There is little (or no) factual underpinning to this legal malpractice case, and no explanation of  the various positions taken by the parties.  In Pistilli Constr. & Dev. Corp. v Epstein, Rayhill & Frankini ; 2011 NY Slip Op 04025 ; Decided on May 10, 2011 ; Appellate Division, Second Department we directly learn only that the law firm wins summary judgment.  Let us try to guess who is who, and why?
 

We see that Plaintiff construction company is represented by a litigation firm in Long island, and that plaintiff is a corporation.  We see that plaintiff attempted to bring in an insurance carrier as being vicariously liable in the matter.  It is our guess that plaintiff was itself a defendant in a tort case, was represented by defendant and that the underlying action did not go well.  We further guess that the carrier did not want to settle the case, or offered advice contrary to plaintiff’s expectations.

You take a look and make your own guess.

"Here, in support of the defendants’ motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint, they demonstrated, prima facie, that the plaintiff was unable to establish that the alleged negligence of the defendants Epstein, Rayhill & Frankini (hereinafter the law firm) and Mona C. Haas proximately caused the loss sustained. In opposition, the plaintiff failed to raise a triable issue of fact. Accordingly, the Supreme Court properly dismissed the first cause of action alleging legal malpractice asserted against those defendants (see Boone v Bender, 74 AD3d 1111, 1112-1113; Boglia v Greenberg, 63 AD3d 973, 974; Kotzian v McCarthy, 36 AD3d 863).

Regarding the second cause of action, "[a] claim of vicarious liability cannot stand when there is no primary liability upon which such a claim of vicarious liability might rest’" (Pereira v St. Joseph’s Cemetery, 54 AD3d 835, 837, quoting Karaduman v Newsday, Inc., 51 NY2d 531, 546). Accordingly, the Supreme Court properly dismissed the second cause of action, which sought to hold the defendant Nationwide Mutual Insurance Company (hereinafter Nationwide) vicariously liable for the alleged malpractice of the law firm and Haas. Furthermore, the facts of this case do not give rise to an [*2]equitable estoppel claim against Nationwide, as it never assumed the defense of the plaintiff in the underlying action (cf. Brooklyn Hosp. Ctr. v Centennial Ins. Co., 258 AD2d 491; Touchette Corp. v Merchants Mut. Ins. Co., 76 AD2d 7, 12). Therefore, the Supreme Court also properly dismissed the plaintiff’s third cause of action."