One of the crucial questions to be asked in legal malpractice litigation is when did the representation end. This question comes only shortly after the question of when did the negligent event take place. The statute of limitations is three years from the negligent event or the last date that the attorneys represented the client, whichever is later.

Years ago it was possible to extend that time to 6 years, under a breach of contract theory, but the legislature simply voted that method away. Here, in Daniels v Turco ; 2011 NY Slip Op 03990
Decided on May 10, 2011 ;Appellate Division, Second Department we see how the theory plays out.
 

"The cause of action alleging legal malpractice accrued no later than April 18, 2005, when the defendants returned the case file to the plaintiff with an accompanying letter of discharge. That date was more than three years before the commencement of this action in June 2009 (see CPLR 214[6]; McCoy v Feinman, 99 NY2d 295, 301; Tsafatinos v Lee David Auerbach, P.C., 80 AD3d 749). Contrary to the plaintiff’s assertion, there was no evidence of any continuous ongoing relationship between the plaintiff and the defendants after the file was returned and, therefore, the continuous representation doctrine is not applicable (see Shumsky v Eisenstein, 96 NY2d 164, 168-171; Marro v Handwerker, Marchelos & Gayner, 1 AD3d 488; Daniels v Lebit, 299 AD2d 310; Wester v Sussman, 287 AD2d 618). Accordingly, the Supreme Court properly granted that branch of the defendants’ motion which was for summary judgment dismissing the legal malpractice cause [*2]of action as time-barred (see CPLR 214[6]; Adler v Gershman, 305 AD2d 342, 342-343).

In addition, the plaintiff’s cause of action sounding in fraud was duplicative of the legal malpractice cause of action, because it arises from the same facts as the legal malpractice cause of action and does not allege distinct damages (see Tsafatinos v Lee David Auerbach, P.C., 80 AD3d at 749; Kvetnaya v Tylo, 49 AD3d 608, 609; Daniels v Lebit, 299 AD2d at 310; Mecca v Shang, 258 AD2d 569, 570). Accordingly, the fraud cause of action is likewise subject to the three-year limitations period (see Tsafatinos v Lee David Auerbach, P.C., 80 AD3d 749, 750), and the Supreme Court properly granted that branch of the defendants’ motion which was for summary judgment dismissing the fraud cause of action as time-barred. "