We believe in several tropes about legal malpractice.  One is that we live in a legal centric country, and accordingly, legal malpractice is ubiquitous as well as omnipresent.  The second is that legal malpractice cases are treated differently because they are laws written by lawyers, concerning lawyers, and decided upon by lawyers.

We think that Garnett v Fox, Horan & Camerini, LLP ; 2011 NY Slip Op 01589 ; Decided on March 3, 2011 ; Appellate Division, First Department is just such a case.  It seems to us that only in legal malpractice is such strong scrutiny applied to the underlying premises of the case.  In a car case we do not see the court determining who was in the wrong at an intersection, in a products case we do not see the court determining whether the washing machine was dangerous.  Yet here we see Supreme Court determining (we believe from the decision) that the attorneys gave good advice and that they cannot under any circumstances be responsible for Boylan’s eventual bankruptcy,
 

The Appellate Division thought differently.  "The amended complaint alleges that defendant was negligent in failing to advise Boylan International properly, that defendant’s negligence caused Boylan’s loss, and that Boylan sustained actual damages (see Reibman v Senie, 302 AD2d 290 [2003]). Specifically, it alleges, inter alia, that defendant failed to mount a defense to Boylan’s tax assessment arrears based on Blackstar Publ. Co. v 460 Park Assoc. (137 Misc 2d 414 [1987] [escalation clauses should not be applied where the tax increase is caused by extensive renovation that does not inure to the tenant’s benefit]), negotiated a settlement less beneficial than simply paying the demanded amount, and coerced Boylan into executing the settlement although it knew of the dire consequences thereof. "A claim for legal malpractice is viable, despite settlement of the underlying action, if it is alleged that the settlement of the action was effectively compelled by the mistakes of counsel" (Bernstein v Oppenheim & Co., P.C., 160 AD2d 428, 430 [1990] [citation omitted]). The amended complaint further alleges that, but for defendant’s negligence, Boylan would not have had to declare bankruptcy and incur additional attorney’s fees. These allegations are sufficient to withstand a CPLR 3211(a)(7) motion. At this stage, plaintiff does not have to show a "likelihood of success," as the motion court found, but is required only to plead facts from which it could reasonably be inferred that defendant’s negligence caused [*2]Boylan’s loss (see InKine Pharm. Co. v Coleman, 305 AD2d 151 [2003]). Plaintiff also does not have to show that Boylan actually sustained damages but is required only to allege facts from which actual damages could reasonably be inferred (see id.). "