Here is a write-in-your-complaint web site.  It’s one variety of calls a legal malpractice attorney gets.  What would be your advice?  The client’s potential complaint:

"I consulted a lawyer in 1998 about defective product that was installed in my home. The charge was $3000 and I wanted it fixed. The lawyer said I could fight it in court but it would cost me the $3000 to fight it or have a letter sent to the installer asking for it to be fixed or we would sue hoping he would make it right. He sent the letter and we waited.

The installer ended up suing us and the lawer agreed to fight it for $3000. In arbitration we were offered $1000 off of the bill but the lawer said that he could get us the full amount in court. He said our charges up to that point was $2500 (which we paid) and that he would take it to court for the additional $500 since most of the preperation was complete so the most we would be out was an addition $1500 if we lost. It turns out he was wrong. Not only did he lose the case, but we were sued for additional legal fees due to having rejected the arbitration. We had to pay the opposing lawyer $3000 on top of the bill plus interest.

For two years we heard nothing more from our attorney and we assumed he ate the additional $500 since his advice had cost us so much. 2 years later he sent us a bill for almost $7000. We sent him a letter asking what happened to our agreement that he would handle the rest of the case for $500 and we heard nothing more from him for 4 more years and now he is suing us for $7500. "

"William F.McMurry, a trial specialist in medical and legal malpractice says, "The
primary purpose of the suit is to hold the Vatican accountable and this
ruling gives us the opportunity to get a hold of church documents and take
depositions of church officials."

William F. McMurry is the only Kentucky lawyer certified as a medical
malpractice and legal malpractice trial specialist by the American Board of
Professional Liability Attorneys (ABPLA). The National Board of Trial
Advocacy (NBTA) also certifies McMurry as a civil trial specialist. "

McMurry reports that he "successfully represented over 243 plaintiffs that settled a
suit for $25.3 million against the Archdiocese of Louisville in 2003. He is
currently seeking class action status in the suit against the Vatican. "

"Foley & Lardner Sued Over Missed Biotech Patent Filing
Zusha Elinson
The Recorder
January 17, 2007

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Apparently, there’s no vaccine for legal malpractice suits against IP lawyers.

A fledgling San Diego biotech company is suing Foley & Lardner for allegedly missing the filing date on an international patent application.

Vaxiion Therapeutics Inc., which develops new ways to deliver vaccines using genetically engineered mini-cells, claims attorneys in Foley’s San Diego office missed the deadline by four days, allowing a competitor to cash in on the same intellectual property, according to a complaint filed in San Diego County Superior Court late last month.

The kicker is that Foley allegedly represented the competitor, EnGene Inc., at the same time without notifying Vaxiion, causing a conflict, according to the suit.

"We believe the allegations being made in this action are meritless, and we are in the process of preparing our defense," said Foley partner James Clark in an e-mail. "Beyond that, it is our policy not to comment outside of the court proceeding with regard to the details of matters involving former clients."

Vaxiion and its lawyer, Vincent Bartolotta Jr. of San Diego’s Thorsnes Bartolotta McGuire, are seeking damages but have not disclosed the amount.

"We want to be put back in the position we were in before this happened," Bartolotta said, adding that there’s a lot of money at stake. "The potential harm is 100 million or more," he said.

The suit comes on the heels of a California Supreme Court decision last year to let stand a lower court ruling on a malpractice award of about $30 million against Boston-based Fish & Richardson over similar allegations. In that case, Kairos Scientific Inc., a San Diego chemical digital imaging company, won the judgment after Fish’s Redwood City, Calif., office failed to file a patent in a timely fashion.

Claims like these are a sign of the ever-increasing value businesses place on intellectual property, IP lawyers say.

"The reason why they’re increasing is because patents are so much more valuable, not because more deadlines are being missed," said Raymond Sweigart, an IP litigator at Pillsbury Winthrop Shaw Pittman.

And it’s not just IP lawyers that are taking note of the trend — insurers are as well.

"The malpractice insurance has gone up significantly for IP attorneys in the last 10 years and, certainly, in the last five," said JoAnna Esty, who heads Los Angeles-based Liner Yankelevitz Sunshine & Regenstreif’s IP department. "There’s a recognition among businesses that if they lose a property right, there is an inquiry into the reasons for the loss and, where appropriate, an attribution of fault and an expectation of redress."

A past chairwoman of the intellectual property law section of the State Bar of California, Esty said premiums for IP lawyers, which used to be lower, are now at the same level as other lawyers. Richard Peterson, a solo patent lawyer in San Francisco and also Esty’s husband, used to pay just $2,000 a year five years ago — now he pays $10,000 a year without any claims having been made against him, she said.

