While it is rare, on ocassion, a client may be ordered to pay double fees in a contingent fee case. Here is an example:
Greenberg v. Cross Island Industries Inc., 05CV6026
Decided: October 16, 2007
District Judge Arthur D. Spatt
U.S. DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
Alpert & Kaufman, LLP
First Attorneys for the Plaintiff
Gair, Gair, Conason, Steigman & Mackauf
Second Attorneys for the Plaintiff
Judge Spatt
"What began as a routine settlement in a personal injury action has evolved into a contentious battle between plaintiffs’ previous and present counsel over the proper apportionment of legal fees. Here, however, in a somewhat unusual circumstance, the clients, rather than present counsel, are to pay the fee of previous counsel separately and in addition to the fee of present counsel
The Gair Firm asserts that Alpert & Kaufman was dismissed by the Greenbergs for cause and is not entitled to any legal fee. See Garcia v. Teitler, 443 F.3d 202, 212 (2d Cir. 2006); Friedman v. Park Cake, Inc., 34 A.D.3d 286, 287, 825 N.Y.S.2d 11, 12 (1st Dep’t 2006) (stating that where an attorney is discharged for cause, she is entitled to no compensation).
Evidence of a general dissatisfaction with an attorney’s performance or a difference of opinion between attorney and client does not establish that the attorney was discharged for cause absent some evidence that the attorney failed to properly represent the client’s interest. Garcia, 443 F.3d at 212; Costello v. Kiaer, 278 A.D.2d 50, 50, 717 N.Y.S.2d 560, 561 (1st Dep’t 2000). Indeed, "[a]ttorney-client relationships frequently end because of personality conflicts, misunderstandings, or differences of opinion having nothing to do with any impropriety by either the client or the lawyer." Klein v. Eubank, 87 N.Y.2d 459, 663 N.E.2d 599, 640 N.Y.S.2d 443, (1996); see also D’Jamoos v. Griffith, 2006 WL 2086033, at *5 (E.D.N.Y. July 25, 2006).
Something more than a personality conflict or difference of opinion is required to establish discharge for cause and ‘"[c]ourts typically find a discharge for cause where there has been a significant breach of legal duty.’" D’Jamoos, 2006 WL 2086033, at *5 (quoting Allstate Ins. Co. v. Nandi, 258 F. Supp. 2d 309, 312 (S.D.N.Y. 2003)). For example, in an extreme case, the court held that plaintiff’s counsel was discharged for cause where it kept hidden from its client the fact that it had allowed the statute of limitations to expire. In re Spatola, 196 Misc. 2d 666, 668, 763 N.Y.S.2d 463, 465 (Sur. Ct. Richmond Co. 2003) ("When an attorney deliberately fails to disclose to a client critical information, it weakens [the fundamental] trust and confidence and erodes the relationship to the point that the client . . . has cause to discharge the attorney."). Here, there is no evidence that the conduct of the Alpert Firm breached the trust and confidence so crucial to the attorney-client relationship.
Instead, it is more likely, that the Alpert Firm was discharged as a result of a difference of opinion on how the case ought to be conducted.The Court notes that in Vallejo v. Builders for Family Youth, 2007 WL 10386 (Sup. Ct. Kings Co. Jan. 2, 2007), the court found that because the letters to previous counsel regarding his discharge never mentioned cause and referred to the matter of his compensation, counsel was not discharged for cause. Vallejo, 2007 WL 10386, at *5; see also Realuyo v. Diaz, 2006 WL 695683, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. March 17, 2006) (finding no evidence of discharge for cause because, among other things, the client’s termination letter to attorney failed to specify the reason for termination and requested an accounting of the lawyer’s fee).
There is an unusual twist in the fee arrangement between the Gair Firm and the Greenbergs. In the covering letter from Anthony H. Gair to Barry F. Greenberg dated February 22, 2006 it is stated: "It is understood that you and your wife will be solely responsible for any fees awarded your out-going attorneys. We agree that we will represent you in any fee dispute with the out-going attorneys at no additional cost." In addition, the Gair Firm’s retainer statement, dated March 3, 2006, filed with the Office of Court Administration states that "[a]ny fees awarded to the out-going Attorneys, Alpert & Kaufman, will be the sole responsibility of the plaintiffs." (Retainer Statement of Robert Conason (March 3, 2006)). This agreement is contrary to the usual situation, in which the prior attorney would be paid its portion from the fee received by the incoming firm, rather than by the client.