Legal Malpractice litigation is a world apart from the rest of regular litigation ; it has its own rules, it has its own prinicipals, and is the sole set of rules written by attorneys to regulate attorneys. Criminal legal malpractice is a world within a world…not unlike a russian doll set.
Here, in a Federal District Court case, we see how criminal defense attorneys enjoy almost total freedom from legal malpractice suits, and how a defamation law suit for words spoken in litigation will have little heft.
In Sash v. Rosahn, 08 cv 4032; Decided: June 16, 2009 ; District Judge Barbara S. Jones;U.S. DISTRICT COURT; SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
"Plaintiffs bring a variety of claims stemming from Rosahn’s legal representation of Sash at an April 2005 parole revocation hearing, during which Sash pled guilty with explanation to violations of conditional release.
The Court construes Plaintiffs’ Complaint to state claims of legal malpractice, defamation, and intentional and/or negligent infliction of emotional harm.3
Specifically, Sash alleges that Rosahn committed malpractice in ineffectively representing him at a 2005 parole revocation hearing (including allegations that Rosahn failed to move to suppress certain evidence potentially relevant to the hearing, that Rosahn arranged with officers of the court to "fix" the hearing against Sash, and that Rosahn abaondoned representation of Sash following the hearing), defamed Sash in conversation with officers of the Court following the hearing, and intentionally or negligently inflicted emotional harm on Plaintiff Sash therein.4
On January 17, 2003, Plaintiff Sash was sentenced to a term of one to three years following a guilty plea on a second-degree forgery charge. Sash was placed on conditional release in January of 2005. In February 2005, Sash was arrested at his wife’s residence in New Jersey for violation of his conditional release (leaving the state of New York without permission).
On April 4, 2005, at a parole revocation hearing, Sash pled guilty with explanation to violating the conditions of his release. Rosahn, then an employee of the Legal Aid Society of New York, represented Sash during that hearing and provided the explanation to the charges as requested by Sash.
Directly following the hearing Rosahn spoke with the administrative law judge and the parole specialist, during which conversation transcripts indicate that Rosahn stated, "thank you for biting your tongue," and "I had to bite my tongue," Comp. paras. 41-42. The Complaint alleges that these statements referred to Sash.
"[t]o state a cause of action for legal malpractice arising from negligent misrepresentation in a criminal proceeding, plaintiff must allege his innocence or a colorable claim of innocence of the underlying offense." Sash v. Dudley, No. 05-cv-7498, 2006 WL 997256, at **2-3 (S.D.N.Y. April 17, 2006); Carmel v. Lunney, 518 N.Y.S.2d 605, 607 (1987). It is well established under New York law that "so long as the determination of [a plaintiff’s] guilt for that offense remains undisturbed, no cause of action will lie." Id. A guilty plea will therefore generally preclude a defendant from lodging a malpractice claim against his defense lawyer. See Scanio v. Palmiere & Pellegrino, 674 N.Y.S.2d 527, 528 (4th Dep’t 1998); see also Estes v. Doe, No. 97 Civ. 8133, 1999 WL 983886, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 29, 1999). "Thus, a criminal defendant cannot even state a claim for legal malpractice until his conviction is overturned or vacated."