This is really unheard of.  Jail for Disciplinary violations by an attorney. This, from the NYLJ:

"Panel Sentences Lawyer to 10 Days in Jail for Misconduct
Mark Fass
New York Law Journal
April 2, 2007

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An immigration attorney charged with 19 counts of misconduct — including misappropriating payments, commingling funds and lying to clients about the status of their cases — has not only been disbarred by the New York Appellate Division, 1st Department, but also fined $1,000 and sentenced to 10 days in jail.

Kemakolam Comas ignored numerous attempts by the disciplinary committee to communicate with him and failed to submit files as ordered or appear at disciplinary hearings.

"[T]he Referee’s finding of contempt has abundant support in the record insofar as an order of this Court was in effect, respondent had knowledge of the order, he knowingly disobeyed the express and unequivocal directions set forth therein, and he intentionally impaired the rights and remedies of the Court-appointed Receiver concerning this proceeding," the panel said. "Indeed … respondent’s conduct throughout the course of this matter has been nothing less than astounding and his continued, blatant defiance … requires us to impose a severe penalty."

Appel-Hole v. Wyeth-Ayerst Laboratories, 700000/98
Decided: March 27, 2007

Justice Charles Edward Ramos

NEW YORK COUNTY
Supreme Court

Justice Ramos
In motion seq. no. 007, Parker and Waichman LLP (P&W), on its own behalf and on behalf of its clients, moves pursuant to CPLR 2221 for leave to renew or reargue its motion to intervene (previously denied by order dated November 24, 2003). In addition to P&W, proposed intervenors referred to as the "Abramova Plaintiffs," also seek leave to intervene. In the event intervention is granted, P&W and the Abramova Plaintiffs seek disclosure of certain documents referred to as submissions in support of the amended order dated November 7, 2001, which approved the settlement of this action and will then seek to vacate that settlement order.1

In this action, known as the New York Diet Drug Litigation,

New York County Index No. 700000/98, plaintiffs asserted claims of personal injury and loss of consortium allegedly due to the ingestion of "fen-phen" diet drugs.2 Some of those plaintiffs and others are here challenging a settlement approved by our predecessor court (Freedman, J.) by her order dated November 7, 2001, which, inter alia, held that the terms of the settlement were fair and reasonable and conformed with all ethical requirements. In that settlement, defendant, American Home Products ("AHP"), offered a large sum of money3 to settle virtually all claims.4

The ethical issues raised in this case arise out of one of the thorniest areas in tort law – the process to be applied in the settlement of mass tort litigation. Because of the large number of claimants whose cases are settled at one time (in this case over 5,000), mass tort settlements often take the form of collective settlement structures. The alternative to a collective settlement would require the piecemeal analysis of the merits of each claim and individual settlements thereafter, as contemplated when the classic case dominated tort law (one injured plaintiff and one or more allegedly responsible defendants). This would consume the lifetime of many of the claimants themselves when there are thousands of claims to be compromised. As a consequence, counsel and the courts have devised means of settlement expedition, such as the placing of claimants in objective categories of severity of injury, age, gender, economic status, and each claimant’s relationship to the acts of the defendant, and then entering into a mass settlement. Because of the large number of clients, great care must be exercised to insure that each client understands the settlement offer and is treated fairly. Ethical rules guide the actions of counsel in these circumstances.

This mass settlement was further complicated by the need to pay a portion of the attorneys’ fees earned by settling counsel to other attorneys who referred additional clients. Therefore, claimants who were the original clients of the settling attorneys, Napoli Kaiser & Bern ("Napoli Firm"), would generate greater net legal fees for the firm than would clients who were referred to them by other attorneys (e.g. P&W and others).

The record on this motion, which includes a number of previously sealed documents and an affidavit of a former member of the Napoli Firm, has unfortunately raised serious questions regarding the settlement process herein, including claims that:

(1) claimants who were Napoli Firm clients were offered disproportionately larger settlements because the firm unfairly inflated settlement offers for its clients so that the attorneys’ fees earned by the firm would be greater;

(2) unknown to the claimants, their cases were not settled for an amount negotiated for each claimant with AHP, rather their claims were settled based upon the Napoli Firm’s own evaluation of the value of each claim in light of a lump sum offer;5

(3) the Special Master6 appointed by the settling court did not make individual evaluations of the settlement offers in each case as was represented by the Napoli Firm to its clients and to the settling court; and

(4) the ethics opinion submitted in support of the settlement was flawed and based upon less than a full understanding by the expert of the circumstances surrounding the settlement and the applicable law.

