One of the paradoxes of the legal malpractice world is the number of pro-se plaintiffs.  While there are some pro-se defendants [both top-tier and totally uninsured], pro-se plaintiffs are often present.  Here, in Walter v Jones, Sledzik, Garneau & Nardone, LLP ;  2009 NY Slip Op 08003 ;  Decided on November 4, 2009 ; Appellate Division, Second Department we see a pro-se plaintiff who sues the law firm, only to fail at the very begining of the case.
 

"The plaintiff did not effect proper service of process upon the defendant, since she failed to deliver the summons, or cause it to be delivered, to an individual who was authorized to accept service on behalf of the defendant (see Hossain v Fab Cab Corp., 57 AD3d 484, 485; Kurshan v Townhouse Mgmt. Co., 223 AD2d 402). The defendant moved pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(8) to dismiss the complaint for lack of personal jurisdiction. The plaintiff failed to oppose that motion, and the Supreme [*2]Court granted it upon her default.

Thereafter, the plaintiff moved, in effect, to vacate her default. The Supreme Court properly denied her motion. A party seeking to vacate an order entered on his or her default must establish both a reasonable excuse for the default and a meritorious cause of action (see Matter of Jones v Stewart, 63 AD3d 836, 836; Aguilera v Pistilli Constr. & Dev. Corp., 63 AD3d 765, 768; Zherka v Zherka, 17 AD3d 668, 668). Contrary to the plaintiff’s contention, neither the fact that she was proceeding pro se, nor her belief that the defendant’s motion was frivolous and, therefore, that opposition was unnecessary, constituted a reasonable excuse for her default (see Kanat v Ochsner, 301 AD2d 456, 458). " A litigant appearing pro se acquires no greater right than any other litigant and such appearance may not be used to deprive defendants of the same rights enjoyed by other defendants’" (Roundtree v Singh, 143 AD2d 995, 996, quoting Morgan v Sylvester, 125 F Supp 380, 388, affd 220 F2d 758, cert denied 350 US 867). Accordingly, the Supreme Court providently exercised its discretion in denying the plaintiff’s motion, in effect, to vacate her default. "