Jfurti, LLC v Mintz, Levin, Cohn, Ferris, Glovky & Popeo, P.C. 2025 NY Slip Op 33977(U) October 15, 2025 Supreme Court, New York County Docket Number: Index No. 155965/2024 Judge: Anar R. Patel is the story of a $ 38 Million judgment which just faded away.

“Jfurti is a Delaware limited liability company whose sole member is nonparty Jacob
Frydman (“Frydman”). Ledgerock is a New York limited liability company of which Frydman is also the sole member. Ledgerock was the owner of a certain residential property located in Hyde Park, New York (“Ledgerock Property”) that was Frydman’s personal residence (NYSCEF Doc. No. 56, Exhibit F). Defendant is a law firm that represented Jfurti in an action to enforce a $16 million promissory note captioned as JFURTI, LLC v Suneet Singal, et al., NY County Index No. 656273/2016 (“Collection Action”) (NYSCEF Doc. No. 28, “Am. Compl.” ¶¶ 37, 39). Jfurti prevailed in the Collection Action and, in December 2017, obtained a judgment against Suneet Singal (“Singal”) and 13 entities controlled by him (collectively “Judgment Debtors”), in the amount of $21,221,676.53, which Plaintiffs claim is now worth more than $38.7 million after
interest (“the Judgment”) (Am. Compl. ¶ 1).

On February 23, 2018, Jfurti and Frydman entered into an amended engagement agreement with Defendant (NYSCEF Doc. No. 57, “Amended Engagement”). In relevant part, the Amended Engagement provided that Defendant would represent Jfurti in the collection of the Judgment, in exchange for which Defendant would receive a portion of the recovery (Amended Engagement at 2). The Amended Engagement specified that the scope of Defendant’s engagement did not extend to affiliates of Jfurti (Amended Engagement, Engagement Memorandum at 1). Nonparty Christopher Sullivan (“Sullivan”), then a partner at Defendant, was the lead attorney representing
Jfurti in the Collection Action and subsequent Judgment enforcement actions until May 2022, at which time he changed firms.”

“On April 19, 2019, Plaintiffs and Frydman executed a Funding and Investment Agreement with nonparty Curiam Investments 2 LLC (“Curiam”), a litigation finance provider (NYSCEF Doc. No. 58, “Funding Agreement”). Frydman signed the Funding Agreement on behalf of himself, Jfurti, and Ledgerock, under a heading that reads “ACCEPTED AND AGREED,” along with Curiam’s representative. Sullivan also signed the Funding Agreement on behalf of Defendant, under a separate heading that read “Acknowledged and Agreed.” Plaintiffs claim that Defendant was party to the Funding Agreement, which Defendant denies. The Funding Agreement’s preamble defines its “Parties” as Curiam “together with Judgment Creditor [Jfurti], Ledgerock and Frydman” (Funding Agreement, Preamble).

Pursuant to the Funding Agreement, Curiam made a $6 million upfront payment to Jfurti in exchange for purchasing an approximately 25% interest in the Judgment (Am. Compl. ¶¶ 3–4; Funding Agreement § II.A). Jfurti was responsible for reimbursing Curiam for the $6 million “Investment Amount” and for payment of an additional “Funder Return” out of its share of the collections on the Judgment (Funding Agreement §§ I.R., III.A; Appendix 3 § 3). Frydman and Ledgerock both executed guarantees concurrently with the Funding Agreement. Ledgerock also executed a mortgage for the Ledgerock Property with Curiam as collateral for Jfurti’s repayment obligations (Funding Agreement, Exhibit D, “Curiam Mortgage”). The Curiam Mortgage gave Curiam the option to foreclose on the Ledgerock Property in the event of a default (id. § 7.03).
The Funding Agreement provided that Curiam’s failure to receive “on or prior to the fifth (5th) anniversary of the date hereof . . . an amount equal to the Investment Amount plus the Funder Return” would constitute a default (Funding Agreement § VI.C). Plaintiffs allege that Defendant persuaded them to enter the Funding Agreement after Sullivan oversaw a due diligence investigation that found there was “no reason why it would not be able to collect at least the amount needed to re-pay Curiam and the Repayment Obligation” within five years and to release the collateral (id. ¶¶ 7–9).
Plaintiffs maintain that Defendant “did an admirable job pursuing enforcement of the
Judgment” in the two years after entering the Funding Agreement, with Sullivan overseeing these efforts (id. ¶ 14). Defendant domesticated the Judgment in multiple jurisdictions and commenced enforcement and collection proceedings (id. ¶ 15). Defendant allegedly identified executable assets including a bank account with approximately $220,000, two luxury vehicles, a $25 million note due to the Judgment Debtors, and 89 million shares of stock in a publicly traded company, PhotoMedix (id. ¶ 16). Sullivan allegedly caused the PhotoMedix shares, worth approximately $20 million at the time, to be seized by the New York Marshal (id. ¶¶ 16–17). The shares were
not subsequently sold.

