Well, the case is not strictly about Dog, it does derive from litigation surrounding him.  Question:  you have a dispute over a sum of money with "X" and "Y".  You also have a legal malpractice case against your attorney, who worked on the "x" and "Y" case.  If you collect from your attorney in legal malpractice, does that affect your right to the money in dispute with "X" and "Y" ?

In A&E TELEVISION NETWORKS, LLC, , -v.- PIVOT POINT ENTERTAINMENT, LLC,; 10 Civ. 9422 (PGG) (JLC);UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK;2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 149740;December 20, 2011 we see:

"Before the Court in this interpleader action are letters from both parties and non-parties in connection with the request of Defendants Duane "Dog" Chapman and Beth Alice Barmore-Smith Chapman (the "Chapmans") seeking to compel Defendant Pivot Point Entertainment, LLC ("Pivot Point") to produce a confidential settlement agreement (the "Agreement"), and all drafts thereof, entered into by the parties in the action Krutonog v. Akin, Gump, Strauss, Hauer & Feld, et al. (the "Krutonog Action") filed in the Superior Court of California for the County of Los Angeles. "

"Here, the Chapmans, who were neither parties to the Krutonog Action nor the Agreement, assert that the unpaid compensation at issue in the Krutonog Action is "in substantial part the same monies that A&E has deposited with the Court in this Interpleader Action" because both actions involve the Co-Executive Producer Agreement. (Joint Letter at 3). As such, the Chapmans argue, any money paid to Krutonog in settlement of his claims mitigates [*5] his and, by extension, Pivot Point’s alleged losses under the Co-Executive Producer Agreement and should offset Pivot Point’s recovery of damages here. (Id.). In addition, the Chapmans contend that the Agreement is relevant because it supports their theory that Krutonog was a de facto talent agent for the Chapmans, which entitles the Chapmans to recover the interpleaded assets deposited by A&E with the Court. (Id.).

While the Chapmans cite to several cases for the proposition that settlement agreements can be discoverable and do not require a heightened showing of relevance in light of Rule 408 of the Federal Rules of Evidence, see, e.g., Small v. Nobel Biocare USA, LLC, No. 06 Civ. 0683 (RJH) (JLC), 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 77838, 2011 WL 3055357, at *1-2 (S.D.N.Y. July 19, 2011); ABF Capital Management v. Askin Capital, Nos. 96 Civ. 2978 (RWS), 95 Civ. 8905 (RWS), 97 Civ. 1856 (RWS), 97 Civ. 4335 (RWS), 98 Civ. 6178 (RWS), 98 Civ. 7494 (TSZ), 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3633, 2000 WL 191698, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 8, 2000), and it is true that Rule 408 applies to admissibility not discoverability of settlement agreements, see, e.g., Conopco, Inc. v. Wein, No. 05 Civ. 9899 (RCC) (THK), 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 27339, 2007 WL 1040676, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 4, 2007), they do not cite [*6] to any authority to support the notion that Krutonog’s monetary settlement in a legal malpractice lawsuit should offset his potential recovery in an interpleader action. The Chapmans do not explain why or how money paid to settle the Krutonog Action should serve to offset Pivot Point’s, or enhance the Chapmans’, entitlement to the interpleaded "stake." The mere fact that both lawsuits involve the same agreement—the Co-Executive Producer Agreement, to which the Chapmans are not parties (Joint Letter at 4)—does not, by itself, mean that recovery in one lawsuit should mitigate recovery in another. Recovery in either lawsuit by Krutonog, who is not a party in this action, or Pivot Point, who was not a party in the Krutonog Action, would not violate the rule against "double recovery for the same injury," Shepherd v. Law Offices of Cohen & Slamowitz, LLP, 668 F. Supp. 2d 579, 582 (S.D.N.Y. 2009), as the injuries alleged in both lawsuits—legal malpractice and breach of fiduciary duty on the one hand, and conflicting claims to the interpleaded assets on the other—are entirely different."
 

"As for the Agreement itself, California law permits disclosure only if certain conditions are satisfied, including, for example, if the "agreement provides that it is admissible or subject to disclosure, or words to that effect." See Cal. Evid. Code § 1123(a). Here, however, the Agreement contains a strict confidentiality provision. (Akin Gump Letter at 2). And while an in camera review of the Agreement might determine whether other conditions for disclosure have been met, see, e.g., Cassel v. Superior Court, 51 Cal. 4th 113, 119 Cal. Rptr. 3d 437, 244 P.3d 1080, 1089 (Cal. 2011) (quoting Cal. Evid. Code § 1123(b) (disclosure of written settlement agreement permitted if "’agreement provides that it is enforceable or binding or words to that effect’"), such a review is unnecessary at this time. The California Superior Court in the Krutonog Action entered a sealing order to protect the confidentiality of the Agreement. (Joint Letter at 6; Akin Gump Letter at 2). Pursuant to Rule 2.551(h)(1) of the California Rules of Court, "[a] sealed record must not be unsealed except on order of [*10] the court." The record before the Court does not indicate that the Chapmans have obtained any such order. Accordingly, the Chapmans have not established that the Agreement is discoverable."

"In sum, the Chapmans’ request is denied. Any application to unseal the Agreement, and subsequently to compel its disclosure upon a showing of relevance under the applicable law, is appropriately made by the Chapmans in Superior Court in California."