It’s rarely the mistake (the departure) upon which plaintiff and defense battle in legal malpractice.  It is almost always the "but for" part of the equation, in which plaintiff must show a departure, but for which there would have been a better and different outcome, in which the mistake and the outcome are proximately related, with ascertainable damages.  As an example, in this case could plaintiff have won his case, but for the mistake of his attorneys?

Catuzza v Rodriguez   2012 NY Slip Op 01949   Decided on March 16, 2012   Appellate Division, Fourth Department  questions whether the underlying case could ever have been won. 
"Memorandum: Plaintiff commenced this legal malpractice action seeking damages allegedly resulting from defendants’ negligence in their representation of him in an action against, inter alia, his former employer, the Erie County Water Authority (hereafter, ECWA action). The ECWA action was dismissed based upon plaintiff’s failure to comply with discovery demands. Supreme Court properly denied the motion of defendant David Rodriguez, Esq. and the motion of defendants Noemi Fernandez-Hiltz, Esq. and The Law Offices of Noemi Fernandez, PLLC seeking summary judgment dismissing the complaint. Defendants moved for such relief on the ground that plaintiff could not have prevailed in the ECWA action, inasmuch as he failed to exhaust his administrative remedies by appealing the determination of the Hearing Officer in the prior proceeding pursuant to Civil Service Law § 72. Defendants, however, failed to establish as a matter of law that the complaint in the ECWA action would have been dismissed on that ground (see generally Zuckerman v City of New York, 49 NY2d 557, 562). Failure to exhaust administrative remedies is a defense that may be waived if not timely raised (see Matter of Punis v Perales, 112 AD2d 236, 238), and the defendants in the ECWA action did not raise that defense in their answer. Further, inasmuch as " the grounds urged for relief’ and the remedies sought in [the ECWA action and the prior Civil Service Law § 72 proceeding] are separate and distinct," plaintiff did not fail to exhaust his administrative remedies with respect to [*2]the conduct of the defendants in the ECWA action (Matter of Sokol v Granville Cent. School Dist. Bd. of Educ., 260 AD2d 692, 694). "
 

Print:
Email this postTweet this postLike this postShare this post on LinkedIn
Andrew Lavoott Bluestone

Andrew Lavoott Bluestone has been an attorney for 40 years, with a career that spans criminal prosecution, civil litigation and appellate litigation. Mr. Bluestone became an Assistant District Attorney in Kings County in 1978, entered private practice in 1984 and in 1989 opened…

Andrew Lavoott Bluestone has been an attorney for 40 years, with a career that spans criminal prosecution, civil litigation and appellate litigation. Mr. Bluestone became an Assistant District Attorney in Kings County in 1978, entered private practice in 1984 and in 1989 opened his private law office and took his first legal malpractice case.

Since 1989, Bluestone has become a leader in the New York Plaintiff’s Legal Malpractice bar, handling a wide array of plaintiff’s legal malpractice cases arising from catastrophic personal injury, contracts, patents, commercial litigation, securities, matrimonial and custody issues, medical malpractice, insurance, product liability, real estate, landlord-tenant, foreclosures and has defended attorneys in a limited number of legal malpractice cases.

Bluestone also took an academic role in field, publishing the New York Attorney Malpractice Report from 2002-2004.  He started the “New York Attorney Malpractice Blog” in 2004, where he has published more than 4500 entries.

Mr. Bluestone has written 38 scholarly peer-reviewed articles concerning legal malpractice, many in the Outside Counsel column of the New York Law Journal. He has appeared as an Expert witness in multiple legal malpractice litigations.

Mr. Bluestone is an adjunct professor of law at St. John’s University College of Law, teaching Legal Malpractice.  Mr. Bluestone has argued legal malpractice cases in the Second Circuit, in the New York State Court of Appeals, each of the four New York Appellate Divisions, in all four of  the U.S. District Courts of New York and in Supreme Courts all over the state.  He has also been admitted pro haec vice in the states of Connecticut, New Jersey and Florida and was formally admitted to the US District Court of Connecticut and to its Bankruptcy Court all for legal malpractice matters. He has been retained by U.S. Trustees in legal malpractice cases from Bankruptcy Courts, and has represented municipalities, insurance companies, hedge funds, communications companies and international manufacturing firms. Mr. Bluestone regularly lectures in CLEs on legal malpractice.

Based upon his professional experience Bluestone was named a Diplomate and was Board Certified by the American Board of Professional Liability Attorneys in 2008 in Legal Malpractice. He remains Board Certified.  He was admitted to The Best Lawyers in America from 2012-2019.  He has been featured in Who’s Who in Law since 1993.

In the last years, Mr. Bluestone has been featured for two particularly noteworthy legal malpractice cases.  The first was a settlement of an $11.9 million dollar default legal malpractice case of Yeo v. Kasowitz, Benson, Torres & Friedman which was reported in the NYLJ on August 15, 2016. Most recently, Mr. Bluestone obtained a rare plaintiff’s verdict in a legal malpractice case on behalf of the City of White Plains v. Joseph Maria, reported in the NYLJ on February 14, 2017. It was the sole legal malpractice jury verdict in the State of New York for 2017.

Bluestone has been at the forefront of the development of legal malpractice principles and has contributed case law decisions, writing and lecturing which have been recognized by his peers.  He is regularly mentioned in academic writing, and his past cases are often cited in current legal malpractice decisions. He is recognized for his ample writings on Judiciary Law § 487, a 850 year old statute deriving from England which relates to attorney deceit.