Bumpus v New York City Tr. Auth. ;2009 NY Slip Op 05737 [66 AD3d 26] ;July 7, 2009 ;Dillon, J., J. discusses what to do when the defendant can’t be identified, or served within a 120 day period.  On Wednesday we discussed the first two options: making a motion after the 120 days have expired pursuant to CPLR 306-b.  Here are other alternatives set forth in Bumpus.

"The practicing bar need not rely exclusively on the ameliorative provisions of CPLR 306-b for coping with the difficulties posed by pursuing actions against unknown parties. There are, in fact, at least four procedural mechanisms that may be utilized which, if applicable and successful, would render unnecessary a party’s reliance upon "good cause" or the "interest of justice"{**66 AD3d at 33} for additional time to serve process upon "Jane Doe" defendants who cannot be readily identified.

One such method is pre-action disclosure as permitted by CPLR 3102 (c). The statute permits a prospective plaintiff to seek, by court order, disclosure that will aid in bringing the action (see CPLR 3102 [c]). It has been recommended that a request for pre-action disclosure be sought by means of a special proceeding pursuant to CPLR article 4 (see Connors, Practice Commentaries, McKinney’s Cons Laws of NY, Book 7B, CPLR C3102:6, citing Robinson v Government of Malaysia, 174 Misc 2d 560 [1997]). While pre-action disclosure is often thought of as a device to enable the plaintiff to frame a complaint (see generally Matter of Wien & Malkin v Wichman, 255 AD2d 244 [1998]; Matter of Perez v New York City Health & Hosps. Corp., 84 AD2d 789 [1981]; Matter of Rosenberg v Brooklyn Union Gas Co., 80 AD2d 834 [1981]; Matter of Urban v Hooker Chems. & Plastics Corp., 75 AD2d 720 [1980]; Matter of Roland [Deak], 10 AD2d 263, 265 [1960]) or to preserve evidence for a forthcoming lawsuit (see generally Matter of Thomas v New York City Tr. Police Dept., 91 AD2d 898 [1983]; Gearing v Kelly, 15 AD2d 477 [1961]; Matter of O’Grady v City of New York, 164 Misc 2d 171, 173 [1995]; Matter of Spraggins v Current Cab Corp., 127 Misc 2d 774, 775 [1985]), it has also been recognized as an appropriate device for ascertaining the identities of prospective defendants (see Matter of Alexander v Spanierman Gallery, LLC, 33 AD3d 411 [2006];"
 

"A second mechanism, available when a governmental entity may know the identity of the unknown party, is the Freedom of Information Law (Public Officers Law art 8 [hereinafter FOIL]). In a case such as this involving a public employee, Public Officers Law § 89 would require the disclosure of the employee’s name (see Matter of Faulkner v Del Giacco, 139 Misc 2d 790,{**66 AD3d at 34} 794 [1988]" 

"Third, if pre-action discovery or FOIL requests are not viable options, plaintiffs intending to pursue a "Jane Doe" defendant may commence their actions against any known codefendants, who may possess information identifying the unknown party, well in advance of the statute of limitations (accord Misa v Hossain, 42 AD3d 484, 486 [2007]). Doing so affords two distinct procedural options. If the discovery process would not lead to an identification of the unknown target in sufficient time for service of process upon that party under the limited 120-day deadline of CPLR 306-b, the subsequent disclosure of identifying information will still permit, within the wider statute of limitations, either an amended complaint by stipulation or by leave of court naming the [*4]additional party (see CPLR 3025 [b]), or alternatively, the commencement of a timely separate action against the additional party with a view to its later consolidation with the original action"

"Fourth, when an originally-named defendant and an unknown "Jane Doe" party are united in interest, i.e. employer and employee, the later-identified party may, in some instances, be added to the suit after the statute of limitations has expired{**66 AD3d at 35} pursuant to the "relation-back" doctrine of CPLR 203 (f), based upon postlimitations disclosure of the unknown party’s identity (see Reznick v MTA/Long Is. Bus, 7 AD3d 773, 774 [2004]; Gottlieb v County of Nassau, 92 AD2d 858 [1983]). "