Courts are institutionally wary of JL 487 cases. This wariness is demonstrated in Radiation Oncology Servs. of Cent. N.Y., P.C. v Warren 2024 NY Slip Op 00484
Decided on February 1, 2024 Appellate Division, Third Department.

“As more fully set forth in two prior decisions of this Court (Radiation Oncology Servs. of Cent. N.Y., P.C. v Our Lady of Lourdes Mem. Hosp., Inc., 221 AD3d 1324 [3d Dept 2023]; Radiation Oncology Servs. of Cent. N.Y., P.C. v Our Lady of Lourdes Mem. Hosp., Inc., 148 AD3d 1418 [3d Dept 2017]), plaintiff Radiation Oncology Services of Central New York, P.C. (hereinafter ROSCNY) entered into a written coverage agreement with Our Lady of Lourdes Memorial Hospital, Inc. (hereinafter Lourdes) pursuant to which ROSCNY was granted the exclusive right to provide oncology services at the hospital, with plaintiff Michael J. Fallon serving as medical director. After plaintiffs’ services were terminated, they commenced an action against Lourdes and certain other affiliated individuals for, among other things, breach of contract, libel and slander (hereinafter the Cortland County action). Following a lengthy period of discovery, plaintiffs moved for spoliation sanctions against Lourdes due to its failure to preserve and produce several documents during the discovery process. Plaintiffs also sought monetary sanctions against the attorneys of record for Lourdes based upon allegations that one of its attorneys, defendant Jeanette N. Warren, made intentionally false and misleading statements to Supreme Court and plaintiffs during the course of the years-long discovery litigation. Amongst the various falsehoods allegedly uttered, plaintiffs asserted that Warren repeatedly assured the court that a litigation hold had been implemented for the Cortland County action when, in fact, one had not been in place. In a series of orders, Supreme Court (Masler, J.) granted plaintiffs $10,000 in spoliation sanctions upon a finding that Lourdes failed to preserve certain documents, but declined to impose sanctions upon Lourdes’ attorneys.

Undeterred, plaintiffs commenced this action against Warren, defendant James Gleason and the law firm for whom they worked alleging causes of action pursuant to Judiciary Law § 487 related to the allegedly false and deceitful statements proffered by Warren, and purportedly consented to by Gleason, in the context of the Cortland County action. Defendants thereafter moved to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a cause of action and as barred by the doctrine of collateral estoppel. On the latter point, defendants argued that plaintiffs were collaterally estopped from relitigating the alleged Judiciary Law § 487 violations because they were all addressed and resolved in the context of plaintiffs’ motion for sanctions in the Cortland County action. Supreme Court (McBride, J.) denied the motion, and this appeal ensued.

We agree with defendants that, to the extent plaintiffs’ Judiciary Law § 487 claims are premised upon the statements made by Warren concerning the existence of a [*2]litigation hold in the Cortland County action, they are barred by principles of collateral estoppel. Collateral estoppel “precludes a party from relitigating in a subsequent action or proceeding an issue clearly raised in a prior action or proceeding and decided against that party. . . , whether or not the tribunals or causes of action are the same” (Ryan v New York Tel. Co., 62 NY2d 494, 500 [1984]; see Matter of Dunn, 24 NY3d 699, 704 [2015]). The doctrine applies “where the issue in the second action is identical to an issue which was raised, necessarily decided and material in the first action, and the party who is being estopped had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue in the earlier action” (Simmons v Trans Express Inc., 37 NY3d 107, 112 [2021] [internal quotation marks and citation omitted]; see Matter of Molnar v JRL S. Hampton, LLC, 212 AD3d 974, 975 [3d Dept 2023], lv denied 39 NY3d 911 [2023]). To establish a claim under Judiciary Law § 487 (1), it must be shown that the defendant attorney engaged in “deceit or collusion, or consent[ed] to any deceit or collusion, with intent to deceive the court or any party.”

