The Curtis law firm bills itself as "the only law firm[s] in the United States" to concentrate their practice on "representing clients injured by attorneys."   In this US District Court case we see legal malpractice attorneys suing legal malpractice attorneys under a very unconventional theory of law.

CURTIS & ASSOCIATES, P.C. and W. ROBERT CURTIS, Sc.D., J.D., Plaintiffs, – against – THE LAW OFFICES OF DAVID M. BUSHMAN, ESQ.; DAVID M. BUSHMAN, ATTORNEY AT LAW; DAVID M. BUSHMAN, ESQ.; JANET TURANSKY CALLAGHAN; STEVI BROOKS NICHOLS; JEFFREY LEVITT, ESQ.; JEFFREY LEVITT, ATTORNEY AT LAW; HERBERT MONTE LEVY, ESQ.; LAW OFFICES OF HERBERT MONTE LEVY, ESQ.; JOHN DOE, ESQ.; LAW OFFICES OF JOHN DOE, ESQ.; JANE DOE, ESQ.; LAW OFFICES OF JANE DOE, ESQ.; and EILEEN DEGREGROIO,

Its a 43 page decision, but we’ll try to cut to the chase here. "This understanding — that the alleged RICO predicate acts are no more than "litigation activities" alone — brings into focus plaintiffs’ rather striking theory of the case. Plaintiffs essentially allege that any client with the impudence to contest the Curtis Law Firm’s legal fees, and further, to litigate in court that client’s obligation to pay those fees or challenge through a malpractice action the professional conduct of the Curtis Law Firm, and any attorney who represents such a client, is a racketeer and liable for treble damages. The gravamen of the Complaint is thus that defendants’ have violated RICO by defending against plaintiffs’ fee claims or initiating malpractice [*44] actions against plaintiffs and thereby forcing plaintiffs to litigate allegedly "phony" and "frivolous" lawsuits in state court. This theory cannot withstand a motion to dismiss because it fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.

First, persuasive authority in this and other jurisdictions suggests that the litigation activities alleged in this Complaint cannot properly form the basis for RICO predicate acts. See, e.g., Gunn v. Palmieri, No. 87-cv-1418, 1989 WL 119519, at *1 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 29, 1989), aff’d, 904 F.2d 33 (2d Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1049, 111 S. Ct. 758, 112 L. Ed. 2d 777 (1991) (rejecting "untenable" interpretation of RICO which would permit litigation activities to be construed as RICO predicate acts). Thus, on similar facts, a number of courts have found that allegations such as those here more properly may be classified as claims sounding in abuse of process 21 or malicious prosecution. 22 See, e.g., Daddona v. Gaudio, 156 F. Supp. 2d 153, 162 (D. Conn. 2000) (finding allegations "at best amount to vague abuse of process or malicious prosecution claims" where complaint lists "a [*45] variety of ‘predicate acts,’ all of which involve the filing of complaints and other legal documents"); Nakahara v. Bal, No. 97-cv-2027, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 825, at *20-21, *27 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 30, 1998) (finding that plaintiffs’ mail and wire fraud claims are at most "a potential yet still inchoate claim for malicious prosecution or abuse of process" where "the gravamen of [plaintiffs’] Complaint . . . is patently directed at [the defendant’s] filing of, or participation in, the various legal actions pending against [plaintiffs]"); Von Bulow v. Von Bulow, 657 F. Supp. 1134, 1140-42 (S.D.N.Y. 1987) (finding that the "essence of the stated [fraud] claim" sounds in malicious prosecution where plaintiffs’ allegations "closely parallel[ed] the elements of malicious prosecution claim).
 

Further, and even more compelling than the persuasive authority discussed above, plaintiffs’ claims must be rejected because finding otherwise – and allowing malicious prosecution claims such as those attempted to be alleged here to suffice as RICO predicate acts – would lead to absurd results. First, if routine litigation activities such as defending against a fee claim or prosecuting a malpractice action against a former attorney is a violation of RICO, then almost every state or federal action could lead to corollary federal RICO actions. See Kashelkar v. Rubin & Rothman, 97 F. Supp. 2d 383, 392 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) ("Garden-variety pleading errors and the filing of routine motions do not constitute RICO predicate acts. To hold otherwise would turn every state court lawsuit into a predicate for a subsequent federal RICO action."). Plaintiffs’ interpretation of RICO is untenable and would result in the inundation of federal courts with civil RICO [*50] actions that could potentially subsume all other state and federal litigation in an endless cycle where any victorious litigant immediately sues opponents for RICO violations. See, e.g., Gunn, 1989 WL 119519, at *1 ("If serving and filing an answer or a motion by any defendant . . . could be considered . . . [a RICO predicate act], this Court would be flooded with motions to amend complaints by plaintiffs seeking to add RICO claims based upon mail fraud and obstruction of justice as soon as an answer was served. Such an interpretation of the RICO statute is untenable."