In New York there is case law which holds the attorney liabile for errors by a process server. Here is a similar case and analysis from Arizona

"Like most states, Arizona recognizes an exception to this rule, generally referred to as the "nondelegable duty exception." Id. "The policy reasons justifying such a departure are that the employer is the one who primarily benefits from the contractor’s work, the employer is free to select the contractor and may insist on one that is financially responsible and competent, and the employer has the ability to internalize the cost of insurance necessary to distribute the risk as a cost of doing business." Miller v. Westcor Ltd. Partnership, 171 Ariz. 387, 391, 831 P.2d 386, 390 (App.1991).

As the Arizona Supreme Court held in Ft. Lowell, the nondelegable duty exception arises in situations involving a "special relationship between persons," such as "persons who engage in relationships that are ‘protective by nature’ (e.g., the common carrier, innkeeper, employer) [who] are often held to possess an affirmative duty to guard the safety of their respective charges." Ft. Lowell, 101, 800 P.2d at 967. The Court explained:

The nondelegable duty exception is somewhat of a misnomer because it refers to duties for which the employer must retain responsibility, despite proper delegation to another. Such situations exist where the employer is under a higher duty to some class of persons. This duty may be imposed by statute, by contract, by franchise or charter, or by the common law. If the employer delegates performance of a special duty to an independent contractor and the latter is negligent, the employer will remain liable for any resulting injury to the protected class of persons, as if the negligence had been his own. The exception is premised on the principle that certain duties of an employer are of such importance that he may not escape liability merely by delegating performance to another.
The type of situation — i.e., negligence of a process server — was addressed in Kleeman v. Rheingold, 614 N.E.2d 712 (1993), where a client brought a legal malpractice action against a law firm based upon negligence of process server in failing to serve medical malpractice defendant within statute of limitations. The sole issue addressed by the Court was "whether an attorney may be held vicariously liable to his or her client for the negligence of a process server whom the attorney has hired on behalf of that client." Id. at 714. "

An Apology rather than a law suit.  This article reports that it works in medical malpractice.  Would it work in legal malpractice?

"Since encouraging its doctors to apologize for errors, the University of Michigan Health System’s annual attorney fees have dropped by two-thirds, and malpractice suits and notices of intents to sue have fallen by half, says a former …
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Yesterday we reported on the Thomas Hyland letter in support of his firm’s position in the Wilson Elser Legal Malpractice case.  Today, a bar association rejoinder.  This second letter is not directed to the arguments that WEMED made, but to the entire concept of arguing the merits of a law suit in the letters to the Editor venue.:

"Letter to the Editor

Letter Is Disservice To Bench and Bar

New York Law Journal
April 11, 2007

I write with reference to the letter published on April 9, 2007, from Thomas W. Highland of Wilson Elser Moskowitz Edelman & Dicker. I am disturbed both by the fact of Mr. Highland’s letter and by its contents. The letter itself takes exception with no statement contained in an April 5 story to which the letter purports to respond. Indeed, that story reports the Wilson Elser firm’s disappointment with the court’s decision. But, Mr. Highland’s letter goes beyond that perfectly natural response. He offers a one sided, condensed version of the arguments he says he looks "forward to presenting . . . to a higher court," together with the citation of cases and rehashing of evidence. His letter seems more appropriate for an appellate brief rather than a letter to the editor.

I believe that such letters, especially from lawyers associated with a case pending in the courts, are inappropriate for a variety of reasons, not the least of which is the potential threat they pose to judicial independence. As a lawyer, Mr. Highland is presumably aware that his criticism of the judge cannot be answered by the judge herself because of ethical constraints upon a judge’s comments about pending cases. In that sense, the letter is patently unfair to the judge because it was composed with knowledge that the judge would not and could not respond in kind. I hope that Wilson Elser’s adversaries refrain from submitting some counter-letter for publication because such partisan sparring in the press detracts from the independence of the bench, the role of appellate courts, and the dignity of the organized bar.

I hope that no members of the judiciary will be deterred from "calling them like they see them" by the potential threat of litigants or their lawyers presenting their one sided views to the media about pending or impending litigation. I urge all members of the bar to refrain from writing or circulating such letters during the course of litigation in which they are so clearly partisans. Such letters as that April 9 letter are a far cry from the scholarly and thoughtful commentary by objective lawyers, for which the Law Journal is esteemed to publish. That sort of commentary is a service to both the bench and the bar. I submit that the April 9 letter is disservice to both.

Edwin David Robertson
The author is president of the New York County Lawyers’ Association. "

Geoffrey Tracktenberg reports this comma error which cost one side $1 Million in a legal malpractice case, which stemmed from a contract sentence.  The story itself came from the NY TImes.

