We looked at the underlying decisions in this case, and are still scratching our figurative head here.  in Lusk v Weinstein , 2011 NY Slip Op 04742 , Decided on June 7, 2011 , Appellate Division, First Department we see the AD citing an obviously correct principal of law: "a charging lien entered in the underlying action against plaintiff barred her from thereafter asserting a claim for legal malpractice (see Judiciary Law § 475; Wallach v Unger & Stutman, LLP, 48 AD3d 360 [2008])."
 

But, in the underlying case, after a charging lien was entered, the parties agreed and "entered into a stipulation with Parker to resolve the parties’ fee dispute without prejudice to any other claims either party might assert against the other in other actions, e.g., Parker’s res judicata defense here."
 

Why, then, was defendant permitted to utilize a res judicata defense?  Maybe our readers could explain it to us?