Legal malpractice seems to exist across the board everywhere an attorney interacts with a client.  Like the New Yorker cartoon showing a 5 year old who has dropped an ice cream cone, with an adult standing above and asking "Do you need an attorney?"  we see legal malpractice cases stitched in all settings.

Here in AMUSEMENT INDUSTRY, INC. dba WESTLAND INDUSTRIES; and PRACTICAL FINANCE CO., INC., Plaintiffs, -v.- MOSES STERN, aka MARK STERN; JOSHUA SAFRIN; FIRST REPUBLIC GROUP REALTY LLC; EPHRAIM FRENKEL; and LAND TITLE ASSOCIATES ESCROW, Defendants.;07 Civ. 11586 (LAK) (GWG);UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK;2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11817 the attorney is Buchanan Ingersol.
This case is about a failed real estate partnership.  From the case: "On June 29, 2007, third-party defendants Steven Alevy and Friedman — who "was acting, at all times mentioned herein, in his capacity as an attorney and shareholder of [Buchanan]," 3d-Party Compl. P 5 — "presented an investment opportunity to Amusement, purportedly on behalf of Safrin and others," although Safrin had not authorized either party to do so, id. PP 26-27. Indeed, while Friedman held himself out as Safrin’s representative, "Safrin never retained or otherwise authorized Friedman to speak or act on his behalf in connection with the transactions described in the [underlying] Complaint." Id. P 29.

On that same date, Steven Alevy drafted [*10] a "letter of intent," which was "signed by [defendant Moses] Stern on behalf of First Republic Corp.," and which "identifies as its parties First Republic Corp. and Westland Industries, the name under which Amusement does business." Id. P 30. Safrin was not a party to the letter of intent. Id. P 31. That day, Amusement wired $ 13 million into an escrow account. Id. P 33.

Amusement and First Republic agreed to "work in good faith ‘to finalize [their agreements]’" during the seven-day period following June 29, 2007. Id. P 37. During this period, Amusement "drafted and forwarded three partnership agreements to Friedman for Safrin, among others, to sign in order ‘to complete a transaction.’" Id. (emphasis omitted). Nonetheless, "[n]one of these draft agreements called for Safrin’s signature." Id. P 38.
 

Buchanan argues that Safrin’s claim for implied indemnification against it must be dismissed because "Safrin’s denial of any contractual relationship between he [sic] and BIR makes it impossible for him to allege an implied contractual right to indemnification because there is nothing from which to create any implied obligation running from BIR to Safrin." Buchanan Mem. at 6 (citing 3d-Party Compl. PP 28, 63, 65, 66, 72, 73).

Buchanan’s argument must be rejected because Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(d) expressly permits "hypothetical" pleading and the assertion of "inconsistent claims or defenses." See Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(d)(2)-(3). Safrin’s assertion that there was no relationship between him and Buchanan, see, e.g., 3d-Party Compl. P 3, does not, therefore, bar him from asserting that, should such a relationship be found, Buchanan is obligated to indemnify him, id. PP 85-86. See, e.g., Henry v. Daytop Vill., Inc., 42 F.3d 89, 95 (2d Cir. 1994) ("Under [Rule 8(d)] of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a plaintiff may plead two or more statements of a claim, even within the same count, regardless of consistency. [*17] . . . [T]herefore, we may not construe [the] first claim as an admission against another alternative or inconsistent claim.") (citations omitted); Padre Shipping, Inc. v. Yong He Shipping, 553 F. Supp. 2d 328, 333 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) ("plaintiffs are allowed to assert inconsistent facts in support of alternative claims, and courts may not construe allegations regarding one claim to be an admission against another") (citation omitted); Ascher v. Target Corp., 522 F. Supp. 2d 452, 458 (E.D.N.Y. 2007) ("the Court cannot construe one claim as an admission against another alternative or inconsistent claim") (citation omitted)."