The Attorney judgment rule holds that no attorney may be held liable for a strategic decision which was reasonable both objectively and subjectively. This may include choices of questions at trial, selection of experts, choices of evidence.
Here is a story from Hinshaw, of a Michigan Case: Bowman v. Gruel Mills Nims & Pylman, LLP, 2007 WL 1203580 (W.D. Mich. April 24, 2007)
"A federal district court in Michigan has held in a legal malpractice case that an attorney was precluded from obtaining summary judgment under the “attorney judgment rule” because he violated the Michigan Rules of Professional Conduct requirement that he keep his client informed of important decisions. Bowman retained attorney Gruel to seek maximum retirement benefits. Gruel consulted with an employee benefits specialist, attorney Stevenson, who advised that if Gruel sought to recover the retirement benefits by asserting causes of action under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA), the claim would face “a number of significant obstacles.”
Gruel filed suit in state court seeking recovery solely under a state law theory of breach of contract. Knape & Vogt contended that ERISA preempted the claim. In response, Gruel contended that Bowman had been wrongfully denied benefits in violation of § 1132(a)(1)(B) of ERISA. The case was tried to the state court judge, who applied ERISA to Bowman’s claim. The judge ruled that under ERISA, the Administrative Committee’s decision to deny maximum retirement benefits was not “arbitrary and capricious.” The trial judge then applied a theory that Gruel had not raised, and ruled that Bowman was entitled to maximum retirement benefits under ERISA based on a promissory estoppel theory.
A Michigan appellate court reversed the trial court’s award of benefits, ruling that the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over § 1132(a)(3) of ERISA, which was the basis for the promissory estoppel claim. Instead, the appellate court held, state courts have subject matter jurisdiction only over claims under § 1132(a)(1)(B) of ERISA, which applies to wrongful denial of benefits. The Michigan Supreme Court denied leave to appeal.
Bowman sued Gruel for legal malpractice for seeking recovery under a state law breach of contract claim rather than under ERISA, and for failing to advise him that recovery would not be sought under ERISA. Gruel moved for summary judgment based on the “attorney judgment rule” and on the grounds of causation. The court ruled that Gruel was not entitled to summary judgment under the attorney judgment rule, but that he was entitled to partial summary judgment on the ground of causation. "