Reem Contr. v Altschul & Altschul 2024 NY Slip Op 32915(U) August 19, 2024 Supreme Court, New York County Docket Number: Index No. 104202/2011 Judge: David B. Cohen presents the interesting question of whether a party may make a second motion for summary judgment, and if so, under what circumstances. Here, Defendants are denied a second motion and plaintiffs are permitted a second motion. Neither succeeds on summary judgment.

“This is a legal malpractice action brought by plaintiffs Reem Contracting Corp. (Reem Contracting), Jona Szapiro (Szapiro ), Reem Plumbing and Heating Corp. (Reem Plumbing), and the Estate of Steven Stein (Stein) ( collectively, plaintiffs) against defendants Altschul & Altschul, Mark Altschul, Esq. (Altschul), and Cory Dworken, Esq. (Dworken) ( collectively, defendants). Defendants represented plaintiffs in a federal action seeking recovery under section 515 of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA), 29 USC§ 1145 (the underlying action). Defendants move, pursuant to CPLR 3212, for summary judgment: (1) dismissing the complaint; and (2) granting judgment on their counterclaims for an account stated (motion sequence number 016).”

“Defendants again move for summary judgment, arguing that they have good cause for their second motion for summary judgment, relying on Executive Order No. 202.9 (9 NYCRR 8.202.8), issued during the COVID-19 pandemic, which allegedly prevented them from filing their motion until after the deadline to file motions had already expired. Further, defendants maintain that, as the court previously held that plaintiffs’ expert report was not in admissible form, plaintiffs do not have an expert opinion that they can rely on to prove their case, and plaintiffs previously conceded that the Reem entities were alter egos of each other. In response, plaintiffs contend that defendants have failed to demonstrate good cause for their second motion for summary judgment, as their initial motion for summary judgment was timely filed in compliance with the court’s deadline of February 28, 2020. They assert that defendants should have raised the purported admission that the Reem entities were alter egos in opposition to plaintiffs’ first motion for summary judgment. Finally, plaintiffs maintain that defendants have failed to obtain an expert and cannot serve as their own expert witness, and, thus, are unable to meet their burden of proving that plaintiffs’ legal malpractice claim is without merit.

“‘Successive motions for summary judgment should not be entertained without a showing of newly discovered evidence or other sufficient justification”‘ (Maggio v 24 W 57 APF, LLC, 134 AD3d 621, 625 [1st Dept 2015], quoting Jones v 636 Holding Corp., 73 AD3d 409,409 [1st Dept 2010]; see also Pough v Aegis Prop. Servs. Corp., 186 AD2d 52, 53 [1st Dept 1992] [“[A]s a matter of policy, multiple summary judgment motions are discouraged in the absence of newly discovered evidence or ‘other sufficient cause”‘]).”

“A party seeking summary judgment should anticipate having to lay bare its proof and should not expect that it will readily be granted a second and third chance”] [internal quotation marks omitted]). Accordingly, defendants’ motion for summary judgment is denied.”

“Plaintiffs contend that they have good cause for their second motion, as the court previously denied their motion primarily because their expert report was unswom. They now submit an affidavit from their expert, Bennett J. Wasserman, which annexes his report offered on the prior motion (NYSCEF Doc No. 359, Wasserman aff), and Wasserman opines therein that defendants’ conduct fell below the standard of care in the underlying action in that, among other things: (1) defendants failed to investigate and marshal appropriate lay and expert evidence in a timely fashion; (2) defendants stipulated to the fact that the Reem entities were alter egos, notwithstanding the fact that Stein testified to the contrary; (3) defendants never advised plaintiffs about the existence of potential conflicts of interest; and ( 4) defendants failed to communicate with plaintiffs (id., ,i 10 [c], [d], [e], [f], [k]).”

“Here, plaintiffs have demonstrated good cause for their second motion for summary judgment (see Darwick v Paternoster, 56 AD3d 714, 715 [2d Dept 2008]), as the prior denial was based, in part, on the fact that their expert report was unswom and therefore inadmissible. Now, plaintiffs have, in effect, moved to renew their prior motion for summary judgment to correct a procedural oversight and have submitted their expert’s affidavit in admissible form (see Feuerman v Marriott Intl., 201 AD3d 566, 567 [1st Dept 2022]; Shaw v Looking Glass Assoc., 8 AD3d 100, 102 [1st Dept 2004]). The court, therefore, must determine whether plaintiffs are entitled to summary judgment.”

“Even considering Wasserman’s affidavit, the court finds that plaintiffs are still not entitled to summary judgment. First, there are issues of fact as to proximate cause (see Birnbuam v Misiano, 52 AD3d 632, 634 [2d Dept 2008]). Plaintiffs argue that by conducting their own informal audit, they “met the proximate cause element of this litigation, through the ‘case within a case’ standard, as they successfully refuted the Funds’ audit and refuted the uncontested judgment against Plaintiffs” (NYSCEF Doc No. 360 at 28). However, they concede that the audit is inadmissible at trial, and thus, as previously held on plaintiffs’ first summary judgment motion, the audit is insufficient to demonstrate proximate cause (see CPLR 4547; CNP Mech., Inc. v Allied Bldrs., Inc., 66 AD3d 1340, 1340 [4th Dept 2009] [subcontract summary prepared by defendants’ counsel “was prepared for the purpose of settlement negotiations and was therefore inadmissible as proof of the amount of damages”]). “