Brooklyn Med. Eye Assoc., LLC. v Rivkin Radler LLP,
.2018 NY Slip Op 32913(U) November 13, 2018 Supreme Court, Kings County Docket Number: 505978/18 Judge: Leon Ruchelsman is an example of what happens when a doctor to doctor business sale goes wrong.
“At the end of 2012 an entity called Craniofacial Surgery P.C., owned by Dr. Dominick Golio entered into a purchase· agreement to buy Brooklyn Medical Eye Associates, LLC [hereinafter ‘BMEA’] owned by Dr. George Hyman. Dr. Golio. He executed a personal guaranty guaranteeing all the payments due to Dr. Hyman. Pursuant to a promissory note the first payment due to Hyman was not made and thereafter Dr. Hyman sued Dr. Golio in Nassau County and Dr. Golio was represented by defendant Rivkin Radler LLP in that action. Dr. Hyman moved seeking summary judgement in lieu of a complaint, however, such motion was denied on the grounds there were questions whether Dr. Hyman failed to transfer patients to BMEA pursuant to the agreement. Likewise, a motion to reargue was similarly denied. In a decision and order dated October 30, 2015 the Appellate Division reversed that determination holding that “the plaintiff established, upon reargument, his prima facie entitlement to judgement as a matter of law by proving the existence of a guaranty, the underlying debt, and the guarantor’s failure to perform under the guaranty” (id). The Appellate Division rejected the argument any unfulfilled obligations absolved the guarantor stating that “by
the plain language of the guaranty, the defendant was precluded from raising any defenses or counterclaims relating to the underlying debt” (id). Following that decision a judgement was
entered against Dr. Golio. ”
“The crux of plaintiff’s malpractice claim in this regard is that the defendants failed to, argue that additionally Dr. Hyman was actively soliciting BMEA’s patients in further violation of the purchase agreement. Stated simply, the plaintiff argues the defendant failed to argue additional breaches of the agreement by Hyman. However, the Appellate Division rejected the allegation Hyman’s failure to deliver the patient lists exempted Golio from making payment under the guaranty. This was based upon the legal principle, expressed by the Appellate Division, that the guaranty “is a
separate undertaking and a self-standing document … and properly served as the predicate for the plaintiff’s motion for summary judgement in lieu of complaint” (supra). The Appellate Division
further explained that “by its plain terms, and its broad, sweeping, and unequivocal language, the defendant’s guaranty forecloses any challenge to the enforceability and validity of the promissory note made by nonparty Craniofacial Surgery P.C.” and that “by the plain language of the guaranty, the defendant was precluded from raising any defenses or counterclaims relating to the underlying debt” (supra). Thus, the Appellate Division has unequivocally explained that there are no defenses that would have excused Golio from making payments under the guaranty. Thus, Golio has failed to present any basis that the defendant’s failure to present this specific argument would have resulted in a different conclusion. On the contrary, it is clear that no argument would have prevailed absolving Golio of his obligations under the guaranty. Golio argues that §9.2 of the purchase
agreement, a set-off provision would have surely entitled Golio to offset the amount owed due to Hyman’s breaches. However, Hyman’s breaches of which the Appellate Division was aware and of
which arguments were presented were also sufficient to violate the restrictive covenants. Nevertheless, the Appellate Division ruled that no defenses to the guaranty were available. This
position likewise governs the actual solicitation allegedly committed by Hyman. Consequently, the third cause of action is hereby dismissed. “