The record reflects that the issue of whether Warren attempted to intentionally deceive plaintiffs or the court in the Cortland County action by falsely representing that Lourdes had implemented a litigation hold was fully litigated in the Cortland County action and resolved by Supreme Court (Masler, J.) in its order declining to impose sanctions upon defendants. In that order, the court expressly rejected plaintiffs’ claims that defendants had “intentionally deceived and misled” the court and plaintiffs by inaccurately stating that a litigation hold was in place. In so concluding, Supreme Court specifically found that defendants did not engage in a “deliberate pattern of obstructing disclosure” and that their representations with regard to the litigation hold “[were] not without [a] factual basis” and did not “affirmatively mislead” the court or any party. Plaintiffs plainly had a full and fair opportunity to litigate this issue in the Cortland County action, a point underscored by the fact that they moved to renew their request for sanctions against defendants after they failed to succeed in obtaining such relief in the first instance. Because the issue of whether defendants engaged in intentional deceit in connection with the representations made concerning the existence of a litigation hold was already raised and decided in the Cortland County action, plaintiffs are precluded from relitigating that same issue in this matter (see Mortgage Elec. Registration Sys., Inc. v McVicar, 203 AD3d 919, 920 [2d Dept 2022]; Platt v Berkowitz, 203 AD3d 447, 448 [1st Dept 2022]; Doscher v Mannatt, Phelps & Phillips, LLP, 148 AD3d 523, 523-524 [1st Dept 2017]; Neroni v Follender, 137 AD3d 1336, 1337 [3d Dept 2016]).”

Sciocchetti v Molinsek 2024 NY Slip Op 00116 Decided on January 11, 2024
Appellate Division, Third Department is a case which highlights a common claim in matrimonial cases, that the attorney spun out the case for personal profit, and maybe, had a relationship going with one of the spouses while the attorney was profiting. Here, the court dissects the claims and allows for complete dismissal.

“Plaintiffs commenced this action on April 22, 2022 alleging claims under Judiciary Law § 487 related to a divorce action involving plaintiff Andrew Sciocchetti and his now-former wife (hereinafter the wife). Plaintiffs alleged in the complaint, among other things, that defendant, the wife’s attorney in the divorce action, made false representations in the divorce action, that defendant failed to disclose that he and the wife were romantically involved during the divorce action and that defendant wilfully delayed the divorce action for personal gain. In a pre-answer motion, defendant moved to dismiss the complaint under CPLR 3211 (a) (7). Supreme Court granted the motion. This appeal by plaintiffs ensued.”

“

The alleged deceit by defendant centers on the undisclosed romantic relationship between defendant and the wife during the divorce action. Plaintiffs, however, failed to sufficiently plead how the concealment of this relationship caused plaintiffs any damages or led to any adverse rulings in the divorce action (see Saporito v Branda, 213 AD3d 588, 589 [1st Dept 2023]; DeMartino v Abrams, Fensterman, Fensterman, Eisman, Formato, Ferrara & Wolf, LLP, 189 AD3d 774, 776 [2d Dept 2020]; Jean v Chinitz, 163 AD3d 497, 497 [1st Dept 2018]; cf. Tenore v Kantrowitz, Goldhamer & Graifman, P.C., 121 AD3d [*2]775, 776 [2d Dept 2014]). Plaintiffs maintain that Sciocchetti incurred additional legal fees in the divorce action, but failed to allege how such fees were attributable to defendant’s concealment of the relationship with the wife (see Mizuno v Barak, 113 AD3d 825, 827 [2d Dept 2014]). Furthermore, although plaintiffs alleged that defendant’s deceit resulted in fraudulent statements of net worth being filed, thereby forcing Sciocchetti to pay more financial support than was required, plaintiffs acknowledged that any error was corrected at the divorce trial. If anything, the allegations of a romantic relationship between defendant and the wife and the failure to disclose that relationship potentially compromised defendant’s representation of the wife and would give rise to a Judiciary Law § 487 claim by the wife (see e.g. A.M.P. v Benjamin, 201 AD3d 50, 57 [3d Dept 2021]).

