Capogrosso v Landsman ;2011 NY Slip Op 02826 ;Decided on April 5, 2011 ;Appellate Division, Second Department  is an example of the problem of successor attorneys.  Aside from the fact that this particular plaintiff is herself an attorney, and has herself sued many attorneys (and lost), the more salient point to take from this case is that there is always a problem of the successor attorney and how liability might be attributed. 
 

Here, plaintiff herself was the successor attorney, but that is not important for the more general lesson that when a successor attorney takes over and the case (or appeal) is still alive, it will be the work of that successor attorney to win or lose, and the predecessor attorney is more or less off the hook.

"The defendant represented the plaintiff, an attorney, in a prior action. Following a trial in the prior action, judgment was entered against the plaintiff. The defendant filed a notice of appeal on the plaintiff’s behalf and then withdrew as her counsel in the action. The plaintiff proceeded pro se, perfected the appeal, and the Appellate Division, First Department, affirmed the judgment against the plaintiff (see Capogrosso v Reade Broadways Assoc., 63 AD3d 414).

Subsequently, the plaintiff commenced this legal malpractice action against the defendant, alleging, inter alia, that the defendant failed to turn over the case file from the prior action, and that this failure prevented the plaintiff from perfecting her appeal. The defendant moved, among other things, to dismiss the complaint pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(1), asserting that the plaintiff had, in fact, perfected her appeal and lost. In addition, the defendant contended that he had a retaining lien on the case file in the prior action because the plaintiff owed him substantial fees for his services. In response, the plaintiff argued that she was forced to bring an appeal limited to a single issue because she was unable to construct a complete record for the appeal in the absence of the defendant’s file. The Supreme Court, inter alia, granted that branch of the defendant’s motion which was to dismiss the complaint pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(1), and the plaintiff appeals. We affirm the order insofar as appealed from. "