Solo NY attorney represented California client in Oregon courts is permitted to sue for legal fees here in NY.

Fischbarg v Doucet ,2007 NY Slip Op 01964 ,Decided on March 13, 2007 ,Appellate Division, First Department .

"With the evolution of technology, it is clear that physical presence alone should not determine whether one has purposely availed itself of a state’s rights and benefits for jurisdictional purposes. One court has recognized this fact, stating "lawyers and other professionals today transact business with their pens, their fax machines and their conference calls not with their feet" (see Bank Brussels Lambert v Fiddler Gonzalez & Rodriguez, 171 F3d 779, 787 [2d Cir 1999]). Indeed, the notion that a party need not have a physical presence in New York to be subject to CPLR 302(a)(1) jurisdiction is long recognized. In 1970, our Court of Appeals held that "one need not be physically present to be subject to the jurisdiction of our courts under CPLR 302 for, particularly in this day of instant long-range communications, one can engage in extensive purposeful activity here without actually setting foot in the State" (Parke-Bernet Galleries, Inc. v Franklyn, 26 NY2d 13, 17 [1970]). Thus, it is not determinative that defendants were not physically present in New York (see Pilates, Inc. v Pilates Inst., Inc., 891 F Supp 175, 179 [SD NY 1995] ["defendant need not actually enter New York to be viewed as transacting business in the state [under CPLR 302[a][1]"]). "

Nor does the fact that the litigation took place in Oregon, not New York, preclude plaintiff from suing his clients in New York for his fees (cf. Colucci & Umans v 1 Mark, Inc., 224 AD2d 243 [1996] [CPLR 302(a)(1) jurisdiction based upon out of state defendant’s retention of New York lawyer to handle litigation in New York court]; Otterbourg, Steindler, Houston & Rosen v Shreve City Apts., 147 AD2d 327 [1989] [same]; Elman v Belson, 32 AD2d 422 [1969] [same]); see generally Liberatore v Calvino, 293 AD2d 217 [2002] [Rhode Island attorney subject to New York’s long arm statute based upon his actions preceding the filing of an untimely complaint in a New York court]).