In Doviak v Finkelstein & Partners, LLP ; 2011 NY Slip Op 09085 ; Decided on December 13, 2011 ; Appellate Division, Second Department  the Court has to decide whether a failure to report an offer by defendants to settle the case might be sufficient to demonstrate legal malpractice, as well as to forfeit legal fees which would otherwise be due to the attorneys.  Here, defendants obtained a jury verdict, and even succeeded in increasing the ad damnum clause, but not to the level said to have been offered by the underlying case defendants.
 

"A client has "an absolute right, at any time, with or without cause, to terminate the attorney-client relationship by discharging the attorney" (Campagnola v Mulholland, Minion & Roe, 76 NY2d 38, 43; see Coccia v Liotti, 70 AD3d 747, 757). "An attorney who is discharged for cause, however, is not entitled to compensation or a lien" (Callaghan v Callaghan, 48 AD3d 500, 501; see Campagnola v Mulholland, Minion & Roe, 76 NY2d at 44; Coccia v Liotti, 70 AD3d at 757). An attorney who violates a disciplinary rule may be discharged for cause and is not entitled to any fees for services rendered (see Quinn v Walsh, 18 AD3d 638; Matter of Satin, 265 AD2d 330; Yannitelli v Yannitelli & Sons Constr. Corp., 247 AD2d 271, 272, cert denied sub nom. Heller v Yannitelli, 525 [*3]US 1178; Pessoni v Rabkin, 220 AD2d 732; Matter of Winston, 214 AD2d 677). Moreover, even " [m]isconduct that occurs before an attorney’s discharge but is not discovered until after the discharge may serve as a basis for a fee forfeiture’" (Coccia v Liotti, 70 AD3d at 757, quoting Orendick v Chiodo, 272 AD2d 901, 902). This rule is intended to " promote public confidence in the members of an honorable profession whose relation to their clients is personal and confidential’" (Campagnola v Mulholland, Minion & Roe, 76 NY2d at 44, quoting Martin v Camp, 219 NY 170, 176). However, a client’s "dissatisfaction with reasonable strategic choices regarding litigation" does not "as a matter of law, constitute cause for the discharge of an attorney" (Callaghan v Callaghan, 48 AD3d at 501; see Magnacoustics, Inc. v Ostrolenk, Faber, Gerb & Soffen, 303 AD2d 561, 562). In general, a hearing is required to determine whether a client has cause for discharging an attorney (see Teichner v W & J Holsteins, 64 NY2d 977, 979; Ulico Cas. Co. v Wilson, Elser, Moskowitz, Edelman & Dicker, 56 AD3d 1, 13; Byrne v Leblond, 25 AD3d 640, 642; Hawkins v Lenox Hill Hosp., 138 AD2d 572). "