Infant Plaintiff is injured in a paper shredder, and goes to attorney 1.  Attorney 1, who wisely understands that he lacks the special expertise to handle the case correctly in US District Court hands case off to Attorney 2.  After a while attorney 2 speaks to a law firm even more experienced, and they together bring the case to an almost  $1 million settlement.  At the infant’s compromise, all the attorneys agree on a split between them.  Balance is to go to a structured settlement for the infant.  Done, ok?  Not so ok. 

The Magistrate decides that Attorney 1 is in violation of the then Dr-102 and has not done enough work to warrant a fee.  So, what does the Magistrate do?  The money which was to go to Attorney 1 is given to the plaintiffs, so that they get roughly 75% of the settlement. 

In   WAGNER & WAGNER, LLP, DANIEL J. BAURKOT, ESQ., Non-Party-Appellants, DAYANARA RODRIGUEZ, an infant by her , Plaintiffs, v. ATKINSON, HASKINS, NELLIS, BRITTINGHAM, GLADD & CARWILE, P.C., Non-Party-Appellee, INTERNATIONAL SALES, INC., INTERNATIONAL GROUP OF COMPANIES, Docket No. 08-4966-cv; UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT;2010 U.S. App. LEXIS 3170;August 25, 2009, Argued ; February 18, 2010, Decided  we see:

"After an infant compromise hearing, Judge Mann awarded $ 107,654.56 in attorneys’ fees and $ 49,866.84 in expenses to Atkinson, Haskins, Nellis, Brittingham, Gladd, & Carwile , P.C. (the "Atkinson firm" or "appellees"), and $ 133,286.60 in attorneys’ fees and $ 2,378.86 in expenses to Wagner & Wagner, LLP. She denied an award of fees to Baurkot because Wagner & Wagner’s sharing of the fees with Baurkot was not properly disclosed to plaintiffs and Baurkot had performed no services of value in the litigation. Therefore, she concluded, the fee sharing agreement was in violation of New York Disciplinary Rule 2-107 ("DR 2-107"). 1 The magistrate judge awarded Baurkot’s portion of the fee to the plaintiffs. Appellants then took this appeal. The Atkinson firm has filed a brief responding to Wagner & Wagner’s argument that if we affirm the award to the plaintiffs, the fee splitting agreement between Wagner & Wagner and the Atkinson firm requires a redistribution of fees between the two firms."
 

"The magistrate judge then denied any portion of the attorneys’ fees to Baurkot because DR 2-107 prohibited it. First, she found that DR 2-107 was violated because plaintiffs never received the required disclosure of the fee-sharing agreement. The judge rejected Wagner & Wagner’s and Baurkot’s contentions that they [*9] had orally sought and received the required consent. Instead, the magistrate judge relied on the plaintiffs’ testimony indicating they were unaware that Baurkot would be working on the case.

Second, the magistrate judge concluded that DR 2-107 was violated because the requirement that either the work done be in proportion to the fee received or that the attorneys agree in a writing to undertake joint responsibility was not met. In so finding, she relied on several pieces of evidence, including: (i) Wagner & Wagner’s initial failure to disclose Baurkot’s share of the fee to plaintiffs; (ii) Wagner & Wagner’s and Baurkot’s failure to show specific work he performed on the case; and (iii) the lack of any documents in Wagner & Wagner’s file to corroborate the claim that Baurkot performed services on the case.

The magistrate judge determined that the portion of the fee claimed by Baurkot should be awarded to the plaintiffs, rather than going to Wagner & Wagner. She expressed a concern that the fee would still find its way to Baurkot if Wagner & Wagner received it, and, moreover, noted that Wagner & Wagner had acknowledged that it considered $ 133,286.60 fair and adequate compensation for [*10] its efforts.

Wagner & Wagner and Baurkot filed timely objections to the Report and Recommendation. They objected to those parts of the order that determined that Baurkot’s portion of the fee should go to plaintiffs. These objections included an objection to the awarded fees because they resulted in a 55.3%/44.7% split between Wagner & Wagner and the Atkinson firm, rather than the agreed upon 65%/35% split. However, Wagner & Wagner and Baurkot specifically stated that "[t]he Wagner Firm, [sic] is not suggesting that the fee to the Atkinson Firm be reduced. . . . What we are stating is that since the fee to the Atkinson Firm is 35% of the full one-third contingency fee, the fee to the Wagner Firm should be 65% of the full one-third contingency fee." Judge Gleeson adopted the magistrate judge’s Report and Recommendation in full. This appeal followed."