Most firms take special precautions to avoid missing patent application dates because the stakes are so high.

"You have to have a double docket system," said Paul Davis, who heads Heller Ehrman’s patent and trademark group. "We also have a top docket person, and we pay them a lot of money."

The case is Vaxiion Therapeutics Inc. v. Foley & Lardner LLP, 877641. "

That title implies the progression of the attorney into debtorhood. However, the story is different here. The case. 

Bell v. Hubbert, 05 Civ. 10456
Decided: December 22, 2006

"In or around November 1992, Bell retained the Defendants’ law firm, known as Lester, Hubbert & Gill, P.C. ("LH&G"), to prosecute a cause of action in New York Supreme Court. Defendants’ then – law partner, LeRoi Gill ("Gill"), neglected to respond to a summary judgment motion in that matter, and judgment was subsequently entered against Bell on default. Gill failed to advise Bell of the default, instead representing on several occasions between October 1993 and July 1994 that the summary judgment motion was still pending. Bell discovered these misrepresentations in July 1994, and discharged LH&G shortly thereafter.

Following Gill’s suspension from the practice of law for three years on October 3, 1996, the Defendants continued to practice under the name of Lester & Hubbert, P.C. ("L&H").

On March 26, 1998, Bell filed an action in New York Supreme Court against Gill, alleging breach of contract, breach of fiduciary duty, fraud and malpractice. On May 24, 2000, Bell was awarded a default judgment in the amount of $138,533.67 against Gill and L&H. No judgment was entered against Hubbert or Lester personally.

Bell discovered in or about July 2000 that neither LH&G nor L&H was incorporated as a professional corporation.

Bell filed an action in New York Supreme Court on July 14, 2000, alleging malpractice and fraud by Hubbert and Lester. Upon the default of Hubbert and Lester, a judgment in the amount of $142,037.23 was filed on October 2, 2001.

Lester filed for bankruptcy on December 12, 2001. By order dated July 9, 2003, the Honorable Novalyn L. Winfield of the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of New Jersey held that the judgment of $142,037.23 was non-dischargeable debt pursuant to 11 U.S.C. §523(a)(2). On or about July 23, 2003, Lester moved to voluntarily dismiss his bankruptcy petition.

By order to show cause filed in the New York Supreme Court, Lester succeeded in having the $142,037.23 judgment opened. The underlying action against Hubbert and Lester, originally filed on July 14, 2000, was dismissed as time-barred by opinion of the Honorable Richard F. Braun of the New York Supreme Court. Bell v. Hubbert, No. 115509/00 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Nov. 3, 2004).

Although this Court generally permits amendment of a fee-paid action to cure any defects before dismissing the case, Hughes v. Albany, 76 F.3d 53 (2d Cir. 1996), there is no need to do so here as Bell presents no arguably meritorious issue. See Mallard v. United States Dist. Court, 490 U.S. 296, 307-08 (1989) ("Section 1915 . . . authorizes courts to dismiss a ‘frivolous or malicious’ action, but there is little doubt they would have power to do so even in the absence of this statutory provision."); cf. Pillay v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 45 F.3d 14, 17 (2d Cir. 1995) (per curiam) (discussing appellate court’s inherent authority to dismiss meritless and/or frivolous fee-paid cases). Repleading would also be inappropriate here in light of Bell’s "history of abusing the process of this and other courts by repeatedly filing actions based on the same allegations." Malley v. N.Y.C. Bd. of Educ., No. 94 Civ. 7186 (JFK), 1997 WL 570501 (Sept. 15, 1997) (enjoining plaintiff from filing further complaints in any federal court based on given allegations without prior permission). In addition to filing several state court complaints alleging fraud and malpractice on the part of Defendants, Bell has been a frequent litigant in this District. In the last three years, he has filed at least eleven complaints, many involving similar facts and allegations. See Bell v. Schaeffer Buick BMW, Inc., No. 03 Civ. 10315 (PKC) (FM) (S.D.N.Y. filed Dec. 31, 2003); Bell v. Classic Chevrolet/Buick and BMW, Inc., No. 04 Civ. 0693 (PKC) (S.D.N.Y. filed Jan. 29, 2004); Bell v. Zavell, No. 04 Civ. 9733 (RWS) (S.D.N.Y. filed Dec. 10, 2004); Bell v. Gordon, No. 05 Civ. 2163 (NRB) (S.D.N.Y. filed Feb. 4, 2005); Bell v. Stephens, No. 05 Civ. 7182 (LTS) (RLE) (S.D.N.Y. filed Aug. 12, 2005); Bell v. Hubbert, No. 05 Civ. 10456 (RWS) (S.D.N.Y. filed Dec. 13, 2005); Bell v. Gotham Process Service, Inc., No. 06 Civ. 0470 (JGK) (S.D.N.Y. filed Jan. 23, 2006); Bell v. South Bay European Corp., No. 06 Civ. 0472 (PKC) (GWG) (S.D.N.Y. filed Jan. 23, 2006); Bell v. Manhattan Motorcars, Inc., No. 06 Civ. 4972 (GBD) (S.D.N.Y. filed June 28, 2006); Bell v. Carlsen Motor Cars, Inc., No. 06 Civ. 4974 (LBS) (DFE) (S.D.N.Y. filed June 28, 2006); Bell v. Brace Engineering and Investment Corp., No. 06 Civ. 5742 (KMK) (S.D.N.Y. filed July 28, 2006).

