In this New Jersey Case , DIANNE VIGLIONE v.CHRISTINE FARRINGTON, ESQ.,  we find the NJ Supreme Court discussing the emotional and cerebral aspects of matrimonial litigation, and giving the plaintiff a little breathing room in bringing this legal malpractice case.  Does this portend a different rule for matrimonial legal malpractice cases in NJ?

Great emotional pain and stress are attached to contested matrimonial proceedings, where "the client’s desires may be influenced in large measure by the advice the lawyer provides[.]" Ziegelheim v. Apollo, 128 N.J. 250, 261 (1992). An economically dependent spouse relies on his or her matrimonial attorney to lead the way through the litigation labyrinth to the path of future economic security. Nothing in this record suggests that plaintiff knew or should have known that defendant had taken her off-course. While plaintiff expressed disappointment with the final divorce settlement, she had no reason to know that defendant’s advice regarding the resolution of the alimony and equitable distribution issues upon the termination of her long-term marriage, were significantly flawed.

Plaintiff’s acceptance of defendant’s expertise, supporting her lack of knowledge that malpractice had occurred, was accentuated by plaintiff’s execution of a post-judgment retainer agreement with defendant one month following the divorce settlement. Had plaintiff possessed the knowledge that legal malpractice occurred, she would likely not have engaged defendant to provide new legal services.

Also, we do not agree that plaintiff’s conversation with Ruitenberg prior to signing the PSA provided sufficient notice of the "facts essential to the malpractice claim," Vastano, supra, 178 N.J. at 236 (quoting Grunwald, supra, 131 N.J. at 494), such that her cause of action accrued. Ruitenberg, an accountant, is unqualified to give legal advice. Further, the record reveals Ruitenberg also told plaintiff "you have to listen to your attorney." And plaintiff did just that by accepting the PSA. Her actions are not only understandable, but were reasonable, under the totality of the circumstances. Giving plaintiff the benefit of the discovery rule, we conclude her cause of action was not barred by the six-year statute of limitations, N.J.S.A. 2A:14-1, when her malpractice complaint was filed.

The motion judge’s tangential comments regarding the defenses of waiver and estoppel raise fact-sensitive issues, which cannot properly be determined in a motion for summary judgment. The specific representations by Corcoran, as well as any assertions by plaintiff in the post-judgment hearing before Judge Humphreys, need to be further examined.

Finally, we determine the motion judge must again review her discretionary denial of plaintiff’s application to amend her complaint to add an additional cause of action for malpractice based on defendant’s alleged violation of RPC 1.4, 1.7, and 1.8. Because the motion judge’s conclusion was bottomed on the dismissal of the complaint as barred by the statute of limitations, which decision we have reversed, consideration of plaintiff’s request must be made and fairly evaluated in the light of our disposition. "