In a matrimonial action, every t must be crossed, and every i dotted.  One reason for this is the tremendous emotional and economic issues which often cause irrational conduct.  Hell hath no fury…like a losing matrimonial litigant.  Walker v Kramer  2018 NY Slip Op 04375  Decided on June 13, 2018  Appellate Division, Second Department is an example of how a spouse just won’t comply.

“During the plaintiff’s divorce action, she retained the defendant Kramer & Rabinowitz, LLC (hereinafter the law firm), to represent her. The defendants Lynn Adair Kramer and Gregory Rabinowitz were the members of the law firm. The law firm negotiated a stipulation of settlement between the plaintiff and her former husband wherein the former husband agreed to pay the plaintiff $300,000 as an equitable distribution award. The stipulation provided that the law firm was to prepare a deed transferring ownership of the marital residence from the former husband, who was the sole titled owner, to the plaintiff and the former husband as “joint tenants in common” as a means to secure the husband’s payment of the equitable distribution award to the plaintiff. It is undisputed that the law firm failed to prepare and record the deed, and that the former husband subsequently encumbered the marital residence with a mortgage that had priority over the plaintiff’s claim against the former husband. Thus, the plaintiff was not able to use her anticipated interest in the marital residence to satisfy the $300,000 owed to her by her former husband. The former husband failed to pay the plaintiff her equitable distribution award, and the plaintiff subsequently commenced this action against, among others, Kramer, Rabinowitz, and the law firm (hereinafter collectively the defendants), inter alia, to recover damages for legal malpractice.”

“We agree with the Supreme Court’s determination, upon renewal, to grant those branches of the plaintiff’s cross motion which were for summary judgment on the issue of liability against the law firm and Rabinowitz on so much of the complaint as alleged legal malpractice. The law firm and Rabinowitz do not dispute that they shared an attorney-client relationship with the plaintiff and that they failed to prepare and record the subject deed (see Lory v Parsoff, 296 AD2d 535; Deb-Jo Constr. v Westphal, 210 AD2d 951). The plaintiff, in support of her renewed cross motion for summary judgment, established, prima facie, that the failure to record the deed constituted legal malpractice, resulting in her inability to sell the marital residence to satisfy the [*3]unpaid equitable distribution award, as intended by the stipulation of settlement. The plaintiff, therefore, established her prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law on the issue of liability against the law firm and Rabinowitz. In opposition, the law firm and Rabinowitz failed to raise a triable issue of fact (see Rehberger v Garguilo & Orzechowski, LLP, 118 AD3d 767). For the same reasons, we agree with the court’s determination to deny those branches of the defendants’ separate motions which were for summary judgment dismissing so much of the complaint as sought to recover damages for legal malpractice against the law firm and Rabinowitz.

However, since there are triable issues of fact with respect to the amount of the plaintiff’s damages, upon renewal, the Supreme Court should not have granted that branch of the plaintiff’s cross motion which was for summary judgment on the issue of damages (see e.g. Kryten Iron Works v Ultra-Tech Fabricators, 228 AD2d 416, 417). Accordingly, the matter must be remitted to the Supreme Court, Suffolk County, for a trial on the issue of damages.

We agree with the Supreme Court’s determination to deny those branches of the defendants’ separate motions which were for summary judgment dismissing so much of the complaint as sought to recover attorneys’ fees against the law firm and Rabinowitz based on their legal malpractice. “Damages in a legal malpractice case . . . may include litigation expenses incurred in an attempt to avoid, minimize, or reduce the damage caused by the attorney’s wrongful conduct” (Rudolf v Shayne, Dachs, Stanisci, Corker & Sauer, 8 NY3d 438, 443 [internal quotation marks omitted]). The defendants failed to satisfy their prima facie burden of establishing that no such expenses were incurred by the plaintiff.”

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Andrew Lavoott Bluestone

Andrew Lavoott Bluestone has been an attorney for 40 years, with a career that spans criminal prosecution, civil litigation and appellate litigation. Mr. Bluestone became an Assistant District Attorney in Kings County in 1978, entered private practice in 1984 and in 1989 opened…

Andrew Lavoott Bluestone has been an attorney for 40 years, with a career that spans criminal prosecution, civil litigation and appellate litigation. Mr. Bluestone became an Assistant District Attorney in Kings County in 1978, entered private practice in 1984 and in 1989 opened his private law office and took his first legal malpractice case.

Since 1989, Bluestone has become a leader in the New York Plaintiff’s Legal Malpractice bar, handling a wide array of plaintiff’s legal malpractice cases arising from catastrophic personal injury, contracts, patents, commercial litigation, securities, matrimonial and custody issues, medical malpractice, insurance, product liability, real estate, landlord-tenant, foreclosures and has defended attorneys in a limited number of legal malpractice cases.

Bluestone also took an academic role in field, publishing the New York Attorney Malpractice Report from 2002-2004.  He started the “New York Attorney Malpractice Blog” in 2004, where he has published more than 4500 entries.

Mr. Bluestone has written 38 scholarly peer-reviewed articles concerning legal malpractice, many in the Outside Counsel column of the New York Law Journal. He has appeared as an Expert witness in multiple legal malpractice litigations.

Mr. Bluestone is an adjunct professor of law at St. John’s University College of Law, teaching Legal Malpractice.  Mr. Bluestone has argued legal malpractice cases in the Second Circuit, in the New York State Court of Appeals, each of the four New York Appellate Divisions, in all four of  the U.S. District Courts of New York and in Supreme Courts all over the state.  He has also been admitted pro haec vice in the states of Connecticut, New Jersey and Florida and was formally admitted to the US District Court of Connecticut and to its Bankruptcy Court all for legal malpractice matters. He has been retained by U.S. Trustees in legal malpractice cases from Bankruptcy Courts, and has represented municipalities, insurance companies, hedge funds, communications companies and international manufacturing firms. Mr. Bluestone regularly lectures in CLEs on legal malpractice.

Based upon his professional experience Bluestone was named a Diplomate and was Board Certified by the American Board of Professional Liability Attorneys in 2008 in Legal Malpractice. He remains Board Certified.  He was admitted to The Best Lawyers in America from 2012-2019.  He has been featured in Who’s Who in Law since 1993.

In the last years, Mr. Bluestone has been featured for two particularly noteworthy legal malpractice cases.  The first was a settlement of an $11.9 million dollar default legal malpractice case of Yeo v. Kasowitz, Benson, Torres & Friedman which was reported in the NYLJ on August 15, 2016. Most recently, Mr. Bluestone obtained a rare plaintiff’s verdict in a legal malpractice case on behalf of the City of White Plains v. Joseph Maria, reported in the NYLJ on February 14, 2017. It was the sole legal malpractice jury verdict in the State of New York for 2017.

Bluestone has been at the forefront of the development of legal malpractice principles and has contributed case law decisions, writing and lecturing which have been recognized by his peers.  He is regularly mentioned in academic writing, and his past cases are often cited in current legal malpractice decisions. He is recognized for his ample writings on Judiciary Law § 487, a 850 year old statute deriving from England which relates to attorney deceit.