Dial Car Inc. v Tuch & Cohen, LLP 2021 NY Slip Op 30407(U) February 10, 2021 Supreme Court, Kings County Docket Number: 514138/20 Judge: Leon Ruchelsman gives a nice description of the current standard of JL § 487 in the Second Department. This standard is strikingly different from that of the First Department.
“Concerning Judiciary Law §487, it is well settled that to establish such a cause of action the plaintiff must present evidence an attorney acted “with intent to deceive” either the
court or any party (see, Moormann v. Perini Hoerger, 65 AD3d 1106, 886 NYS2d 49 [2d Dept., 2009]). The allegations concerning the deception must be pled with particularity (Betz v. Blatt, 160 AD3d 696, 74 NYS3d 75 [2d Dept., 2018]). Moreover, the cause of action is only applicable if the conduct alleges took place in a proceeding where the plaintiff was a party (Barouh v. Law offices of Jason L. Abelove, 131 AD3d 988, 17 NYS3d 144 [2d Dept., 2015]). First, it must be noted that the Second Department no longer maintains a cause of action pursuant to Judiciary Law §487 based upon an attorney’s egregious, extreme or chronic delinquent activities. Rather, “the only liability standard recognized in Judiciary Law §487 is that of an intent to deceive” (Dupree v. Vorhees, 102 AD3d 912, 959 NYS2d 235 [2d Dept., 2013]). Second, considering the intent to deceive, such intent can hardly be demonstrated. The complaint merely alleges in conclusory fashion that the defendants “have continuously consented to deceit or collusion, with the intent to deceive and harm Dial” (see, Complaint, ¶157) without elaborating upon those allegations. The mere pursuant of the dismissal of the Guzman lawsuit can hardly be considered an intent to deceive the plaintiff. Further, since
that is the only conduct alleged wherein Dial was a party in a pending action all of the other allegations of the complaint cannot sustain a cause of action in this regard. Therefore, the
motion seeking to dismiss the seventh cause of action is granted. “