There are scholarly works (in the form of law review articles) which argue that the courts tilt towards attorneys in legal malpractice cases.  It is logical that such a prejudice might exist.  Legal malpractice (and ethical) rules are written by attorneys, apply to attorneys, are reviewed by attorneys and are acted upon by judge-attorneys.  Any survey of in-house disciplinary or self-disciplining organizations yields the conclusion that self-discipline is less rigorous than discipline by uninvolved outsiders.

So goes Onyenwe v Hamernick  2020 NY Slip Op 04314 [185 AD3d 1044]  July 29, 2020  Appellate Division, Second Department.  While the AD eventually set things right, look at the number of opportunities given the pro-se attorney, and even when Supreme Court sanctioned him, look how a second judge gave the pro-se attorney defendant another out.

“Ordered that the order dated November 28, 2018, is reversed, on the law and in the exercise of discretion, with costs, and the defendant’s motion, inter alia, pursuant to CPLR 5015 (a) (1) to vacate the order dated April 16, 2018, and thereupon to vacate the note of issue is denied.

In 2014, the plaintiff commenced this action against the defendant, inter alia, to recover damages for legal malpractice. Pursuant to a preliminary conference order dated July 6, 2015, the parties were to appear for depositions and to provide disclosure. By notice of motion dated December 11, 2015, the plaintiff moved, inter alia, to strike the defendant’s answer for his willful failure to appear for his deposition. In an order dated January 15, 2016, the Supreme Court resolved the plaintiff’s motion by directing the parties to appear for their depositions on certain dates and to respond to discovery demands. Thereafter, upon additional motions by the plaintiff, inter alia, to strike the defendant’s answer, the court issued two more orders directing, inter alia, the defendant to appear for his deposition. By notice of motion dated January 5, 2018, the plaintiff again moved, inter alia, to strike the defendant’s answer. In an order dated February 2, 2018, the court directed the defendant to appear for his deposition on or before March 9, 2018, and adjourned the plaintiff’s motion to April 16, 2018. The court stated that the issue of preclusion would be addressed on the adjourned date. In an order dated April 16, 2018, the court granted the plaintiff’s unopposed motion, inter alia, to strike the answer.

By order to show cause dated May 31, 2018, the defendant moved, inter alia, pursuant to CPLR 5015 (a) (1) to vacate the order dated April 16, 2018, and thereupon to vacate the note of issue. The plaintiff opposed the motion. In an order dated November 28, 2018, the Supreme Court granted the defendant’s motion, and the plaintiff appeals.

In order to vacate his default in opposing the plaintiff’s motion, inter alia, to strike the answer, the defendant was required to demonstrate a reasonable excuse for the default and a potentially meritorious opposition to the motion (see CPLR 5015 [a] [1]; 210 E. 60 St., LLC v Rahman, 178 AD3d 888, 889 [2019]; Mollica v Ruzza, 151 AD3d 714 [2017]; Remote Meter Tech. of NY, Inc. v Aris Realty Corp., 83 AD3d 1030, 1031 [2011]). Inasmuch as the defendant failed to demonstrate a reasonable excuse for his default, we need not consider whether he offered a potentially meritorious opposition to the motion (see Turko v Daffy’s, Inc., 111 AD3d 615, 617 [2013]).

Accordingly, the Supreme Court should have denied the defendant’s motion, inter alia, pursuant to CPLR 5015 (a) (1) to vacate the order dated April 16, 2018, and thereupon to vacate the note of issue. Chambers, J.P., Maltese, Christopher and Wooten, JJ., concur.”