Plaintiffs also argue that they stated a claim under Judiciary Law § 487 (2), which provides that recovery may be had when an attorney “[w]ilfully delays [the] client’s suit with a view to his [or her] own gain; or wilfully receives any money or allowance for or on account of any money which he [or she] has not laid out, or becomes answerable for.” Plaintiffs, however, only alleged in a conclusory manner that defendant wilfully delayed the underlying divorce action. Moreover, even accepting as true that defendant was contentious during the divorce action, took unreasonable settlement positions or engaged in protracted postjudgment divorce litigation, such behavior did not exceed the bounds of advocacy in a divorce action so as to constitute wllful delay within the meaning of Judiciary Law § 487 (2). The allegation that defendant failed to timely file the note of issue in the divorce action likewise did not amount to wilful delay. Accordingly, dismissal of the complaint for failure to state a cause of action was correct.”

Lautman v 2800 Coyle St. Owners Corp. 2024 NY Slip Op 00068 Decided on January 10, 2024 Appellate Division, Second Department is one of those inexplicable cases in which a plaintiff loses all, and then waits too long to sue the attorney. The question of how plaintiff lost it all never comes up for review.

“The plaintiff is the former proprietary lessee of a cooperative apartment located in Brooklyn. He owned shares of stock in the defendant 2800 Coyle St. Owners Corp. (hereinafter the co-op), the cooperative corporation that owns the building where the subject apartment is located. In 2012, the co-op commenced a nonpayment proceeding in the Civil Court of the City of New York against the plaintiff. In September 2013, a default judgment of possession was entered against the plaintiff. Thereafter, the plaintiff’s shares were sold at auction, and he was evicted from the apartment.

In 2019, the plaintiff commenced this action against the co-op, the Board of Directors of the co-op, Dependable Property Management, Inc. (hereinafter collectively the co-op defendants), and Sauchik & Giyaur, P.C. (hereinafter Sauchik), the law firm that represented the co-op in the nonpayment proceeding. The co-op defendants moved, inter alia, pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(1), (5), and (7) to dismiss the complaint insofar as asserted against them. Sauchik separately moved pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(5) and (7) to dismiss the complaint insofar as asserted against it. The [*2]plaintiff cross-moved, among other things, for leave to enter a default judgment against the defendants based upon their alleged failure to timely answer or move to dismiss the complaint. In an order dated June 16, 2020, the Supreme Court granted that branch of the co-op defendants’ motion, granted Sauchik’s separate motion, and denied the plaintiff’s cross-motion. The plaintiff appeals. We affirm.”

“Here, in their respective moving submissions, the co-op defendants and Sauchik demonstrated, prima facie, that the first, second, third, fourth, sixth, seven, eighth, ninth, and twelfth causes of action insofar as asserted against each of them were time-barred (see Chao v Westchester Med. Ctr. Advanced Physicians Servs., P.C., 131 AD3d 1130). In opposition, the plaintiff failed to raise a question of issue of fact (see Heritage Hills Socy., Ltd. v Heritage Dev. Group, Inc., 56 AD3d 426, 426-427). Contrary to the plaintiff’s contention, the application of the savings provision of CPLR 205(a), raised for the first time on appeal, “does not involve a pure question of law that appears on the face of the record and could not have been avoided if brought to the Supreme Court’s attention” (U.S. Bank N.A. v Doura, 204 AD3d 721, 723).”

It’s often said (and the PJI specifically covers this) that an attorney is not a guarantor of a good result. The attorney has to use reasonable efforts and not to depart from the standard of practice. Lopez v Pasternack, Tilker, Ziegler, Walsh, Stanton & Romano, LLP
2024 NY Slip Op 30318(U) January 18, 2024 Supreme Court, Kings County Docket Number: Index No. 514717/2023 Judge: Richard J. Montelione is a decision highlighting that principle.

