Yesterday, we started to discuss  Waggoner v. Caruso 2009 NY Slip Op 06739 Decided on September 29, 2009 ; Appellate Division, First Department ; (DeGrasse, J.)

Today we discusse continuous representation, which, in this form, is a question of first impresssion, an issue taken up directly by Justice DeGrasse in the Appellate Division order:
 

"Although we affirm Supreme Court’s order, we do not do so on the ground that plaintiffs’ legal malpractice claim against Pillsbury is time-barred. A legal malpractice action must be commenced within three years of accrual (CPLR 214[6], 203[a]). Accrual occurs when the malpractice is committed (Shumsky v Eisenstein, 96 NY2d 164, 166 [2001]). In this case, plaintiffs’ malpractice claim against Pillsbury accrued nearly six years before this action was commenced. Under the doctrine of continuous representation, however, the statute of limitations is tolled while representation on the same matter in which the malpractice is alleged is ongoing (see Glamm v Allen, 57 NY2d 87 [1982]). The doctrine is rooted in recognition that a client cannot be expected to jeopardize a pending case or relationship with an attorney during the period that the attorney continues to handle the case (see id. at 94). In rendering its decision, Supreme Court ruled that the statute of limitations was not tolled as to Pillsbury because it ceased representing plaintiff in January 2002 when Caruso left the firm and took plaintiffs’ case with him. In HNH Intl., Ltd. v Pryor Cashman Sherman & Flynn LLP (63 AD3d 534 [2009]), this Court has since held that the statute was tolled as to a malpractice claim against a law firm because the attorneys who handled the case continued to represent the plaintiffs in the same matter, albeit at different law firms. Guided by this precedent, we now hold that the statute of limitations was tolled by the doctrine of continuous representation during the time that Caruso represented plaintiffs in the underlying matter while he was a partner at Chadbourne and Bracewell.

Sound policy considerations also support the tolling of the statute of limitations with respect to the legal malpractice claim against Pillsbury. Any suit brought by plaintiffs against Pillsbury would have been based upon Caruso’s acts of malpractice. Caruso would have thereby been exposed to Pillsbury’s potential claims for contribution or indemnification. As noted by the [*5]Court of Appeals in Glamm, a person cannot be expected to jeopardize a relationship with the attorney handling his or her case during the period that the attorney continues to represent him (57 NY2d at 94). An attorney-client relationship would certainly be jeopardized by a client’s allegation that his or her attorney committed malpractice while representing the client. Beal Bank, SSB v Arter & Hadden, LLP (42 Cal 4th 503, 167 P3d 666 [2007]), a case defendants cite, is distinguishable because it involves the interpretation of a California statute that codifies the continuous representation doctrine. New York does not have a similar statute.

Accordingly, the order of Supreme Court, New York County (Bernard J. Fried, J.), entered September 11, 2008, which granted defendants’ motion to dismiss the complaint pursuant to CPLR 3211, should be affirmed, with costs. "