Notwithstanding the Napoli Firm’s protestations to the contrary, no court, trial or appellate, has ruled on these issues in a contested hearing. This is explained by the fact that the order of compromise sought to be vacated here, dated November 7, 2001, was submitted to our predecessor court and executed, ex parte.7

The NYLJ reports this case:

Goldston v. Bandwidth Technology Corp., 112098/04
Decided: March 6, 2007 Justice Rolando T. Acosta
NEW YORK COUNTY
Supreme Court

"This matter, tried before the Court without a jury, primarily revolves around whether the retainer agreement executed by plaintiff Alan M. Goldston on behalf of his law firm, Goldston & Schwab ("G&S"), and Jonathan Star, Bandwidth Technology Corp. and Bandwidth Holdings Corp. ("Bandwidth")’s president, board member and shareholder, is enforceable. Pursuant to the retainer agreement, G&S would be compensated with two percent of the company stock. The Court, by order dated September 29, 2006, found, inter alia, triable issues of fact as to whether Star, as president of Bandwidth, a start-up corporation where informal action had been customary, had the authority to enter into the retainer agreement with G&S. The Court also found triable issues of fact as to whether the retainer was enforceable as a "general" retainer or unenforceable as a "non-refundable special retainer," which would entitle plaintiff to be compensated in quantum meruit only. The Court’s Order was affirmed on September 21, 2006. Goldston v. Bandwidth Technology Corp., 32 A.D.3d 747 (1st Dept. 2006). "

Another blog blurb from Scottsdale:

"Attorneys know that deadlines matter, but in this age of electronic filing and 24-hour drop boxes it was just a matter of time before a court would have to address a filing that was, say, a mere six minutes late. That is what the United States Court of Appeals for the 10th Circuit had to deal with and this is what they had to say about it:

Six minutes seems trivial and unlikely to cause prejudice, but if six minutes can be excused, why not six hours or six days? As we discuss, there is a safety valve, but it lies with the district court and requires a timely application, which never materialized in this case. Ignoring established purposes and methods for extensions of time, Plaintiffs argue for different or additional relief. They are out of luck. Like statutes of limitation, statutes of repose, and other such time bars, rights may be irretrievably lost due to delay. "

Legal malpractice requires legal representation, while breach of fiduciary duty can be had by a non-attorney as the Scottsdale Personal Injury Lawyer tell us.

"Many people do not understand the difference between legal malpractice and breach of fiduciary duty.

Legal malpractice arises when an attorney owes someone a duty of care and, by an act or omission, the attorney’s conduct breaches that duty of care and causes that person cognizable harm

Breach of fiduciary duty arises when there is a "special relationship" between an attorney and, typically a client, where trust or control over another’s affairs are vested with an attorney. The major difference between legal malpractice and breach of fiduciary duty lies in the nature and scope of the applicable "duty."

Here is a divorce legal malpractice case from the Divorce Law Journal  which illustrates the "privity" question.

"Issue and Holding:
Whether an attorney owed any duty to an opposing party in a divorce case. The Court held no, the attorney owed no duty under the facts of this case.

