Balestriere PLLC v Ray 2025 NY Slip Op 34005(U) October 15, 2025 Supreme Court, New York County Docket Number: Index No. 154425/2023 Judge: Mary V. Rosado is a multiple attorney v. client fee and Judiciary Law 487 claim which was dismissed this month. We wonder whether Urias v. Daniel P. Buttafuoco & Associates, 41 N.Y.3d 560, 568 (2024) was considered?

“Plaintiff is a law firm that formerly represented Ray in a litany of lawsuits against Ray’s ex-wife. As alleged in the Complaint, Ray retained Plaintiff on October 3, 2010, and Plaintiff continued to represent Ray until January 2016. As a result of that litigation, a judge issued sanctions in favor of Ray’s ex-wife and against Plaintiff. Plaintiff settled the sanctions order against it. Ray fired Plaintiff, retained another firm, and appealed the sanctions order, which the First Department reversed. As Plaintiff no longer represented Ray, Plaintiff issued a final invoice, which Ray allegedly refused to pay.”

“After a jury trial, the jury returned a verdict in favor of Plaintiff on Ray’s unpaid legal fees and dismissed all of Ray’s claims against Plaintiff. Ray appealed to the Second Circuit, which affirmed the jury’s findings (see Ray v Fariello, 2024 WL 390293 [2d Cir 2024]). During the pendency of the appeal before the Second Circuit, Plaintiff sued Defendants in New York State Court for malicious prosecution, tortious interference with prospective business relations, and Judiciary Law § 487. Defendants move to dismiss and seek the imposition of sanctions. Defendants’ motion is granted in part and denied in part.”

“Plaintiffs Judiciary Law§ 487 claim is dismissed. It is well established that a violation of Judiciary Law § 487 does not give rise to a separate plenary action but must be brought in the action where the alleged deceit or misconduct in violation of the statute occurred, in this case, in the Southern District of New York (see Chibcha Restaurant, Inc. v David A. Kaminsky & Associates, P.C., 102 AD3d 544, 545 [1st Dept 2013] quoting Yalkowsky v Century Apartments Associates, 215 AD2d 214 [1st Dept 1995]; see also Menitzky v Owen, 19 AD3d 201 [1st Dept 2005]). Plaintiff likewise could have sought sanctions against Defendants in the underlying action for what it deemed to be inappropriate or deceitful comments made during closings. Therefore, this branch of Defendants’ motion is granted.”

From Urias: “[1] We conclude, however, that section 487 authorizes a plenary action for attorney deceit under these circumstances. The text of the statute allows recovery of treble damages “in a civil action” where “[a]n attorney . . . [i]s guilty of any deceit or collusion . . . with intent to deceive the court or any party” (Judiciary Law § 487). The phrase “in a civil action” is most naturally read to include a plenary action. Notably, the provision does not differentiate between an action that might undermine or undo a final judgment and one that does not, or between allegations of fraud that are intrinsic to the underlying action, as opposed to extrinsic. Interpreting the statute to permit a plenary action where the remedy would not entail undermining a final judgment (for example, when the deceit harms a prevailing party), but deny one where a final judgment could be impaired, would require us to rewrite the statute. That we cannot do.”