This is a seminal, important case which will, we predict, be widely cited and discussed in Legal Malpractice.   Barnett v. Schwartz, 2007 NY Slip Op. 09712, 2d Dept, December 11, 2007 is important for several reasons. We’ll discuss the first here

“But for” causation is not as difficult as had previously been believed.

Does the failure to exercise” that degree of care, skill and diligence commonly possessed and exercised by members of the legal community.” have to be “the” proximate cause of damages? Must it be “a” proximate cause of damages?

The Appellate Division says that it must be nether “the” or “a” proximate cause of action, but simply requires proof that “but for” the negligence of the defendant-attorney, the plaintiff-client would have prevailed in the underlying action.”

This formulation does not require a greater, more direct degree of causation, and the Appellate Division did not find a “substantive import to the variations in the formulations discussed above, holding that a plaintiff-client in a legal malpractice action need prove only that the defendant-attorney’s negligence was a proximate cause of damages.”

“But for” causation is not synonymous with sole proximate cause, and it is not required that the degree of causation in legal malpractice be any greater than “proximate cause. i.e., greater than that which must be typically proved as against any other professional or lay defendant in a negligence action. There is no case which singles out attorneys for “special treatment on causation.”