"The dispute is over this sentence: "This agreement shall be effective from the date it is made and shall continue in force for a period of five (5) years from the date it is made, and thereafter for successive five (5) year terms, unless and until terminated by one year prior notice in writing by either party."
The regulator concluded that the second comma meant that the part of the sentence describing the one-year notice for cancellation applied to both the five-year term as well as its renewal. Therefore, the regulator found, the phone company could escape the contract after as little as one year."

The Wall Street Journal reports [subscription] that biglaw is a business, and is increasingly the target of legal malpractice suits.  The report is supplemented with a Hinshaw attorney quote.

"Big law firms are mostly in the business of keeping others out of trouble, not themselves. But some practitioners who defend law firms are seeing an uptrend in legal-malpractice claims. "The profession has become more like a business," says Philip Touitou of Hinshaw & Culbertson LLP in New York. "Now that firms have big revenues they’re now seen by the plaintiffs’ bar as viable targets."

Last week alone offered up two high-profile examples, each stemming from soured business deals consummated back around 2000.

On April 6, a Minnesota federal judge ordered that Dorsey & Whitney LLP disgorge about $887,000 in … "

Moving from Bankruptcy court to Federal District Court, the law firm again loses:

"Firm’s Bad Faith Leaves Bad Taste of $877,000 Malpractice Tab

New York Lawyer
April 10, 2007
Reprints & Permissions

By Leigh Jones
The National Law Journal

A Minnesota federal court has found Dorsey & Whitney liable for more than $877,000 for legal malpractice, breach of fiduciary duty and acting in bad faith for its role in a botched Indian casino deal.

Affirming a U.S. Bankruptcy Court decision issued last year, U.S. District Judge Donovan W. Frank ordered Dorsey & Whitney to turn over $887,440 in legal fees it received from former clients it represented in orchestrating a finance deal gone awry for the Akwesasne Mohawk casino in upstate New York.

In a 94-page decision, the judge determined that the 600-attorney firm breached its fiduciary duty of loyalty by representing two adverse clients at the same time and failed to inform its clients that it might have committed malpractice.

A spokesman for Dorsey & Whitney said the firm disagreed with Judge Frank’s decision, which it will appeal to the 8th Circuit Court of Appeals.

Edward Gale, a partner with Leonard, O’Brien, Spencer, Gale & Sayre, in Minneapolis, represented the plaintiffs. "

Zenith Ins. Co. v. Cozen O’Connor, Case No. B184684 (Cal. Ct. App., March 21, 2007).

"The issue presented in this case relates to the nature and extent of the duty, if any, owed to the reinsurer by counsel retained by the ceding insurer to protect the interests of the insured under the underlying policy.

In this action for professional negligence, Zenith Insurance Company (“Zenith”) entered into a contract of reinsurance with Royal Insurance Company (“Royal”). Under the contract, Zenith agreed to reinsure 100% of Royal’s exposure under certain liability policies. After claims were asserted against Royal’s insured, Royal retained the law firm of Cozen O’Connor to provide legal services with respect to the defense of such claims. Ultimately, Zenith filed this action for professional negligence against Cozen alleging that an attorney-client relationship existed based on either: (1) an implied in fact contract; or (2) the theory that Zenith was an intended beneficiary of Cozen’s legal services.

The California Court of Appeals disagreed with Zenith for two reasons. First, under the “intended beneficiary” theory, both Cozen and Royal must have intended Zenith to be the beneficiary of legal services Cozen was to render. The Court held that the fact that Cozen’s representation could incidentally benefit Zenith did “not sufficiently satisfy this predicate.” Moreover, the fact that Zenith agreed to reimburse Royal for all legal fees did not change the conclusions. Second, there was no express agreement between Zenith and Cozen, and Zenith did not allege the predicate facts necessary to establish an implied contract between it and Cozen. Zenith Ins. Co. v. Cozen O’Connor, Case No. B184684 (Cal. Ct. App., March 21, 2007). "

This article from columnists Norman Arnoff and Sue Jacobs [subscription] warns us to protect legal malpractice coverage by carefully answering the application questions.

"Every year someone in each law firm has the task of completing the application for the Lawyers’ Professional Liability Policy commonly called the Malpractice Policy. The policy is "claims-made" so that claims first made during the policy period will be covered during the policy in issue. If the policy is "claims-made and reported" the claim must also be reported during the policy period for coverage.

If the applicant does not disclose or misrepresents a fact that ripens into a claim or lawsuit during the policy term, the carrier may claim the law firm made a false representation of a material fact to induce the carrier to issue the precise policy. The carrier may also attempt to rescind the policy if the claim is significant.

The lawyer may believe she did not purposely answer the question falsely, but, rather, was unaware of all the underlying information. If there is an innocent reason for the nondisclosure the insurer will not be able to rescind. Rather, the carrier will have to establish the misrepresentation to be material and fraudulent, and that it would not have issued the policy for the premium charged if it had the true facts.
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