When the statute of limitations begins to run and whether there is continuous representation is a constant problem in legal malpractice cases.  Here are two, which both illustrate the issue.  One went to the US Supreme Court (cert denied) and one was just affirmed at the AD level.  Both were brought by dedicated practitioners and both had significant money spent on them.  Both were dismissed.

Krichmar v Scher ;2011 NY Slip Op 02630 ;Decided on March 29, 2011 ;Appellate Division, Second Department   "To dismiss an action pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(5) as barred by the applicable statute of limitations, a defendant must satisfy the threshold burden of demonstrating, prima facie, that the time within which to sue has expired, and once that showing has been made, the burden shifts to the opponent to establish that the statute of limitations has been tolled or that he or she actually commenced the action within the applicable limitations period (see Hebrew Inst. for Deaf & Exceptional Children v Kahana, 57 AD3d 734; Savarese v Shatz, 273 AD2d 219, 220). Here, the defendants sustained their initial burden on the motion by demonstrating that the applicable limitations period had expired with respect to all of the alleged acts of legal malpractice (see CPLR 214[6]). In [*2]response, the plaintiff failed to present evidence establishing either that she commenced the action within the applicable three-year limitations period, or that the continuous representation toll applied in this case, since all of the documentary evidence in the record supports the conclusion that the legal representation had ended more than three years before this action was commenced, and there was no mutual understanding of a need for ongoing legal representation in the underlying matter (see Zorn v Gilbert, 8 NY3d 933, 934; McCoy v Feinman, 99 NY2d 295, 306; Hasty Hills Stables, Inc. v Dorfman, Lynch, Knoebel & Conway, LLP, 52 AD3d 566, 567; Melendez v Bernstein, 29 AD3d 872, 873; Guerra Press, Inc. v Campbell & Parlato, LLP, 17 AD3d 1031, 1032). "

In Mccormick v Favreau;  2011 NY Slip Op 02506; ecided on March 31, 2011 ; Appellate Division, Third Department .  "In 1999, plaintiff Roger McCormick, acting on behalf of plaintiff Marimac, LLC, entered into an agreement to purchase  real property in the Town of Chazy, Clinton County from
defendant James Carter. Plaintiffs’ attorney in this transaction was  defendant James Coffey. Carter was represented by defendant William Favreau, an attorney with defendant O’Connell &
Aronowitz (hereinafter O & A). The purchase and sale  agreement included a provision purporting to give plaintiffs a right of  first refusal on two parcels of Carter’s property adjoining  plaintiffs’ parcel. In 2007, Carter sold one of these parcels, and  plaintiffs commenced an action seeking to enforce the right of first  refusal. The agreement was found to lack an essential term and,  thus, to be void based upon the statute of frauds. This Court  affirmed that determination (McCormick v Bechtol, 68 AD3d  1376 [2009], lv denied 15 NY3d 701 [2010], cert denied ___ US  ___, 131 S Ct 655 [2010]).
In December 2008, plaintiffs commenced this action asserting  claims of fraud against Carter, Favreau and O & A, breach of  contract and negligence against all defendants, legal
malpractice, breach of fiduciary duty and strict liability in tort against  Coffey, Favreau and O & A, breach of warranty of fitness  against Favreau and O & A, and breach of a covenant not to
compete against Carter. Defendants separately moved to dismiss  the complaint. Supreme Court found that all of plaintiffs’ claims  against Coffey, Favreau and O & A were time-barred and  dismissed the complaint against them. As to Carter, the court  dismissed all of plaintiffs’ claims except for the cause of action  for breach of the covenant not to compete. Plaintiffs appeal fnref=’1′>Plaintiffs fail to address in their brief Supreme Court’s dismissal of their strict products liability claim; accordingly, any issue with respect thereto is deemed abandoned (see e.g. William J. DeTorres III, M.D., P.C. v Claxton-Hepburn Med. Ctr., 65 AD3d 733, 735 [2009]). and Carter cross-
appeals.

  We agree with Supreme Court’s determinations as to the timeliness of plaintiffs’ claims. Plaintiffs’ claim of legal  malpractice is subject to a three-year statute of limitations which  accrued when the actionable injury occurred — that is, at the time of the  malpractice, not the time of its discovery (see CPLR 214 [6]; McCoy v Feinman, 99 NY2d 295, 301 [2002]). The alleged malpractice — the drafting and review of the defective documents — occurred in 1999, and Supreme Court thus correctly
determined that this claim was time-barred.