” On or about February 11,2014, Decedent Alba Morales hired defendant Pasternack, Tilker, Ziegler~ Walsh, Stanton &Romano; LLP (”the Pasternack Firm”) to represent her in connection with her Workers’ Compensation claims. Defendant Matthew Funk, Esq. was the primary attorney handling her case. The complaint alleges that the Pasternack Firm and defendant Funk held themselves out to be experts in the field of Workers’ Compensation claims.

Ms. Morales’ Workers’ Compensation claims against her former employer Graphnet, Inc arose out of her September 200l work, related injuries and/or illness, Ms. Morales was employed by Graphnet,1nc. in September2001 to clean debris and ashes in buildings neat the World Trade Center in the wake of the September 11, 2001 attacks. Consequently. Ms. Morales developed gastroesophageal reflux disease (“GERD “) and interstitial lung disease.”

“Defendants submitted the Section ‘.32 Agreement to the Workers’ Compensation Board on April 15, 2019. A Workers’ Compensation hearing Was held on July 22. 2019 before Judge Schwartz. Judge Schwartz disapproved the Settlement without preJudice to return the case to the calendar once Ms. Morales obtained the requisite Letter from the World Ttade Center Health Program (“WTCHP”). Ms. Morales passed away on July30, 2020 due to her work-related iJlness. Plaintiff states in the complaint that upon Ms. Morales’ death, she was no longer eligible to receive compensation for the Section 32 Agreement, as she was no longer receiving medical care

The complaint alleges that defendants’ failure to obtain the Letter and finalize the settlement prior· to Ms. Morales’ death constituted a deviation from the good and accepted standards of legal practice in litigating Ms. Morales Workers’ Compensation Claim. However, the record shows that defendants made numerous attempts to obtain the Letter from the WTCHP. On the day of the hearing, July 22, 2019 Fischer Brothers, Esqs. ; the firm representing Graphnet; LLC and their insurance company, expeditiously sent a letter to the WTCHP requesting the Letter and sent a copy of said request to defendants (NYSCEF #8}. Defendants followed up. with Fischer Brothers, Esqs. via email om October 18, 2019 inquiring as to status of the letter (NYSCEF #9). An attorney from Fischer Brothers; Esq. and a:n attorney from the Pasternak’s Firm, Rochelle Jean-Baptiste (“Mr. Jean-Baptiste;;), confirmed via email that they would attempt to call the WTCHP regarding the letter (NYSCEF #9)”

“Accordingly; accepting the allegations in the complaint as true; and the additional facts by undisputed documentary evidence of the. attempts to obtain the Letter, plaintiff fails to state a cause of action for legal malpractice as there are no facts that show that defendants did not exercise the ordinary reasonable skill and knowledge commonly possessed by a member of the legal profession, that their breach proximatey caused the settlement to not be finalized, and that Ms. Morales’ damages were actual and ascertainable, Marinelli v. Sullivan Papa in Block, McGrath& Cannavo, P.C., supra.”

In Sharp v Ferrante Law Firm, 2023 NY Slip Op 05383 [220 AD3d 587], October 24, 2023
the Appellate Division, First Department found that there was no collateral estoppel, but nevertheless, the case was untimely.

“The motion court incorrectly applied the doctrine of collateral estoppel to preclude plaintiff’s legal malpractice claim, as plaintiff’s attorney-client relationship with defendants was not the issue determined in the arbitration between plaintiff and plaintiff’s former employer, Industry Model Group LLC d/b/a Industry Model Management (IMM). Nevertheless, the malpractice claim must be dismissed because it is time-barred. Plaintiff confirmed in the amended complaint that the alleged attorney-client relationship ended as of July 10, 2018. Therefore, the statute of limitations for plaintiff’s malpractice claim expired in July 2021, three years after the attorney-client relationship ended (see CPLR 214 [6]). As plaintiff did not commence this action until June 23, 2022, the malpractice claim is time-barred. Even if the malpractice claim was timely, it should be dismissed because plaintiff failed to allege any negligence on the part of defendants in connection with the July 2018 correspondence (to assist plaintiff’s re-entry into the United States), or that it harmed him.”

