Plaintiff and another get together to form a corporation and buy a 44 condo short stay building in Manhattan.  It’s a multi-million dollar deal, and the closing takes place with no attorney present for plaintiff.  Later, plaintiff sells a different condo for $ 1.6 million, this time with an attorney present.  The Chesterfield, (the short-stay condos) goes sour, and legal malpractice ensues.

"The parties held the closing on September 5, 2000 at North ork Bank on Long Island (the "closing"), Ito, Ishino, Ito’s son, Suzuki, and Rich attended; Roshco was not present. Suzuki
retained Rich to represent Keystone at the closing. In a November 13, 2006 decision/order, Supreme Court (Justice Marylin G. Diamond) dismissed Ito’s individual and derivative claims asserted against Kudman Trachten in the Third Amended Complaint. I t o appealed, and the First Department affirmed, but granted plaintiff leave to file a fourth amended complaint on the limited claim that Kudman Trachten vicariously aided and abetted a breach of fiduciary duty. In August 2009, Ito settled with defendants Sam Suzuki, Katsuko Suzuki, Nomara Suzuki Properties, Ltd., Suzuki Associates, Ltd., Manshion Joho Center I n c . , American Hotel Group, Inc. d/b/a American Hospitality Group, Keystone International, LLC, The Corcoran Funding Group and Suzuki Capital
Funding, Ltd. (collectively referred to as the "Suzuki Defendants") recovering in excess of $1.6 million.’

Thus, to recover, plaintiff must demonstrate that: (1) the attorney was negligent; (2) the attorney’s
negligence was the proximate cause of the sustained loss; and proof of actual damages (L).
Here, even if Ito were to establish defendants were negligent, if Ito cannot raise a factual issue as to whether defendants’ negligence was a proximate cause of the alleged sustained damages, then the legal malpractice should be dismissed (Scbwartz v. Olshan Gundman F rome 302 AD2d 193, 198 [lst Dept 2003). Conclusory allegations are insufficient (a)Hav.ing said that, proximate cause is demonstrated by showing "but for" an attorney’s negligence,  plaintiff would have prevailed in the matter or would not have sustained damages (id).

Although Roshco knew Ito was Japanese, and spoke and understood little English, her language barrier argument is not sufficient to raise a triable issue of fact. To begin, Ito has engaged in p r i o r business transactions and has also previously partnered with Suzuki (Kudman Trachten Moving Papers, Suzuki Aff., p. 2). Indeed, the majority of communications, including Index No. 124399/02
requests to sign important documents were not between the party’s at’torneys, but rather  conducted between Ito and Suzuki, with Ishino or Katsuko’s involvement. Specifically, Ishino said he communicated with Suzuki directly by telephone, e-mail, and facsimile regarding Chesterfield matters, and that Ito signed documents without seeking Roshco’s advice. In fact, Roshco did
not receive t h e March 2000 Contract which It0 alleges altered the Chesterfield price f r o m $9.5 million to $8.6 million. Nor did Roshco receive the operating agreement for review and comment.
Although at no time did Roshco reach out to I t o to ascertain the transaction’s status, Ito, as Keystone’s majority member, did not attempt to reach out to Roshco either."