On some ocassions, the dissection of a case yields interesting insights. Here is a Second Department Case: Petersen v Lysaght, Lysaght & Kramer, P.C. , 2008 NY Slip Op 00472
Decided on January 22, 2008 ,Appellate Division, Second Department which illustrates several points:
1. Some cases are a problem from begining to end. In this case there have been three appeals, and the case ends when plaintiff fails to file a note of issue, and cannot explain why, or show a meritorious case.
2. Nassau and Suffolk notes of issue dates are sacrosanct. "The certification order of the Supreme Court dated February 3, 2006, directing the plaintiff to file a note of issue within 90 days and warning that the action would be deemed dismissed without further order of the court if the plaintiff failed to comply with that directive, had the same effect as a valid 90-day notice pursuant to CPLR 3216 (see Louis v MTA Long Is. Bus Co., 44 AD3d 628; Hoffman v Kessler, 28 AD3d 718).
3. Louis is more often cited for the proposition that the order of court [Kings, for example] did not have the same effect as a CPLR 3216 notice.
4. It is usually a bad sign when the plaintiff-Appellant’s attorney is not listed on the appellate decision. Generally, it means that the attorney did not ask for, or attend for oral argument. Often a bad choice, it tells the court that appellant is not really interested in the outcome.
5. This court determined that everyone here made mistakes:
"Moreover, the plaintiff’s motion papers failed to establish the existence of a meritorious cause of action. Contrary to the plaintiff’s contention, we have not previously decided this issue in his favor. On a prior appeal, we held that the Supreme Court should have denied those branches of a motion by the defendants Lysaght, Lysaght & Kramer, P.C., Peter Kramer, and Michael Balducci (hereinafter the defendants) which were to dismiss certain of the plaintiff’s causes of action insofar as asserted against them as barred by the doctrine of collateral estoppel (see Petersen v Lysaght, Lysaght & Kramer, 250 AD2d 581). On a second prior appeal, we held that the Supreme Court should have denied a motion by the defendants for summary judgment dismissing the same causes of action, on the ground that they failed to establish their prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law (see Petersen v Lysaght, Lysaght & Kramer, 288 AD2d 281). Finally, on a third prior appeal, we reversed so much of an order of the Supreme Court as granted a motion by the defendants for leave to renew their prior summary judgment motion, on the ground that they failed to meet the requirements of CPLR 2221(e)(3)(see Petersen v Lysaght, Lysaght & Kramer, P.C., 19 AD3d 391). Thus, we have never previously held that the subject causes of action are, in fact, meritorious.
6. One really should put everything into demonstrating a meritorious cause of action. "To establish the merit of his claims, the plaintiff tendered a copy of his verified complaint, which, in relevant part, stated that "[t]he defendants made no efforts to secure a default judgment" against a defendant in an underlying personal injury action, thereby committing legal malpractice. Without even a modicum of proof that a default judgment properly could have been obtained against that defendant in the underlying action (see Woodson v Mendon Leasing Corp., 100 NY2d 62, 70-71; CPLR 3215[f]), we cannot conclude that the plaintiff established the existence of a meritorious cause of action to recover damages for legal malpractice.