McGlynn v Burns & Harris, Esq. 2024 NY Slip Op 00187 Decided on January 17, 2024
Appellate Division, Second Department, which we discussed last week, has a secondary issue. Was it spoliation to discard a litigation file?

“In 2007, the plaintiff retained the defendant Burns & Harris, Esq. (hereinafter the B & H law firm), to represent him in the prosecution of an action to recover damages for personal injuries he allegedly sustained in March 2005 while working for United Parcel Service due to an allegedly defective condition on a loading dock in Brooklyn. The defendant Alison R. Keenan was the attorney assigned to handle the plaintiff’s case. The B & H law firm commenced two separate actions on the plaintiff’s behalf against alleged owners of the loading dock. The actions were consolidated (hereinafter the personal injury action), and a default judgment against all the defendants in the personal injury action was obtained, awarding the plaintiff the total sum of $255,914.50.

The plaintiff alleged that he was unable to collect the judgment because the insurance providers for the defendants in the personal injury action disclaimed coverage on the ground that timely notice of the claim was not provided. The plaintiff commenced this action against the B & H law firm and Keenan (hereinafter together the law firm defendants), among others, alleging, inter alia, legal malpractice for the failure to investigate and timely notify the applicable insurance carriers in the personal injury action.”

“The Supreme Court providently exercised its discretion in denying the plaintiff’s cross-motion pursuant to CPLR 3126 to strike the law firm defendants’ answer for spoliation of evidence. “A party that seeks sanctions for spoliation of evidence must show that the party having control over the evidence possessed an obligation to preserve it at the time of its destruction, that the evidence was destroyed with a culpable state of mind, and that the destroyed evidence was relevant to the party’s claim or defense such that the trier of fact could find that the evidence would support that claim or defense” (Pegasus Aviation I, Inc. v Varig Logistica S.A., 26 NY3d 543, 547 [internal quotation marks omitted]; see S.W. v Catskill Regional Med. Ctr., 211 AD3d 890, 891-892). Here, the plaintiff failed to establish that the law firm defendants had an obligation to preserve the case file from the personal injury action or that it was destroyed with a culpable state of mind (see Tanner v Bethpage Union Free Sch. Dist., 161 AD3d 1210, 1211; Perez v Tedesco, 214 AD3d 1010, 1012).”

McGlynn v Burns & Harris, Esq. 2024 NY Slip Op 00187 Decided on January 17, 2024
Appellate Division, Second Department illustrates the proposition that attorneys must try to prove all causes of an accident, even when one of them seems more important than the other. Attorneys also have to try to make sure there is insurance on the other side.

“In 2007, the plaintiff retained the defendant Burns & Harris, Esq. (hereinafter the B & H law firm), to represent him in the prosecution of an action to recover damages for personal injuries he allegedly sustained in March 2005 while working for United Parcel Service due to an allegedly defective condition on a loading dock in Brooklyn. The defendant Alison R. Keenan was the attorney assigned to handle the plaintiff’s case. The B & H law firm commenced two separate actions on the plaintiff’s behalf against alleged owners of the loading dock. The actions were consolidated (hereinafter the personal injury action), and a default judgment against all the defendants in the personal injury action was obtained, awarding the plaintiff the total sum of $255,914.50.

The plaintiff alleged that he was unable to collect the judgment because the insurance providers for the defendants in the personal injury action disclaimed coverage on the ground that timely notice of the claim was not provided. The plaintiff commenced this action against the B & H law firm and Keenan (hereinafter together the law firm defendants), among others, alleging, inter alia, legal malpractice for the failure to investigate and timely notify the applicable insurance carriers in the personal injury action.”

