Lautman v 2800 Coyle St. Owners Corp. 2024 NY Slip Op 00068 Decided on January 10, 2024 Appellate Division, Second Department is one of those inexplicable cases in which a plaintiff loses all, and then waits too long to sue the attorney. The question of how plaintiff lost it all never comes up for review.
“The plaintiff is the former proprietary lessee of a cooperative apartment located in Brooklyn. He owned shares of stock in the defendant 2800 Coyle St. Owners Corp. (hereinafter the co-op), the cooperative corporation that owns the building where the subject apartment is located. In 2012, the co-op commenced a nonpayment proceeding in the Civil Court of the City of New York against the plaintiff. In September 2013, a default judgment of possession was entered against the plaintiff. Thereafter, the plaintiff’s shares were sold at auction, and he was evicted from the apartment.
In 2019, the plaintiff commenced this action against the co-op, the Board of Directors of the co-op, Dependable Property Management, Inc. (hereinafter collectively the co-op defendants), and Sauchik & Giyaur, P.C. (hereinafter Sauchik), the law firm that represented the co-op in the nonpayment proceeding. The co-op defendants moved, inter alia, pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(1), (5), and (7) to dismiss the complaint insofar as asserted against them. Sauchik separately moved pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(5) and (7) to dismiss the complaint insofar as asserted against it. The [*2]plaintiff cross-moved, among other things, for leave to enter a default judgment against the defendants based upon their alleged failure to timely answer or move to dismiss the complaint. In an order dated June 16, 2020, the Supreme Court granted that branch of the co-op defendants’ motion, granted Sauchik’s separate motion, and denied the plaintiff’s cross-motion. The plaintiff appeals. We affirm.”
“Here, in their respective moving submissions, the co-op defendants and Sauchik demonstrated, prima facie, that the first, second, third, fourth, sixth, seven, eighth, ninth, and twelfth causes of action insofar as asserted against each of them were time-barred (see Chao v Westchester Med. Ctr. Advanced Physicians Servs., P.C., 131 AD3d 1130). In opposition, the plaintiff failed to raise a question of issue of fact (see Heritage Hills Socy., Ltd. v Heritage Dev. Group, Inc., 56 AD3d 426, 426-427). Contrary to the plaintiff’s contention, the application of the savings provision of CPLR 205(a), raised for the first time on appeal, “does not involve a pure question of law that appears on the face of the record and could not have been avoided if brought to the Supreme Court’s attention” (U.S. Bank N.A. v Doura, 204 AD3d 721, 723).”