Heirs to the Johnson & Johnson fortune decided that dividends and distributions were not sufficient, and entered into a tax shelter arrangement.  Naturally, it was disastrous, and ended in litigation.  In Johnson v Rose  2014 NY Slip Op 30262(U)  January 23, 2014  Sup Ct, NY County
Docket Number: 652075/2011  Judge: Lawrence K. Marks  we see how the Proskauer Rose LLP law firm engineered a big mess.  Today we will deal with the question of whether a fraud claim can exists side-by-side with a legal malpractice claim.

"Plaintiffs John Seward Johnson, Jr. ("Johnson") and his wife Joyce H. Johnson are Johnson & Johnson, Inc. stockholders who, along with other close affiliates and related entities, were clients of defendants at certain times relevant to the complaint. Through their attorney-client relationship with Johnson, defendants were aware of material aspects of plaintiffs’ financial affairs, including plaintiffs’ ownership of substantial amounts of Johnson & Johnson stock. Defendants approached Johnson (through Matthews) to offer him the opportunity to enter into a tax avoidance transaction with another Proskauer client, nonparty Diversified Group, Inc. ("Diversified"), which was in the business of selling tax planning strategies to high income parties. Defendants told Johnson that the transaction would allow plaintiffs to sell a large block of Johnson & Johnson stock in a manner that would minimize the payment of capital gains taxes. Johnson was realizing significant dividends on the stock up to that time, and had no plans to sell the stock before defendants approached him with the idea."

"Defendants seek to dismiss plaintiffs’ first cause of action as duplicative of the legal malpractice claim. It is well-settled that failure to disclose one’s own malpractice, standing alone, does not give rise to a fraud claim separate from the customary malpractice action. See, e.g., Weiss v. Manfredi, 83 N.Y.2d 974, 977 (1994); Baystone Equities, Inc. v. Handel-Harbour, 27 A.D.3d 231, 231 (1st Dep ‘t 2006); Roswick v. Mount Sinai Med. Ctr., 22 A.D.3d 409, 410 (1st Dep’t 2005). Thus, a fraud claim asserted in connection with a claim for legal malpractice "is sustainable only to the extent that it is premised upon one or more affirmative, intentional misrepresentations — that is, something more egregious than mere concealment or failure to disclose [one’s] own malpractice." White of Lake George v. Bell, 251 A.D.2d 777, 778 (3d Dep’t 1998) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted); accord Carl v. Cohen, 55 A.D.3d 478, 478-79 (1st Dep’t 2008) (fraud claim may be dismissed as duplicative of a malpractice claim if it is ‘"not based on an allegation of independent, intentionally
tortious’ conduct" and "fail[s] to allege ‘separate and distinct’ damages"); Atton v. Bier, 12 A.D.3d 240, 241-42 (1st Dep’t 2004) (suggesting that an alleged failure to disclose one’s own "general incompetence" is, in effect, "founded upon the same underlying allegations as the malpractice claim and seek essentially the same relief’). Mere allegations that defendants "furnished erroneous legal advice and neglected to take appropriate steps to safeguard [plaintiffs’] interests" do not suffice. White of Lake George, 251 A.D.2d at 778. However, not every claim for fraud is duplicative of a professional malpractice claim, even when both are asserted in the same action. For example, it is proper to deny a motion to dismiss a fraud claim as duplicative of a legal malpractice claim where "the fraud cause of action was based upon tortious conduct independent of the alleged malpractice, i.e., an alleged misrepresentation as to the eligibility of the defendant
[attorney] to practice law in the State of Florida, and the plaintiffs alleged that damages flowed from this conduct." Rupolo v. Fish, 87 A.D.3d 684, 685-86 (2d Dep’t 2011); see also Burke, Albright, Harter & Rzepka, LLP v. Sills, 83 A.D.3d 1413, 1414 (4th Dep’t 2011) (fraud counterclaim not duplicative of legal malpractice counterclaim where "[t]he proposed counterclaims are based on allegations that plaintiffs intended to deceive decedent, whereas the ‘legal malpractice  counterclaim] is based on negligent conduct"’); Dischiavi v. Calli, 68 A.D.3d 1691, 1693 (4th Dep’t 2009) (fraud claims not duplicative of legal malpractice claims where "plaintiffs have alleged that the fraud caused additional damages, separate and distinct from those generated by the alleged malpractice")"

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Andrew Lavoott Bluestone

Andrew Lavoott Bluestone has been an attorney for 40 years, with a career that spans criminal prosecution, civil litigation and appellate litigation. Mr. Bluestone became an Assistant District Attorney in Kings County in 1978, entered private practice in 1984 and in 1989 opened…

Andrew Lavoott Bluestone has been an attorney for 40 years, with a career that spans criminal prosecution, civil litigation and appellate litigation. Mr. Bluestone became an Assistant District Attorney in Kings County in 1978, entered private practice in 1984 and in 1989 opened his private law office and took his first legal malpractice case.

Since 1989, Bluestone has become a leader in the New York Plaintiff’s Legal Malpractice bar, handling a wide array of plaintiff’s legal malpractice cases arising from catastrophic personal injury, contracts, patents, commercial litigation, securities, matrimonial and custody issues, medical malpractice, insurance, product liability, real estate, landlord-tenant, foreclosures and has defended attorneys in a limited number of legal malpractice cases.

Bluestone also took an academic role in field, publishing the New York Attorney Malpractice Report from 2002-2004.  He started the “New York Attorney Malpractice Blog” in 2004, where he has published more than 4500 entries.

Mr. Bluestone has written 38 scholarly peer-reviewed articles concerning legal malpractice, many in the Outside Counsel column of the New York Law Journal. He has appeared as an Expert witness in multiple legal malpractice litigations.

Mr. Bluestone is an adjunct professor of law at St. John’s University College of Law, teaching Legal Malpractice.  Mr. Bluestone has argued legal malpractice cases in the Second Circuit, in the New York State Court of Appeals, each of the four New York Appellate Divisions, in all four of  the U.S. District Courts of New York and in Supreme Courts all over the state.  He has also been admitted pro haec vice in the states of Connecticut, New Jersey and Florida and was formally admitted to the US District Court of Connecticut and to its Bankruptcy Court all for legal malpractice matters. He has been retained by U.S. Trustees in legal malpractice cases from Bankruptcy Courts, and has represented municipalities, insurance companies, hedge funds, communications companies and international manufacturing firms. Mr. Bluestone regularly lectures in CLEs on legal malpractice.

Based upon his professional experience Bluestone was named a Diplomate and was Board Certified by the American Board of Professional Liability Attorneys in 2008 in Legal Malpractice. He remains Board Certified.  He was admitted to The Best Lawyers in America from 2012-2019.  He has been featured in Who’s Who in Law since 1993.

In the last years, Mr. Bluestone has been featured for two particularly noteworthy legal malpractice cases.  The first was a settlement of an $11.9 million dollar default legal malpractice case of Yeo v. Kasowitz, Benson, Torres & Friedman which was reported in the NYLJ on August 15, 2016. Most recently, Mr. Bluestone obtained a rare plaintiff’s verdict in a legal malpractice case on behalf of the City of White Plains v. Joseph Maria, reported in the NYLJ on February 14, 2017. It was the sole legal malpractice jury verdict in the State of New York for 2017.

Bluestone has been at the forefront of the development of legal malpractice principles and has contributed case law decisions, writing and lecturing which have been recognized by his peers.  He is regularly mentioned in academic writing, and his past cases are often cited in current legal malpractice decisions. He is recognized for his ample writings on Judiciary Law § 487, a 850 year old statute deriving from England which relates to attorney deceit.