“Contrary to the Supreme Court’s determination, the law firm defendants failed to establish their prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law dismissing the complaint insofar as asserted against them. The law firm defendants’ submissions in support of their motion did not establish, prima facie, the absence of at least one element of the legal malpractice cause of action (see Burbige v Siben & Ferber, 152 AD3d 641, 642). “Under the doctrine of judicial estoppel, also known as estoppel against inconsistent positions, a party may not take a position in a legal proceeding that is contrary to a position he or she took in a prior proceeding, simply because his or her interests have changed” (Bihn v Connelly, 162 AD3d 626, 627; see Archer v Beach Car Serv., Inc., 180 AD3d 857, 861). Here, the plaintiff’s allegation that he was injured due to a defect in the loading dock was not necessarily contrary to the position taken in his workers’ compensation claim that he suffered injuries while moving heavy boxes on the loading dock. There can be more than one proximate cause of a plaintiff’s injuries (see Scurry v New York City Hous. Auth., 39 NY3d 443, 454; Turturro v City of New York, 28 NY3d 469, 483; Moe-Salley v Highbridge House Ogden, LLC, 214 AD3d 722, 722; Reyes v S. Nicolia & Sons Realty Corp., 212 AD3d 851, 852). Accordingly, the court should have denied the law firm defendants’ motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint insofar as asserted against them.”

Servider v Law Offs. of Cervini, Ronemus & Vilensky 2024 NY Slip Op 30160(U)
January 12, 2024 Supreme Court, New York County Docket Number: Index No. 161166/2022 Judge: Mary V. Rosado is a pro-se legal malpractice case which comes after plaintiff has settled a case, and then wriggled to get out of the settlement. These legal malpractice cases rarely succeed, especially after a settlement.

“Beginning in October 2014, Plaintiff retained Cervini to represent him in an action
captioned Philip Servinder et al v. The City of New York, Index No. 160683/2014 (the “Underlying Matter”) to recover damages for alleged personal injuries he suffered while working for the New York City Sanitation Department (NYSCEF [)oc. IS at 5). Cervini represented Plaintiff in the Underlying Matter from October 2014 to October 2015 (NYSCEF Doc. 21). R&V were briefly retained to represent Plaintiff in the Underlying matter beginning in October 2015, pursuant to a signed Consent 10 Change of Attorney form dated October 25, 2015 (NYSCEF Doc. 18). Cervini resumed representation of Plaintiff pursuant to a subsequent Consent to Change Attorney form dated February 3, 2016 (NYSCEF Doc. 19).
The Underlying Mauer was resolved pursuant to a signed Stipulation of Settlement dated April 23, 2019 (the “Settlement Agreement”) (NYSCEF Doc. 17). Subsequently, Plaintiff fired Cervini in December 2022 and proceeded pro se in an attempt to invalidate the Settlement Agreement (NYSCEF Doc. 14 at 7). Plaintiffs motion to vacate the Stipulation of Settlement was denied by the Decision and Order of Hon. Alexander M. Tisch, J.S.C. dated May 24, 2021 and unanimously affirmed by the First Department (Servinder v City of New York, 212 AD3d 475 lst Dept 2023).”

Here, Plaintiff fails to plead that R& V’s negligence was the proximate cause of Plaintiffs
alleged loss. The First Department has held that to establish prox.in1atc cause on a claim for legal malpractice, the “plaintiff must demonstrate that but for the attorney’s negligence, [they] would have prevailed in the underlying mailer or would not have sustained any ascertainable damages” (Brooks v, Lewin, 21AD3d 73 1, 734 [1st Dept 2005]). Further, “speculation on future events are insufficient to establish that fa] defendant lawyer’s malpractice, if any, was the proximate cause of any such loss” (Id. at 735). Even given the benefit of every possible favorable inference, Plaintiffs Complaint fails to adequately allege that but for R&V’s alleged malpractice, Plaintiff
would have prevailed in his underlying actions or would not have sustained any damages. As such, R&V”s motion to dismiss Plaintiffs malpractice claims against it is granted.”