who implicitly assumed the market risk inherent in an investment vehicle such as the Plan "

Finally, at this stage of the proceedings, we are not prepared to rule that defendants’ failure to fix the value of the Plan in the stipulated agreement or otherwise insulate plaintiff from the market risk attendant upon a delay in transfer and distribution of the proceeds cannot be deemed a lapse in the exercise of professional diligence."