Spanish company is in the business of exporting and selling olive oil.  While in bankruptcy it arranges for ongoing sales to the US.  US Company hires CPAs to do routine monthly billing and reconciliations which go wrong.  How long does the representation go on, and does it comprise "continuous representation"?  Is the commencement date for purposes of the statute of limitations the date of the first mistake or of its discovery?

Since at this juncture the intended scope of defendants’ services cannot be determined, it also cannot be determined whether plaintiffs instituted this action within the requisite statute of limitations. Pursuant to CPLR 214(6), an action for professional malpractice must be commenced within three years of the date of accrual. A claim for professional malpractice accrues when the malpractice is committed, not when it is discovered  (see Williamson v Pricewaterhousecoopers LLP, 9 NY3d 1, 7-8 [2007]), Under the continuous representation doctrine, if the accountant whose professional work is being questioned engages in continuous work for the client with respect to the particular transaction that is the subject of the action, the statutory period is tolled (see Mitschele v Schulfz, 36 AD3d 249, 253 [Ist Dept 20061). “The mere recurrence of professional services does not constitute continuous representation where the later services performed were not related to the original services” ( id ) . In the case at bar, the evidence presented indicates that monthly reports were sent to Spain until March of 2004 and that between March and June of 2004, defendants assisted in  the preparation of a revised reconciliation statement to be sent to Fedeoliva. The scope of defendants’ services is undetermined at this time, thus it cannot be stated with certainty when the statute of limitations began to run. Specifically, it is unclear whether the reports and revised reconciliation were part of continuous work for which defendants were engaged, which would make the continuous representation doctrine applicable and toll the statute of limitations. similarly, in order to establish privity between plaintiffs and defendants, it must be shown that: (1) defendants were aware that their reports were to be used for a particular purpose; (2) in the furtherance of which a known party was intended to rely; and (3) some conduct on the part of defendants evincing their understanding that plaintiffs were going to rely on their accounting work (see Security Pac. Bus, Credit v Peat Marnick Main & Co., 79 NY2d 695, 702 [I 9921; Credit Alliance Corp. v Arthur Andersen & Co., 65 NY2d 536 [ISSS]). Since issues of material fact remain as to what service5 defendants agreed to provide and defendants’ knowledge of the relationship between plaintiffs and Fedeoliva USA, defendants’ privity argument cannot be resolved at the present time.

Moreover, the Court is not persuaded by defendants’ in pari delicto argument because, at this time, there is no e-evidence of Fedeoliva USA’s wrongdoing and, even if that doctrine were to apply, it does not exclude a cause of action for contribution among joint tortfeasors (Rpsenbach v The Diversified Group, Inc., 85 AD3d 569 [Ist Dept 201 11).