The right to sue ones lawyer can end after a period of time, called the statute of limitations.  The statute does not start to run until there has been a "mistake" by the attorney, but that time can be tolled by the continuous representation doctrine.  When the attorney-client relationship ends is the subject of endless litigation.

One way to end the attorney-client relationship is to act in a manner incompatible with a relationship of trust and confidence.  That’s what happened in Aseel v Jonathan E. Kroll & Assoc., PLLC   2013 NY Slip Op 03806   Decided on May 29, 2013   Appellate Division, Second Department.
 

"The statute of limitations for legal malpractice is three years (see CPLR 214[6]). The limitations period may be tolled by the continuous representation doctrine " where there is a mutual understanding of the need for further representation on the specific subject matter underlying the malpractice claim’" (Zorn v Gilbert, 8 NY3d 933, 934, quoting McCoy v Feinman, 99 NY2d 295, 306). "For the doctrine to apply, there must be clear indicia of an ongoing, continuous, developing, [*2]and dependent relationship between the client and the attorney’" (Piliero v Adler & Stavros, 282 AD2d 511, 512, quoting Luk Lamellen U. Kupplungbau GmbH v Lerner, 166 AD2d 505, 506). "One of the predicates for the application of the doctrine is continuing trust and confidence in the relationship between the parties" (Luk Lamellen U. Kupplungbau GmbH v Lerner, 166 AD2d at 507; see Coyne v Bersani, 61 NY2d 939; Piliero v Adler & Stavros, 282 AD2d at 512).

Here, contrary to the plaintiff’s sole contention on the issue of timeliness, the Supreme Court did not err in concluding that the relationship necessary to invoke the continuous representation rule ceased to exist by November 5, 2007, when the plaintiff surreptitiously removed his file from the defendants’ office. By so removing the file, the plaintiff evinced his lack of trust and confidence in the parties’ relationship, and his intention to discharge the defendants as his attorneys (see generally Fleyshman v Suckle & Schlesinger, PLLC, 91 AD3d 591, 592; cf. Piliero v Adler & Stavros, 282 AD2d at 512). Accordingly, because, contrary to the plaintiff’s contention, the relationship necessary to invoke the continuous representation doctrine terminated more than three years prior to the commencement of this action, the Supreme Court properly granted that branch of the defendants’ motion which was pursuant to CPLR 3211(a) to dismiss so much of the complaint as alleged legal malpractice against the defendants Kroll, Moss and Kroll, LLP, Martin N. Kroll, and Jonathon E. Kroll (see Fleyshman v Suckle & Schlesinger, PLLC, 91 AD3d at 592; Rupolo v Fish, 87 AD3d 684; Piliero v Adler & Stavros, 282 AD2d at 512). Accordingly, because, contrary to the plaintiff’s contention, the relationship necessary to invoke the continuous representation doctrine terminated more than three years prior to the commencement of this action, the Supreme Court properly granted that branch of the defendants’ motion which was pursuant to CPLR 3211(a) to dismiss so much of the complaint as alleged legal malpractice against the defendants Kroll, Moss and Kroll, LLP, Martin N. Kroll, and Jonathon E. Kroll (see Fleyshman v Suckle & Schlesinger, PLLC, 91 AD3d at 592; Rupolo v Fish, 87 AD3d 684; Piliero v Adler & Stavros, 282 AD2d at 512). "