Here is how a borrowing statute affects litigation and why a Pennsylvania statute of limitations applies to New York litigation.  CPLR 202 requires that when a nonresident sues on a cause of action accruing outside New York, CPLR 202 requires the cause of action to be timely under the limitations periods of both New York and the jurisdiction where the cause of action accrued.   "This prevents nonresidents from shopping in New York for a favorable Statute of Limitations." Global Financial Corp v. Triarc, 93 NY2d 525 (1999).

In Merritt v. Blumenthal, Supreme Court, New York County, Fried, J. we find:

" New York’s borrowing statute, CPLR §202, applies to determine the statute of limitations that governs the malpractice and Judiciary Code claims at issue here. The parties’ dispute regards the outcome of the application of CPLR §202. Specifically, Defendants contend that proper application CPLR §202 requires that the claims in this case be subject to the Pennsylvania statute of limitations, whereas Plaintiff argues that analysis under CPLR §202 leads to the conclusion that either the Delaware of New York statute of limitations applies. Under the shorter Pennsylvania statute of limitations, Plaintiff’s claims would be time-barred. They would still be viable under the New York or Delaware statutes.
 

"This action arises out of Plaintiff’s failed business relationship with a former client of Defendant Michael V. Blumenthal, Esq., involving investments in real estate and race horses. Plaintiffs’ allegations can be characterized as (1) claiming that Mr. Blumenthal committed malpractice against Plaintiff in the course of his involvement in the business transactions and subsequent litigation between Plaintiff and Mr. Blumenthal’s then-client, Ira Russack, and (2) claiming that Defendant violated New York Judiciary Code §487 by offering false testimony when called as a fact witness in the litigation between Plaintiff and Mr. Russack. Defendants Mr. Blumenthal and his former law firms, Brown Raysman Millstein Felder & Steiner LLP and Thelen LLP (collectively, Defendants) move to dismiss on the grounds that Plaintiff’s claims are time-barred and, additionally, that the Complaint does not state a cause of action under New York Judiciary Code §487. For the reasons stated below, Defendants’ motion is granted."