Complex multi-state, multi-district, criminal-civil high stakes litigation…really, it can only end in a legal malpractice case.  Here, in Stonewell Corp. v. Conestoga Title Ins. Co., 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1107 [2004 cv 9867] a decision by Judge Kimba Woods lays out just how complex a case can get.  Today we will deal with the elements of legal malpractice, and tomorrow, with the defense of "professional judgment."

"Stonewell asserts three separate claims alleging that Dollinger committed legal malpractice while representing Stonewell in proceedings related to Stonewell’s purported property rights over a Center Point Mall property in New Jersey. First, Stonewell claims that Dollinger committed legal malpractice by: (1) advising Stonewell to pursue certain legal actions, including filing an "innocent owner" petition pursuant to 18 U.S.C § 1963(l) in the Middle District of Florida; (2) failing to advise Stonewell of the risks of taking such legal actions; (3) advising Stonewell to stay related proceedings in the Southern District of New York; and (4) failing to advise Stonewell of or otherwise [*3] address an alleged conflict of interest with respect to a second "innocent owner" petition in light of Dollinger’s relationship with Conestoga Title Insurance Company (hereinafter "Conestoga"). "
 

"A plaintiff must establish the following elements for a claim of legal malpractice under New York State law: (1) an attorney-client relationship, (2) attorney negligence (3) that is the proximate cause of a loss, and (4) actual damages. See Allianz Ins. Co. v. Lerner, 416 F.3d 109, 118 (2d Cir. 2005); Estate of Re v. Kornstein Veisz & Wexler, 958 F. Supp. 907, 920 (S.D.N.Y. 1997). To succeed on a motion for summary judgment in a legal malpractice action, the defendant must establish that the plaintiff cannot prove at least one of these essential elements. See Rubens v. Mason, 527 F.3d 252, 255 (2d Cir. 2008); Carney v. Philippone, 332 F.3d 163, 167 (2d Cir. 2003).

To find negligence, a court must find sufficient evidence that the defendant-attorney’s conduct "fell below the ordinary and reasonable skill and knowledge commonly [*14] possessed by a member of his profession." Achtman v. Kirby, McInerney & Squire, LLP, 464 F.3d 328, 337 (2d Cir. 2006) (quoting Grago v. Robertson, 49 A.D.2d 645, 370 N.Y.S. 2d 255 (N.Y. 1975)). If the pleadings and evidence indicate no more than an "error of judgment" or a "selection of one among several reasonable courses of action," dismissal of the claims is warranted. Rosner v. Paley, 65 N.Y.2d 736, 481 N.E. 2d 553, 554, 492 N.Y.S.2d 13 (N.Y. 1985); see also Nobile v. Schwartz, 265 F. Supp. 2d 282, 288 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (noting that a plaintiff must show that the attorney "failed to exercise that degree of care, skill and diligence commonly possessed and exercised by a member of the legal community").

Common examples of circumstances for which an attorney may be held liable include "ignorance of the rules of practice, failure to comply with conditions precedent to suit, or . . . neglect to prosecute or defend an action." Hatfield v. Herz, 109 F. Supp. 2d 174, 180 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (quoting Bernstein v. Oppenheim & Co., 160 A.D.2d 428, 554 N.Y.S. 2d 487, 489-90 (1st Dep’t 1990)) Allegations that amount to nothing more than a "dissatisfaction with strategic choices" will not support a malpractice claim as a matter of law. Bernstein, 554 N.Y.S. 2d at 490."