For the reasons stated above, Lester’s motion is granted and the Complaint is dismissed with prejudice as to both Defendants.

It is so ordered. "

Easily the winner in the most tangential legal malpracticeblog blurb, here is the story of a hollywood screenwriter, "The Hitcher", and legal malpractice. 

"The Weekly’s Paul Cullum described the accident as follows:

According to witness statements, [Red’s] Jeep struck his car a second time, gradually picking up speed, until it jackknifed the Honda into oncoming traffic … and suddenly it was going an estimated 35-40 miles per hour the wrong way across Wilshire, witnesses told police. It jumped the curb and obliterated a bus stop, scooping up 26-year-old Santa Monica City College English student David Roos, who was running for the safety of Q’s Billiards, located at 11835 Wilshire, immediately behind him. Taking out an outdoor patio of tables and scattering bodies…

Red, who also wrote the scripts for Near Dark and Blue Steel, then emerged from the car: "Still holding his car keys in his left hand, and bleeding from a small cut on his right eyebrow, Red walked a ways from the vehicle, just in time for Cassady Jeremias, one of Kenny Hughes’s friends in the car ahead of him, to see him pick up a sharp stick and begin ramming it into his chest. Interviewed recently, she remembers thinking, ‘Well, who’s this joker—he’s not going to kill himself with a stick jabbing himself in the chest?’ Undaunted, Red picked up a broken glass off the floor, approximately two inches thick, and slashed once at his neck, cutting it deeply."

Yow! After receiving medical attention, Red was sent to UCLA psychiatric ward and claimed he had a medical condition that caused fainting spells. He spent the next several years in and out of court dealing with civil suits and bankruptcy hearings but not, as he continued to request, a jury trial where he could explain the accident was a byproduct of his fainting. According to Cullum, Red wanted to appeal his way to the U.S. Supreme Court. Meanwhile, the families of his victims tried—and failed—to reopen the criminal case against him and Red sued his own attorneys for legal-malpractice.

But that’s all in the past, right? Red’s got two scripts in various stages of production (one directed by Speed director Jan de Bont). Roger Moore the Orlando Sentinel’s movie blogger, recently called Red "not an utter hack" and says he’s "actually looking forward" to the new Hitcher. Ain’t It Cool News’s Harry Knowles watched the trailer and squealed, "they’re definitely blowing shit up real good and given the laxed attitudes about gross stuff that the MPAA currently has, I’m betting the truck ripping scene will be real good."

The end of the relationship can come from any number of reasons, but the end is reached either before or at the end of the underlying litigation.

<strong>Termination by client</strong>

It is the general rule in the United States, and the rule in New York that an attorney’s representation of a client may be terminated at any time by the client, either for good cause or for no cause.

Analysis of a client’s termination of the attorney’s retention [hereinafter "termination"] starts with determination of whether the termination was for good cause or for no cause.

While the difference between "for cause, good cause, or cause" for termination and "no cause" has been endlessly debated, a "for cause" termination may be based upon misconduct which manifestly does not rise to the level of attorney malpractice.

<strong>Where the discharge is for
cause,the attorney has no
right to compensation</strong>

Where the discharge is for cause, the attorney has no right to compensation. This rule exists regardless of the terms of a retainer or other agreement between the attorney and the client. Traditional contract principles are not always applied to govern disputes between attorneys and clients.

Where the discharge is for cause, the attorney has no right to compensation or a retaining lien, regardless of pleading or stated defenses. "This rule is well calculated to promote public confidence in the members of an honorable profession whose relation to their clients is personal and confidential." "An attorney discharged for cause has no right to a fee or a retaining lien."

