1. Amcan Holdings, Inc. v. Torys LLP,</em> 8637N, Index 115392/04, 590097/05 , SUPREME COURT OF NEW YORK, APPELLATE DIVISION, FIRST DEPARTMENT , 2006 NY Slip Op 6308;
This US and Canadian legal malpractice case, reported by us much earlier in its life, has been fought on two fronts, Essex County and New York County. The claim is that Tory’s , a Canadian law firm, helped to damage plaintiffs through a conflict of interest. Plaintiffs claim that Torys chose to favor a big bank rather than them, and caused multi-millions in damage. Plaintiff Grey, himeslf an attorney, was jailed for contempt as part of this case. “In the absence of demonstrated [**8] prejudice to plaintiffs, it was an abuse of discretion to deny consolidation” (Raboy v McCrory Corp., 210 A.D.2d 145, 147, 621 N.Y.S.2d 14 ). The actions should thus be consolidated under the New York County index number, since “Absent exceptional circumstances involving the convenience of material witnesses, the venue of a consolidated action should be the county in which the first action was commenced” (Teitelbaum, 6 AD3d at 255).” Now the matter is consolidated in New York County. Very interesting legal malpractice case, and may well end in a multi-million dollar result.
2. Simmons v. Edelstein, 2004-10854, 2004-10856, (Index No. 18168/03) , SUPREME COURT OF NEW YORK, APPELLATE DIVISION, SECOND DEPARTMENT , 2006 NY Slip Op 6228; TYhis opinion tells us that the 3211[a] dismissal was affirmed. Apparently plaintiff did not convince the panel that the mistake was a proximate cause of the damage.However, no information is given in the decision. “To survive dismissal, the complaint must show that, but for counsel’s alleged malpractice, the plaintiff would not have sustained some actual ascertainable damages (see Pellegrino v File, 291 A.D.2d 60, 63, 738 N.Y.S.2d 320). The Supreme Court properly determined that the plaintiff failed to allege a cognizable cause of action to recover damages for legal malpractice (see Menicucci Villa & Assoc., PLLC v Pickett, 24 A.D.3d 734, 805 N.Y.S.2d 853; Edwards v Haas, supra).”
3. Brady v. Bisogno & Meyerson, 2005-04314, (Index No. 32094/02) , SUPREME COURT OF NEW YORK, APPELLATE DIVISION, SECOND DEPARTMENT , 2006 NY Slip Op 6144; “In the instant case, the affidavit of the defendants’ expert established, prima facie, that the defendants followed the accepted and customary practices of the legal profession in determining which party controlled or maintained the parking lot where the injured plaintiff fell (see generally Zuckerman v City of New York, 49 N.Y.2d 557, 562, 404 N.E.2d 718, 427 N.Y.S.2d 595). The affidavit of the plaintiffs’ expert failed to rebut this, and stated only in [**3] conclusory fashion that the defendants should have been able to determine that the subject property was controlled by a third party. HN3Conclusory expert opinions are insufficient to raise a triable issue of fact (see Schrader v Sunnyside Corp., 297 A.D.2d 369, 371, 747 N.Y.S.2d 26). Therefore, the Supreme Court properly granted the defendants’ motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint and denied the plaintiffs’ cross motion for summary judgment on the issue of liability.” This matter was brought by Julien & Schlesinger, which is not a customary legal malpractice player. Apparently the wrong party was sued in a trip and fall.
4. Mega Group, Inc. v. Pechenik & Curro, P.C., 98694 , SUPREME COURT OF NEW YORK, APPELLATE DIVISION, THIRD DEPARTMENT , 2006 NY Slip Op 6108; ). Fact laden decision based upon a plethora of prior litigation between the parties. “Here, an attorney-client relationship existed between Mega and the attorneys, and Mega’s pleadings contain sufficient facts to support the conclusion that the attorneys were negligent in defending Mega in the Halton action. As Supreme Court properly found, however, Mega has failed to state facts sufficient to find that it has suffered any actual and ascertainable damages.
First, Mega cannot claim any disadvantage in negotiating the sale by virtue of the attorneys’ alleged negligence in connection with the Halton action because neither Mega nor MPL claims any knowledge that Halton had in fact made cross claims against Mega when the sale took place (see Busino v Meachem, supra at 608). Further, although a default judgment was entered against Mega in the Halton action, it is clear from the record that Mega did not pay that judgment and the judgment has now been satisfied;”