Regular practitioners get little enough guidance in the appellate process, and reasons for dismissals and other outcomes are not always apparent or even stated.  Here, in two cases a pro-se plaintiff has her case dismissed, but with almost no guidance.  In Cascardo v Snitow Kanfer Holtzer & Millus, LLP   2012 NY Slip Op 07615   Decided on November 14, 2012   Appellate Division, Second Department  and in Cascardo v Stacchini   2012 NY Slip Op 07616   Decided on November 14, 2012  Appellate Division, Second Department  we see practically the same delphic pronouncements.  In Stacchini  the Court writes: " Contrary to the plaintiff’s contention, the Supreme Court properly granted that branch of the defendants’ motion which was pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(7) to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a cause of action. In considering a motion to dismiss pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(7), the court must "accept the facts as alleged in the complaint as true, accord [the plaintiff] the benefit of every possible favorable inference, and determine only whether the facts as alleged fit within any cognizable legal theory" (Leon v Martinez, 84 NY2d 83, 87-88). "Such a motion should be granted where, even viewing the allegations as true, the plaintiff cannot establish a cause of action" (Parekh v Cain, 96 AD3d 812, 815; see High Tides, LLC v DeMichele, 88 AD3d 954, 956-957; Schwartz v Schwartz, 55 AD3d 897). "

In Sniktow we see "Here, even viewing the factual allegations of the complaint as true, they failed to state a cause of action to recover damages for legal malpractice. In this regard, the plaintiff’s allegations, inter alia, that the defendants failed to present alleged evidence that the plaintiff in the underlying constructive trust action was manipulated into commencing that action against her, were irrelevant [*2]to the presentation of a viable defense against the elements of that constructive trust claim (see generally Rowe v Kingston, 94 AD3d 852, 853; Marini v Lombardo, 79 AD3d 932, 933). Accordingly, the complaint did not allege sufficient facts to state a cause of action to recover damages for legal malpractice

Here, even viewing the factual allegations of the complaint as true, they failed to adequately state a legally cognizable cause of action. Indeed, in this action against the attorneys who represented her adversaries in unrelated litigation, the plaintiff cannot allege the existence of the requisite contractual, fiduciary, or attorney-client relationship between herself and the defendants to support her various claims sounding in breach of contract, breach of fiduciary duty, and legal malpractice (see generally Breen v Law Off. of Bruce A. Barket, P.C., 52 AD3d 635, 636-637). [*2]Likewise, the plaintiff cannot properly plead reasonable reliance on the representations of another party’s counsel so as to support her claim of fraud (see Mann v Rusk, 14 AD3d 909, 909-910). "

Two losses.  Same appellate panel.