<strong>Where the discharge is without
cause, the attorney is limited
to recovering in quantum meruit</strong>

"When an attorney is discharged without cause, the attorney is entitled to recover compensation from the client measured by the fair and reasonable value of the services rendered whether that be more or less than the amount provided in the contract or retainer agreement." This rule, set forth by the Court of Appeals exists as a matter of law, whether pled or not, and whether set forth as an affirmative defense or not.

Where the discharge is without cause, the attorney is limited to recovering in quantum meruit the reasonable value of the services rendered. The courts clearly "possess the traditional authority to "supervise the charging of fees for legal services," pursuant to their "inherent and statutory power to regulate the practice of law."

<em>Quantum meruit</em> means "as much as he deserved, and is premised upon the finding of an implied promise to pay as much as he reasonable deserved." If it is determined that the termination was without cause, recovery should be determined to be an amount which "they reasonably deserved."

The Court of Appeals has found that where the discharge is without cause, as a matter of law, the attorney is limited to recovering the reasonable value of the services rendered, in quantum meruit.

"<strong>Cause" is not the
equivalent of "malpractice"</strong>

Good cause for termination is not the same as malpractice. Attorney malpractice, defined as a deviation from good and accepted practice, which proximately damaged the party, in which, but for the negligence of the attorney there would have been a different or better result is not the same as good cause for termination.

<strong>"Termination for cause"</strong> has arisen in many situations in which malpractice was not even discussed, much less claimed. For example, substantial delays in prosecuting the case or failing to bring the action until 2 days before the statute of limitations is sufficient; failure timely to obtain medical records is similarly sufficient .

Failure to retain an expert is similarly sufficient . "Employment [which] contravenes specific legal requirements is sufficient, as is abandonment of a case, ; or a conflict of interest; a refusal personally to try a case ; or a failure to disclose a settlement offer are all these examples misconduct which resulted in termination for cause, with no fee to the attorney. They do not amount to malpractice, however.

Termination for cause threshold lies well below any question of malpractice. As an example, Dagny Management Corp.,supra, is instructive. Friction between the client and the attorney grew over the management of the settlement funds, in which the attorneys frustrated, but did not destroy, the settlement. The Appellate Division determined that the "firm’s interference with the client’s right to settle constitutes misconduct sufficient to rise to a level warranting discharge for cause and forfeiture of its fee", citing De Luccia v. Village of Monroe, 180 AD2d 897 [3d Dept, 1992]

The difference flows logically from the question of damages is that in malpractice there is a positive claim for damages, over and above fee considerations from attorneys; in the question of termination for cause, there can be but a reduction of the fees paid, but no positive claim for damages. The heightened burden for malpractice logically accompanies the heightened possibility of damages.

Some people defend legal malpractice, and some move to a new meta-level.  Here is the story of a law firm which apparently failed to advise their client to file a WC claim within a year.  When they are sued, do the simply call the carrier and defend?  No,  They get the legislature to pass a special bill which allows the widow to file a late WC claim.  This special litigation ability to file a claim exonerates the law firm.  Amazing!  The article

Unincorporated LLCs and privity in Legal Malpractice.  Its an arcane area of law.  Here is an interesting analysis of a new case.

"New York Suit By LLC Minority Members Against Attorneys Representing Majority Members
Under New York law, a plaintiff may not allege attorney malpractice absent a showing of actual or near privity between the plaintiff and the attorney, with the exception that no showing of privity is required in claims for fraud, collusion, malicious acts, or other special circumstances. In Aranki v. Goldman & Assocs., LLP, 825 N.Y.S.2d 97, 98-99 (N.Y.A.D. 2 Dept. 2006), the minority members of an LLC sued a law firm for legal malpractice, breach of fiduciary duty, fraud, and breach of contract, contending that the law firm knowingly induced or assisted the LLC members who combined held a majority membership interest to breach their fiduciary duties to plaintiffs. A trial court dismissed plaintiffs’ claims for breach of fiduciary and legal malpractice.

On appeal, a New York appellate court reversed the dismissal, finding that, with respect to the legal malpractice claim, although the complaint did not plead specific facts indicating “the existence of an attorney-client relationship, privity, or a relationship that otherwise closely resembles privity” between the plaintiffs-minority members of the LLC and the defendant law firm, the complaint sufficiently alleged facts that, if proven, “would show that the defendants colluded with the majority members of [the LLC], inter alia, to freeze the plaintiffs out of [the LLC’s] management and profit sharing and force them to surrender, at a reduced price, their minority membership interest in [the LLC].” The court further found that although the complaint did not plead facts sufficient to show that defendants breached any fiduciary duty owed to plaintiffs, it did sufficiently allege that the law firm defendants aided and abetted a breach of fiduciary duty by the LLC’s majority members.