In May 2022, Sullivan departed Defendant and began working at a different law firm,
Nutter McClennen & Fish LLP (“Nutter”) (Am. Compl. ¶ 18; NYSCEF Doc. No. 56 Exhibit C ¶ 6). The parties dispute whether Defendant remained counsel for Jfurti in the Judgment enforcement matters. Plaintiffs allege Defendant continued its epresentation of them until January 17, 2024 (Am. Compl. ¶ 74). Defendant claims that Frydman authorized it to transfer its files for the Jfurti matters to Sullivan at Nutter, producing a Client File Transfer Request Form dated May 23, 2022 (NYSCEF Doc. No. 56 Exhibit C, “Transfer Request Form”). Plaintiffs dispute the authenticity of the Transfer Request Form and claim that Frydman never signed such a document (Am. Compl. ¶ 68). Defendant’s Information Governance department e-mailed Nutter on June 30,
2022 with an embedded link for the files related to the Jfurti matter (NYSCEF Doc. No. 59 at 5–6, 35–36). However, none of the parties produce any communications between Plaintiffs, Frydman, Defendant, and Sullivan about Sullivan’s move or the putative transfer of the Judgment matters.”

“”A plaintiff states a cause of action for legal malpractice where it alleges facts “that, if
proven at trial, would demonstrate that the attorney ‘failed to exercise the ordinary reasonable skill and knowledge commonly possessed by a member of the legal profession and that the attorney’s breach of this duty proximately caused plaintiff to sustain actual and ascertainable damages’ (Kaplan v Conway & Conway, 173 AD3d 452, 452 [1st Dept 2019], quoting Rudolf v Shayne, Dachs, Stanisci, Corker & Sauer, 8 NY3d 438, 442 [2007]). “An attorney’s conduct or inaction is the proximate cause of a plaintiff’s damages if but for the attorney’s negligence” the plaintiff “would not have sustained actual and ascertainable damages” (Nomura Asset Capital Corp. v Cadwalader, Wickersham & Taft LLP, 26 NY3d 40, 50 [2015], rearg denied 27 NY3d 957 [2016] [internal quotation marks and citations omitted]). It is well-established that “absent an attorney client relationship, a cause of action for legal malpractice cannot be stated” (Federal Ins. Co. v North Am. Specialty Ins. Co., 47 AD3d 52, 59 [1st Dept 2007]; see also Volpe v Munoz & Assoc., LLC, 190 AD3d 661, 662 [1st Dept 2021]).”

“The Court finds that Defendant’s documentary evidence does not conclusively establish that it terminated its attorney-client relationship with Jfurti at the time of Sullivan’s departure from the firm in May 2022. The authenticity of the Transfer Request Form is disputed and that document is therefore not credited (see VXI Lux Holdco S.A.R.L., 171 AD3d at 193). Defendant’s internal e-mails and communications with Nutter also do not establish when, if ever, it communicated its intent to terminate its representation of Jfurti and transfer the matter to Nutter. The Court also finds that Defendant does not submit documentation showing when, if ever, Nutter
assumed representation of Jfurti in the Judgment enforcement matters.”

More on this decision in the next blog article.