In Barocca v Garten, 2012 NY Slip Op 30609(U) March 1, 2012 Supreme Court, Nassau County
Docket Number: 5249/11 Judge: Antonio I. Brandveen faced a situation in which plaintiff had a long series of communications with the defendant’s attorney, and then served a summons with notice on the defendant’s attorney.  Does this constitute good service?  What standard is employed to determine whether the service is good or not?

The court wrote: " The Court of Appeals holds: On a motion to dismiss pursuant to CPLR 3211 , the pleading is to be afforded a liberal construction (see CPLR 3026). We accept the facts as alleged in the complaint as true, accord plaintiffs the benefit of every possible favorable inference, and determine only whether the facts as alleged fit * 8 8 within any cognizable legal theory (Morone v Morone 50 NY2d 481 , 484; Rovello v Orofino Realty Co. 40 NY2d 633 634) Leon v Martinez, 84 N. 2d 83 87- 614 N. S.2d 972 (1994). Here, the parties, owners and an architect, executed an agreement for a residential design at 71 Percheron Lane, Roslyn Heights, New York. There were some issues with the Town of North Hempstead. Attorneys represented the parties in their efforts to resolve the issues regarding certain work performed involving the residence. The parties communicated with the assistance of their legal counsels. On April 7, 2011 the plaintiff commenced the instant action. CPLR 306-b provides:

Service of the summons and complaint, summons with notice, third-party summons and complaint, or petition with a notice of petition or order to show  cause shall be made within one hundred twenty days after the commencement of the action or proceeding, provided that in an action or proceeding, except a proceeding commenced under the election law, where the applicable statute of limitations is four months or less, service shall be made not later than fifteen days after the date on which the applicable statute of limitations expires. If service is not made upon a defendant within the time provided in this section, the court upon motion, shall dismiss the action without prejudice as to that defendant, or upon good cause shown or in the interest of justice, extend the time for service.

CPLR 305 (b) provides:
If the complaint is not served with the summons, the summons shall contain or  have attached thereto a notice  stating the nature of the action and the relief sought and, except in an action for medical malpractice, the sum of money for which judgment may be taken in case of default. The Second Department holds:
The 120-day service provision of CPLR 306-b can be extended by a court, upon motion  " upon good cause shown or in the interest of justice (CPLR 306-b). Good cause" and "interest of justice" are two separate and independent statutory . standards (see Leader v. Maroney, Ponzini Spencer 97 N. 2d at 104, 736
S.2d 291 , 761 N.E.2d 1018). To establish good cause, a plaintiff must demonstrate reasonable diligence in attempting service (see Leader v. Maroney, Ponzini Spencer 97 N. 2d at 105- , 736 N.Y.S.2d 291 , 761 N.
1018).. .If good cause for an extension is not established, courts must consider the interest of justice" standard of CPLR 306-b (see e.g. Busler v. Corbett, 259 AD.2d at 17, 696 N. 2d 615). The interest of justice standard does not require . reasonably diligent efforts at service, but courts, in making their determinations may consider the presence or absence of diligence, along with other factors (see Leader v. Maroney, Ponzini Spencer 97 N.Y.2d at 105; 736 N.Y.S.2d 291 761 N. 2d 1018). The interest of justice standard is broader than the good cause
standard (see Mead v. Singleman 24 A.D.3d 1142, 1144 806 N.Y.S.2d 783), as its factors also include the expiration of the statute of limitations, the meritorious nature of the action, the length of delay in service, the promptness of a request by the plaintiff for an extension, and prejudice to the defendant (see Leader v.
Maroney, Ponzini Spencer 97 N. 2d at 105-106, 736 N.Y.S.2d 291 , 761 E.2d 1018; Matter of Jordan v. City of New York 38 AD.3d 336 339 833 Y.S.2d 8; Estey-Dorsa v. Chavez, 27 A.D.3d 277, 813 N. S.2d 54; Mead v.
Singleman 24 AD.3d at 1144, 806 N. 2d 783; de Vries v. Metropolitan Tr. Auth. 11 AD.3d 312, 313, 783 N. S.2d 540; Bafkin v. North Shore Univ. "