Facts:
Baker filed for divorce from her husband, Collins, in 1989. A divorce decree, which referenced their Property Settlement Agreement, was entered in 1990. As part of the Agreement, Collins agreed to pay Baker $500,000. A balloon payment of $300,000 was due by January 1, 2002 and the remaining $200,000 due in ten annual installments of $20,000 continuing through January 1, 2001. The Agreement also provided that if the balloon payment was paid prior to the due date, the other payments would be forgiven. As security for the payments, Baker was given liens on all of Collin’s stock holdings of closely held corporations. Collin was to “execute all necessary documents to effectuate these liens” and “the Certificates shall be held by Ronald Coombs, Attorney.” Coombs represented Collins in the divorce proceedings and in other matters.
Despite the Agreement, Collins never gave Coombs any stock certificates before Collins died in September 1999. Coombs asked Collins for the certificates, but Collins never delivered them. Shortly before Collin’s death, Baker discovered that he had sold his interest in his largest corporation in 1992 without perfecting a lien in his stock holdings and making the agreed upon transfer to Baker. Baker did not know what happened to the other corporations, but none of them were listed as assets of his estate. Baker did not know whether any liens were ever prepared and she could not recall inquiring as to the liens or certificates prior to Collin’s death.
In November 1999, Baker filed a proof of claim against Collin’s estate for monies owed to her under the Agreement. The estate objected. Therefore in December 1999, she filed a complaint against the estate, Collin’s widow, and Coombs. Baker alleged that properties were transferred out of Collin’s name, prior to his death, in a deliberate attempt to prevent the payment of monies he owed to her and to reduce the inheritance of his child. She also alleged that Coombs failed to follow the terms of the Agreement in not holding the stock certificates and allowing Collin’s to sell his businesses without taking action to assure that Baker be paid what she was owed.
Baker was awarded a judgment against the estate. Baker and Coombs then filed cross motions for summary judgment. The trial court concluded that Coombs did not commit professional negligence and that he was not personally liable for the monies Collins owed Baker. The court held that Coombs signed the Agreement only in his capacity as Collin’s counsel, and not as a party to the Agreement. Therefore, only Collins and his estate could be held liable. Baker appealed. "

Appellate Law & Practice of California reports this legal malpractice case:

"CA1: Legal malpractice claims by 3d-party based on defrauded ponzi scheme fail
International Strategies v. Greenberg Traurig, 06-1790. This case involves a lot of people and firms that I really don’t want to smear. Not because I don’t like smearing, but because I think that most of the defendants here were trying to represent their clients in a good way, but their clients did a lot of bad things. If any of the people involve want to chime in, send me an email and I will prominently post your version of events or the law, or correct anything I got wrong (based on the published opinion.)

The underlying transactions are quite complex. But they ended in their ex-client suing their lawyers. ISG “invested” money with Corporation of the BankHouse ("COB"), who seemed to promise the impossible, and, of course, was a ponzi scheme. COB claimed that it was the victim of another scheme, and its CEO declared that "I have chosen to move to prepare litigation against the parties utilizing the law firm of Greenberg & Traurig [sic]. I have utilized the law firm of Seamin Cherin & Melott [sic] for the criminal assistance against the parties." Specifically, A. John Pappalardo began representing COB, and somehow COB convinced ISG to not independently sue the people that “defrauded” COB, because they would take care of it. Therefore, “ ISG alleges that these representations, and other events that we detail below, led it to believe that Pappalardo was ISG’s legal representative and that an attorney-client relationship had been formed.”

Pappalardo kept telling everyone that he would recover the funds, but he never sued anyone. Eventually, “ISG finally retained outside counsel on November 7, 2001. Through counsel, ISG filed suit against COB and Pomeroy in March 2002. ISG obtained a $10 million judgment in that suit, but the award has proven uncollectible.” Then, ISG sued everyone.

The Story

"Four years of lawsuits and federal investigations had worn down the leaders of Jenkens & Gilchrist. Many of their biggest earners were leaving the law firm and taking their prized clients with them. And it had become hard to attract talent, with no end in sight for the firm’s problems.

Also Online
04/01/07: IRS cuts, growing wealth gave rise to questionable tax shelters

04/01/07: Jenkens’ collapse not an unusual case

03/30/07: Jenkens & Gilchrist closing after admitting role in tax fraud

03/23/07: Jenkens loses most of its Chicago staff

02/28/07: Jenkens & Gilchrist shrinking in wake of tax scandal

Graphic: Rise and fall (.pdf)
It was time to execute the last-ditch plan: dissolve the firm. Jenkens & Gilchrist couldn’t be saved. So the firm’s leaders had to try and save the people. "There is a timeline beyond which even the most loyal people say no," said former chairman Tom Cantrill. "It had just taken so long."

Founded 56 years ago and once the largest law firm in Dallas, Jenkens is closing its doors for good this weekend. What drove it to extinction was a combination of issues, including misjudgments tied to rapid growth and an aggressive drive to bring in business.

But above all, a risky tax shelter practice out of its Chicago office brought about the firm’s end. The tax scheme, which Jenkens long defended but wound up admitting was fraudulent, left a cloud that would not disperse, according to interviews with nearly three dozen people inside and outside the firm.