Architectural malpractice follows the same rules as legal malpractice.  Duplicitive pleadings are not permitted, and will be dismissed.  As we discussed yesterday in Beck v Studio Kenji, Ltd.
2011 NY Slip Op 33470(U); December 21, 2011; Sup Ct, NY County; Docket Number: 108995/09
Judge: Louis B. York one might plead 10 claims, only to have them cut to the basic breach of contract and malpractice.

"Recovery in quasi-contract ordinarily is precluded “when a valid and enforceable written contract” governs the specific subject matter (Clark-Fr‘Fitzpatrick, Inc. v. Long Island R. Co., 70 N.Y.2d 382, 389, 521 N.Y.S.2d 653, 656 [1987](Clark-Fitzpatrick)). Only where there is no express contract or where the validity of the contract is at issue is a quasi-contract theory possible, If there is no contract or an unenforceable agreement, the Court may find that a quasi-contact exists to prevent unjust enrichment (Clark v. Fitzpatrick,, 70 N.Y.2d 382,389, 521 N.Y.S.2d 653,656 [1987]). Here, neither party questions that a contract exists. Moreover, plaintiff bases his unjust enrichment claim on the contract itself. Therefore, an independent quasi-contract claim cannot exist and the
claim is not legally viable. "

"Next, defendants state that the fourth cause of action for breach of implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing is not viable against Studio Kenji because it is based on the same facts as the breach of contract claim. Defendants are correct. Under New York law, parties to an express contract are bound by an implied duty of good faith, but breach of that duty is merely a breach of the underlying contract (Panasia Estates, Inc. v. Hudson Ins. Co., 68 A.D.3d 530, 530,889 N.Y.S.2d 452,453 [lst Dept 20091). Accordingly, a claim for breach of the implied covenant is dismissible as redundant if it arises under the same facts which form the basis for the breach of contract claim (Constar v. JA. Jones Const. Co., 212 A.D.2d 452,453,622 N.Y.S.2d 730,73 1 [1st Dept
19951). The court therefore dismisses the fourth cause of action as well. Turning to the fifth cause of action for breach of fiduciary duty, defendants argue that the claim is redundant of the malpractice claim and therefore they seek the same relief. Defendants are correct when they state that the claims are duplicative. New York courts have consistently held that a breach of fiduciary duty claim that is premised on the same facts as the legal malpractice cause of action, is redundant and should be dismissed (E.g., Murray Hill Investments, Inc. v. Parker Chapin Flatow & Kimple, LLP 305 A.D.2d 228,229,759 N.Y.S.2d 463,464 [l” Dept 20031; Turk. Angel, 293 A.D.2d 284,284, 740 N.Y.S.2d 50, 58 [l” Dept 2002)."

Finally, defendants argue that the this Court should dismiss the cause of action, for gross negligence. Gross negligence, as both parties state, is “conduct that evinces a reckless disregard for the rights of others or ‘smacks’ of intentional wrongdoing,” (Sommer v. Federal Signal Corp., 79 N.Y.2d 540,554,583 N.Y.S.2d 957,593 N.E.2d 1365). “It is conduct that evinces a reckless indifference to the rights of others,” (id.). Whether defendants’ conduct rises to this level of culpability is a question of fact. The failure to meet applicable building and fire safety codes, as well as DOB rules and regulations during construction could arguably constitute gross negligence in light of the potentially serious consequences thereof, both financially and in creating a risk of injury to plaintiff and other residents of the building. This is a question to be resolved by a jury
and it would therefor be inappropriate to dismiss the cause of action.